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Compton v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jun 24, 2008
No. 05-07-01165-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 24, 2008)

Opinion

No. 05-07-01165-CR

Opinion issued June 24, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.

On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F06-01164-JW.

Before Justices MORRIS, WHITTINGTON, and O'NEILL.


OPINION


A jury convicted Maria Michelle Compton of murder. The jury found appellant acted with sudden passion and assessed punishment, enhanced by a prior felony conviction, at twenty-five years' imprisonment. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction and the jury's rejection of her self-defense claims. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

On September 19, 2005, appellant fatally stabbed her husband Richard Compton with a knife. An autopsy revealed Compton sustained stab wounds to his left arm, chest, back, and both hands. The stab wound to his left arm went through the entire arm and re-entered his left chest, piercing the left lung and left side of the heart. Dr. Jeffrey Barnard, the medical examiner, testified this wound would be a "rapidly fatal injury," while the wounds to Compton's hands were defensive-type wounds. A toxicology screening showed methamphetamine in Compton's blood sample. Gerald Edwards testified he had known Compton for thirty years and appellant for nine years. He also knew Compton had been separated from appellant for about two years before his death. Edwards shared an efficiency apartment with Compton. Sometime in September 2005, Compton picked up appellant from the bus station and brought her to the apartment to stay a few days. In the evening on September 18, 2005, Edwards, Compton, and appellant drank beer and visited while inside the apartment. Edwards did not see anyone use drugs. Compton told appellant he had been seeing someone else while they were separated and would probably see the woman again. Appellant's mood immediately changed. Compton asked Edwards to leave the apartment so he and appellant could have some privacy. Edwards left the apartment around midnight. He sat outside on the steps for a while, went to a nearby store, then returned and sat on a lawn chair outside the next door neighbor's apartment. The neighbor invited Edwards inside his apartment, and Edwards and the neighbor smoked methamphetamine and watched television. At about 5:00 a.m., Edwards heard someone beating on the neighbor's door and yelling, "[C]all 911, call 911." Edwards opened the door and saw Compton sit down on the sidewalk. Compton had a "big hole" in his chest. Edwards tried to stop Compton's bleeding chest with a T-shirt or a towel. When Edwards noticed that Compton's apartment door was open, he ran inside. Appellant was standing there alone, covered in blood. Edwards asked appellant what happened. Appellant said, "[I] didn't mean to do it, I didn't mean to do it. I stabbed him." Edwards ran back outside and tried to help Compton. Appellant followed Edwards outside. She used Compton's cell phone and called 911, telling the operator to send an ambulance because she "stabbed her husband." Appellant sat on the ground and screamed, "[W]hat have I done, what have I done." When Edwards told appellant she "killed him," appellant asked Edwards to kill her. Brenda Neese, a 911 operator, testified she received a call from appellant at 5:15 a.m. on September 19, 2005. Appellant was hysterical, screaming, and crying. Appellant said she had just stabbed her husband, he was dying because she stabbed him, and said "please kill me." An audiotape of the 911 call was played to the jury. Officer Lamark Carstarphen testified he saw appellant screaming and crying while a man lay on the ground bleeding. Appellant was wearing a T-shirt and underwear, and was covered in blood from head to toe. Carstarphen testified there was blood all over the apartment and a blood trail from the apartment to the sidewalk outside a neighbor's apartment door. Officer Michael McBride testified that when he handcuffed appellant, she made "lots of statements." McBride transported appellant to the police station. A video CD from the patrol car's camera and while appellant was at the police station was played to the jury. Officer Curtis Chism testified he saw blood all over the one-room efficiency apartment where appellant had stabbed Compton, and retrieved a knife that was on the floor near a brown chair. The blade was about five inches long and had blood on it. There was nothing broken or knocked over inside the apartment, and nothing indicating there had been a struggle. Chism also found Compton's wallet and a pocket knife in a pair of shorts on the floor, and several other pocket knifes in the apartment. Chism photographed the apartment, and took photographs of appellant at the jail. Chism testified he did not see any injuries on appellant, nor did appellant say she had received any injury. Chism did see a few "faded bruises" on appellant's arms and left leg, but no fresh injury. Officer Kirk Lecroy testified he photographed appellant at the scene. Appellant had a "lot of blood" on her clothing and her body. Lecroy downloaded the photos to a computer at the police station, but was unable to retrieve them due to a malfunction. Linda Endara, appellant's mother, testified that during appellant's three-year marriage to Compton, Endara saw