Contrariwise, objects that are generally not considered dangerous as such may become so by virtue of the manner in which they are used in the offense. Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 620 (automobiles, telephone cords, bathwater, feather pillows, golf clubs, shanks); Crutcher v. State, 969 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd) (flashlight); Sellers v. State, 961 S.W.2d 351, (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd) (fire); Davis v. State, 955 S.W.2d 340, 352 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref'd) (mixture of sedatives); Najera v. State, 955 S.W.2d 698, 701 (sexual organ and bodily fluids of man who was HIV positive); Powell v. State, 939 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (feet); Morales v. State, 792 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.) (hands and underpants); Cooper v. State, 773 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.) (hands); Compton v. State, 759 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.) (broken bottle). These cases simply echo the plain language of Penal Code § 1.07: if an actor uses or intends to use an object in a manner in which it is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, it is a deadly weapon.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2014). Importantly, "[c]ourts have found that, when wielded by a person as a club, a bottle is clearly a deadly weapon." Compton v. State, 759 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.) (citations omitted) (threatening complainant when holding beer bottle by neck with bottom broken off, leaving a jagged edge, was sufficient evidence to support deadly weapon finding). Here, Jones does not dispute that he assaulted McGowan; he argues only that a jury could have rationally concluded that he stabbed at McGowan with a beer bottle instead of a knife.
Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon 2003). Although a quart sized beer bottle is not a deadly weapon per se, it can become a deadly weapon if, in the manner of its use, it is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See Bui v. State, 964 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd) (listing a Coke bottle as an object found to be a deadly weapon based on the manner of its use); Enriquez v. State, 826 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no pet.) (finding an empty sixteen ounce soft drink bottle with a styrofoam sleeve around it may be a deadly weapon when used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury); Compton v. State, 759 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.) (holding a quart sized beer bottle with the bottom broken out, leaving a jagged edge can be a deadly weapon). In this case, the State was required to show that the bottle used by Perales was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury based on the manner of its use.
Several courts have upheld findings that a bottle used in this manner is a deadly weapon. See Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Enriquez v. State, 826 S.W.2d 191, 192-93 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, no pet.); Compton v. State, 759 S.W.2d 503, 503-04 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.). The fact that the State did not call a witness to testify that the bottle was a deadly weapon is irrelevant. Cf. Hayes, 728 S.W.2d at 808 ("The complainant's own testimony reveals that he struck appellant with the Coke bottle, clearly an object capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.").
This evidence satisfies our requirement that the defendant use or threaten to use a dangerous weapon or implement. Courts of other jurisdictions have found a broken beer bottle to be a dangerous weapon. Compton v. State of Texas, 759 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988); People of the State of Illinois v. Ptak, 193 Ill. App.3d 782, 785, 550 N.E.2d 711, 713, 140 Ill. Dec. 826, 829, appeal denied, 132 Ill.2d 552, 555 N.E.2d 383, 144 Ill. Dec. 264 (1990); and Wright v. The State, 175 Ga. App. 788, 788, 334 S.E.2d 382, 382 (1985). When defendant held the broken bottleneck to Ms. Pittman's face and lip and threatened to "cut her bad," the defendant's use of the broken bottleneck constituted a dangerous weapon.
Appellant also notes that courts often look at the size, shape, or sharpness of a thing in determining its deadly character. Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (knife); Compton v. State, 759 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, no pet.) (broken bottle); Garza, 695 S.W.2d at 728 (belt buckle); Jackson v. State, 668 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref'd) (ax handle). Appellant argues that a floor cannot be a deadly weapon because its size, shape, and sharpness are irrelevant to its deadliness.