Opinion
21-931
04-07-2022
PAUL T. COMPTON, THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHERENE PAVONE, SAL PAVONE, MICHAEL KERWIN, DOUGLAS DEMARCHE, STATE OF NEW YORK ONONDAGA COUNTY FAMILY COURT, DAVID PRIMO, KIT MOORE, MICHELLE PIRRO-BAILEY, WILLIAM ROSE, MARTHA WALSH-HOOD, Defendants-Appellees.[*]
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Paul T. Compton, pro se, Baldwinsville, NY. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Barbara D. Underwood, Jeffrey W. Lang, Kevin C. Hu, for Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY (for Sal Pavone, State of New York Onondaga County Family Court, David Primo, Kit Moore, Michelle Pirro-Bailey, William Rose, Martha Walsh-Hood); Paul G. Ferrara, Daniel Rose, Costello, Cooney & Fearon, PLLC, Syracuse, NY (for Michael Kerwin and Douglas Demarche); Robert G. Wells, Law Office of Robert G. Wells, Syracuse, NY (for Sherene Pavone).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMAR1 ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OI APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDEB IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR A1N ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMAR1 ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of April, two thousand twenty-two.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Hurd, J.).
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Paul T. Compton, pro se, Baldwinsville, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
Barbara D. Underwood, Jeffrey W. Lang, Kevin C. Hu, for Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY (for Sal Pavone, State of New York Onondaga County Family Court, David Primo, Kit Moore, Michelle Pirro-Bailey, William Rose, Martha Walsh-Hood);
Paul G. Ferrara, Daniel Rose, Costello, Cooney & Fearon, PLLC, Syracuse, NY (for Michael Kerwin and Douglas Demarche);
Robert G. Wells, Law Office of Robert G. Wells, Syracuse, NY (for Sherene Pavone).
PRESENT: MICHAEL H. PARK, STEVEN J. MENASHI, MYRNA PEREZ, Circuit Judges.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Paul Compton, proceeding pro se, sued the Onondaga County Family Court ("OCFC"), six OCFC judges and officials, and three private attorneys under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and other federal statutes. He generally alleged that Defendants engaged in corruption and conspired to harm his two children. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous and denied leave to amend as futile. Compton appealed the dismissal and filed a motion to seal with this Court. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We affirm the district court's judgment because the complaint fails to state a claim. "A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
To state a civil RICO violation under 18 U.S.C § 1962(c), "a plaintiff must show that he was injured by defendants' (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., 187 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). Compton's complaint contains no factual allegations and instead relies on conclusory allegations. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 1 ("With the intent to harm the children of the Plaintiff or Plaintiff, the Defendants have abused process, violated Rights guaranteed by the UNITED STATES, and committed crimes to attempt to sustain their racketeering, or detract from their liabilities or crimes."). Although Compton's subsequent filings contain some factual allegations, they are inadequate to state a RICO violation. For instance, Compton alleged that Defendants knowingly endangered his child, which resulted in the child suffering a physical assault on August 14, 2018 and a drug overdose on February 28, 2020. Compton does not explain, however, why Defendants are responsible for his child's injuries, much less allege facts sufficient to show a pattern of racketeering activity.
Compton also alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 1589. But these are criminal statutes that lack a private cause of action. See Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[I]n our federal system crimes are always prosecuted by the Federal Government, not . . . by private complaints."). Finally, Compton asserted in his complaint that he "reserve[s] the right to also charge the Defendants with violations of any/all of the following additional UNITED STATES statutes," but does not appear to pursue them further in his complaint or subsequent submissions. Compl. ¶ 3. In any event, he failed to make relevant factual allegations in support of these claims, and most of the statutes he cited also do not contain a private right of action. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 245, 249, 1513, 1584 (criminal statutes); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that state and territorial statutes and judicial proceedings shall be given full faith and credit within any United States court); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (establishing the duties of the United States Sentencing Commission).
Compton contends that the district court erred by failing to grant him leave to amend his complaint. A pro se plaintiff should be "grant[ed] leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated," but leave to amend should be denied where it would be futile. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). As discussed above, none of Compton's seven submissions in the district court suggested that he could state a RICO violation or a claim under any of the other statutes he cited. Thus, the district court did not err by denying Compton leave to amend his complaint.
We have considered all of Compton's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we deny Compton's motion to seal and affirm the judgment of the district court.
We deny Compton's motion to seal his "appeal brief document" and his name, the name of his children, and his "credentials." Letter Clarifying Motion to Seal, Compton v. Pavone, No. 21-931 (2d Cir. 2022), ECF No. 104. The briefs and record on appeal do not contain the name of Compton's children or information about his "credentials." Id. And Compton never moved below to seal any district court documents even though they include his name and other information that appears in his appellate brief, and he has not explained why he failed to do so. Compton fails to provide reasons supporting his motion. He thus fails to overcome the "presumption of public access" for "judicial document[s]." Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
[*]The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.