bruises on appellant's body on a regular basis. She knew appellant and Compton were "having problems," and argued a lot. Although she saw appellant every week and saw bruises each time, she did not call the police or report the abuse to appellant's probation officer because appellant did not want to involve the police. Appellant was using drugs before she met Compton and was in a drug rehabilitation program as a juvenile. Endara testified she was afraid of Compton because he was violent, but she never personally saw Compton hit appellant. Juan Endara, appellant's brother, testified appellant and Compton argued constantly and Compton used to "beat her up a lot." Juan testified he saw bruises on appellant's body when he visited her. Juan never saw Compton hit appellant, and knew appellant and Compton hit each other often. Juan testified he had a felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Lisa Rowley testified she worked with appellant at one time and allowed appellant to live with her for about two months in 2004. During that time, Rowley always saw bruises on appellant's body whenever appellant returned from seeing Compton. Rowley saw the bruises about "four or five times," but she never saw Compton be violent towards appellant. Appellant admitted she stabbed Compton, but testified she did so in self-defense. Appellant testified she and Compton married in November 2002. Their relationship was good in the beginning, then things changed. She and Compton used cocaine and methamphetamine together and "drank a lot" every day. Appellant began getting "real crazy and hearing things." During this time, appellant's three children were taken away from her and eventually given to her mother. She and Compton began fighting "a lot." Compton would hit her and she would hit him back. Appellant testified Compton "put up with a lot of my crazy" before he ever hit her. Appellant testified she was afraid of Compton. Appellant and Compton separated in 2004, but still stayed in contact and saw each other from time to time. In 2005, both she and Compton were in jail. Appellant had been convicted of burglary of a habitation and went to prison. Appellant testified that when she got out of prison, she went back to Compton even though she was afraid of him. Appellant picked her up from the bus station and took her to his apartment. Edwards was also at the apartment. The next day, appellant, Compton, and Edwards were drinking and "getting high" on drugs. Appellant and Compton argued about the fact that he had been with someone else while he and appellant were apart. Compton was sitting on a chair next to the bed "twisting" a knife on the ground. Appellant was sitting on the bed next to the chair. Compton made threatening statements to appellant while he twirled the knife. Appellant felt "really scared" and believed her life was in danger and that Compton was going to kill her. Compton slapped appellant, and she kicked him. When Compton fell back onto the chair, the knife fell down. Appellant "got" the knife and stabbed Compton. On cross-examination, appellant testified she joined a gang when she was fourteen and had been adjudicated for a juvenile assault. At age seventeen, she committed the burglary of a habitation and received deferred probation. She was eventualy adjudicated and sentenced to two years in prison in July 2004. During the time she was on probation, she reported monthly to her probation officer. Appellant did not recall if she ever reported any kind of abuse by Compton to her probation officer. Appellant did not report any instances of abuse by Compton to anyone. Appellant testified she did not recall if Compton dropped the knife on the floor or on the bed, and did not recall how she got the knife in her hand or how blood got on the floor by the closet in the corner of the room. Appellant also did not recall how she stabbed Compton, how a bloody handprint got on the floor, stabbing him six times, whether she cried out for help, or making any statements to the 911 operator or the police. Appellant testified there was nothing out of place in the apartment that would indicate a struggle between her and Compton, and acknowledged the front door was approximately three feet from where she was sitting on the bed. Appellant testified she did not try to get out of the room or retreat after Compton slapped her. On rebuttal, Richard Lee Compton, Compton's father, testified Compton was not a violent person and never acted aggressively towards anyone. He saw Compton once a week and sometimes saw appellant with Compton. He never saw any bruises on appellant, but he sometimes saw bruises on Compton. Richard testified that if Compton had been hitting appellant, Richard would have confronted Compton about it. Richard also said he was concerned for Compton's safety, and at one point told Compton not to bring appellant to Richard's house. Jeff Larson, a probation officer, testified he supervised appellant from August 1999 to May 2004. If a probationer comes to the office with visible bruises and marks, Larson notes that in his records. Larson testified the only time he noted bruising on appellant was in May 2004. Appellant told him she had been arrested a week earlier for public intoxication and had been in "a little bit of a tussle" with the police. Larson noted appellant had bruise marks on the "undersides of her arms." There was no other time Larson recalled seeing bruises on appellant's body.

