t patently unreasonable for trial counsel, rather than risk losing credibility, to make the strategic decision not to seek a voluntary manslaughter charge" and instead to pursue an all-or-nothing justification defense, where the evidence of voluntary manslaughter was weak and contradicted the defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense); Morrison v. State , 300 Ga. 426, 428, 796 S.E.2d 293 (2017) (holding that counsel's decision not to pursue a theory of self-defense as an alternative to the main defense theory of accident was not deficient performance where the accident theory was more strongly supported by the evidence); Savior v. State , 284 Ga. 488, 493, 668 S.E.2d 695 (2008) (holding that counsel acted reasonably in not requesting charges on voluntary manslaughter, self-defense, and accident, because those theories were contrary to the defense strategy, based on the defendant's assertions, that he did not have a gun in his hands until the fighting and shooting were finished); Conaway v. State , 277 Ga. 422, 424, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003) (holding that counsel's decision to pursue solely an accident defense and not request a coercion instruction was reasonable strategy). See also Wells v. State , 295 Ga. 161, 165-166, 758 S.E.2d 598 (2014) (citing several Eleventh Circuit cases making the same point).

Gregoire also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to questions about whether witnesses believed the children or not. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424(2), 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). “[T]he question of ineffectiveness, including both the performance and prejudice prongs, is a mixed question of law and fact ... subject to independent review by the appellate court.” Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 87(4), 526 S.E.2d 347 (2000).

Gregoire also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to questions about whether witnesses believed the children or not. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108) (2003). "[T]he question of ineffectiveness, including both the performance and prejudice prongs, is a mixed question of law and fact . . . subject to independent review by the appellate court."

Reed v. State, 248 Ga. App. 107, 108 (1) ( 545 SE2d 655) (2001). See Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108) (2003). With respect to the deficiency prong, Bass must overcome a "strong presumption that the performance of trial counsel falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."

When Appellant entered the home, Stilwell asked how he got in. As to Appellant's affirmative defense of coercion, his self-serving testimony "at most created a conflict with other evidence that showed his participation in the crimes was voluntary" (punctuation omitted) Brooks v. State , 305 Ga. 600, 605, 826 S.E.2d 45 (2019) (quoting Conaway v. State , 277 Ga. 422, 423, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003) ), and "it is not for this Court to either weigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence; those matters are left firmly within the province of the jury." Lowery v. State , 310 Ga. 360, 362 (1) (a), 851 S.E.2d 538 (2020).

See also Vega v. State , 285 Ga. 32, 33 (1), 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009) ("It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence." (citation and punctuation omitted)); Conaway v. State , 277 Ga. 422, 423, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003) (concluding that the evidence supporting the appellant's convictions was legally sufficient, notwithstanding his testimony that he was coerced to commit the crimes, which "at most created a conflict with other evidence that showed his participation in the crimes was voluntary"). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime); Butts v. State , 297 Ga. 766, 770 (2), 778 S.E.2d 205 (2015) (explaining that under OCGA § 16-2-20, a jury may infer a common criminal intent from the defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes); Cargill v. State , 256 Ga. 252, 253 (1), 347 S.E.2d 559 (1986) (explaining that the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant was a party to the crime and that it thus did not matter whether the defendant or his accomplice inflicted the fatal injury because "the act of one was the act of the other in the commission of the armed robbery and the ensuing death which resulted therefrom") (citat

"[A]s counsel articulated a valid strategic decision regarding [this] instruction, failure to request [this] charge is not ineffective assistance." Conaway v. State , 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2), 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). (f) Finally, the cumulative prejudice from any assumed deficiencies discussed in Divisions 3 (b), (c), and (d) is insufficient to show a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of the alleged deficiencies.

"As counsel articulated a valid strategic decision regarding a [mere presence] instruction, failure to request that charge is not ineffective assistance." Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (589 SE2d 108) (2003). Alternatively, the trial court also correctly concluded that Cochran had failed to demonstrate prejudice.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33, 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009) (" ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ " (citation omitted)); Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 423, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003) (concluding that the evidence supporting the appellant’s convictions was legally sufficient, notwithstanding his testimony that he was coerced to commit the crimes, which "at most created a conflict with other evidence that showed his participation in the crimes was voluntary"). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime); Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 770, 778 S.E.2d 205 (2015) (explaining that under § 16-2-20, a jury may infer a common criminal intent from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes).

But, as counsel testified during the hearing on the motion for new trial, not only was there no evidence to support an instruction on accident, but the theory of defense that counsel presented to the jury was that Hendricks did not discharge a firearm at all, and this argument would be inconsistent with an accident defense. “Counsel's decision as to which requests to charge to pursue in light of the defense theory is a strategic one.” Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424(2), 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). (b) Hendricks asserts that it was error for trial counsel not to call expert witnesses, but does not show what favorable evidence would have been elicited from such witnesses, or even suggest in what areas such witnesses should have expertise.