Applicable Law

In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). A review of the evidence for legal sufficiency does not involve a re-weighing of the evidence or a substitution of the jury's judgment. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 282 (2007); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 87 (2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, No. 0182-07, 2008 WL 2081638, at *5 (Tex.Crim.App. May 14, 2008). The State is not required to affirmatively produce evidence to refute a defendant's self-defense claims; it must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Self-defense is an issue of fact to be determined by the fact finder. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. A guilty verdict is an implicit finding rejecting a defendant's self-defense theory. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. To obtain a conviction for murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Compton by stabbing him with a knife, a deadly weapon, or intended to cause serious bodily injury to Compton and committed an act learly dangerous to human life and thereby caused the death of Compton. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02 (Vernon 2003). A "deadly weapon" was defined as anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17) (Vernon Supp. 2007). The jury was instructed that a person is justified in using deadly force against another if she reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to protect herself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, and a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not have retreated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(a).

Discussion

Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction and the jury's rejection of her self-defense claims because: (1) appellant had signs of abuse and had an abusive marrage with Compton; (2) Compton had a knife in his hand while making threatening remarks; (3) Compton used drugs that evening and his aggressive conduct towards appellant included slapping her; and (4) a reasonable person in appellant's situation would not have retreated because she reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to protect herself against Compton's attempted use of unlawful deadly force. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction and rejection of his self-defense claims. The evidence presented was appellant and Compton had been using drugs the evening before his murder. Appellant admitted she stabbed Compton, but testified she only did so after he made threatening remarks while "twisting" a knife on the floor. Appellant testified she believed Compton was going to kill her, but she did not remember how she got the knife, how she stabbed Compton, or what occurred after the police arrived. Appellant claimed Compton slapped her right before she stabbed him, and that Compton had a history of physically abusing her and leaving bruises on her body. Appellant's mother, brother, and friend also testified they saw evidence of physical abuse of appellant by Compton on several occasions, but each of them admitted they never saw Compton hit appellant. Edwards, who shared the efficiency apartment with Compton, testified appellant admitted to him that she had stabbed Compton, but did not say he had slapped her. Nor did appellant tell anyone that appellant had slapped her. The 911 tape and police video show appellant repeatedly admitting she stabbed Compton, but she never mentioned Compton had hit her or abused her in any way. Appellant's probation officer never saw any physical signs of abuse to appellant except for the occasion where appellant "tussled" with police officers while being arrested for public intoxication. Compton's father testified he never saw bruises on appellant's body, but he sometimes saw bruising on Compton's body. It was the jury's function to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence. See Lancon, 2008 WL 2081638, at *5. We must afford due deference to a jury's determination. See Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625. The jury was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Viewing the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction and the rejection of appellant's self-defense claims. See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. We resolve appellant's issues against her. We affirm the trial court's judgment.


Summaries of

Compton v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jun 24, 2008
No. 05-07-01165-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 24, 2008)
Case details for

Compton v. State

Case Details

Full title:MARIA MICHELLE COMPTON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jun 24, 2008

Citations

No. 05-07-01165-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 24, 2008)

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