Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-161.
November 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Robert D. Compton ("Compton") brings this action against HPI Acquisition Co. ("HPI"), d/b/a Charter Communications ("Charter"), alleging the following claims: that he was terminated because of his disability, in violation of the AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213; that he was denied medical leave and terminated in violation of the FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654; that he was terminated because of his age, in violation of the TENNESSEE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ("THRA"), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-101 to 4-21-1004, and the AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 to 634; and, that he was terminated in retaliation for seeking disability benefits, in violation of the THRA. [Court File No. 1]. HPI moves for summary judgment on all claims. [Court File No. 21]. Compton opposes this motion [Court File No. 25] and HPI has filed a reply brief [Court File No. 26]. For the reasons expressed below, C D's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Shah v. Racetrac Petroleum Co., 338 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2003). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). "Evidence suggesting a mere possibility" of a factual dispute is not enough to preclude summary judgment. Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; Nat'l Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907. While the Court draws all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it may grant summary judgment if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational, objective jury to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; McKinnie v. Roadway Express, Inc., 341 F.3d 554, 557 (6th Cir. 2003).
II. Facts
Robert D. Compton ("Compton") began working for Charter's predecessor companies in June 1973. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 10]. Compton became a Charter employee on October 1, 1999, when HPI acquired Compton's employer, Intermedia. [ Id., Ex. 2, Def.'s Response to Interrog. 2]. Compton was credited with his original 1973 service date. [ Id.]. In June 2002 Compton was a Technical Operations Manager, responsible for overseeing the installation and maintenance of cable services in Cleveland, Tennessee. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 23-24].
At that time, Mike Burns was the General Manager of Charter's Cleveland facility. [ Id., Ex. 4, Burns Dep. at 8]. Connie Wilson was the Office Operations Manager in Cleveland and essentially served as a local human resources officer. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 10]. Patty Tester, based in Kingsport, Tennessee, was the Human Resources Manager for the Cleveland facility. [ Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 7, 10-11]. Brenda Scott was the Director of Human Resources for the region including Tennessee and was responsible for making final termination decisions. [ Id., Ex. 6, Scott Dep. at 9-10; Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 13].
In approximately 1993 Compton began suffering from insulin-dependent diabetes. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 30-31]. To manage his condition, Compton was required to take insulin twice a day. [ Id.]. Still, Compton suffered various complications from his illness which limited his ability to walk, work, sleep, and stand. [ Id., Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶ 2]. As of June 2002 Compton's condition was widely known among Charter employees. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 18; Id., Ex. 4, Burns Dep. at 17-18; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 14-15; Court File No. 25, Ogle Dep. at 48].
Compton was hospitalized from June 5, 2002, to June 8, 2002, due to complications from his diabetes. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 8, Wade Dep. at 27]. Compton returned to work on June 11 and asked Connie Wilson about Charter's long-term disability plan. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 156-57; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 24, 37-39]. Compton also provided Wilson a note from Dr. Chastain, indicating that Compton "needs to be placed on long-term disability." [ Id., Ex. 10, Dr. Chastain's June 11, 2002, Note; Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 156-57; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 24, 39; Court File No. 25, Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶ 9]. Wilson informed Compton that, as a manager, Compton would receive sixty percent (60%) of his salary on long-term disability. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 156-57; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 27]. After deciding that he could not afford to be placed on Charter's long-term disability plan, Compton chose to remain at work and informed Wilson of this decision the afternoon of June 11. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 162; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 37-39].
Because Compton had presented Wilson a note from Dr. Chastain indicating that Compton was unable to work and needed to be placed on disability, Wilson needed another doctor's note certifying that Compton was able to perform his job responsibilities. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 38-39]. To that end, Wilson faxed Dr. Chastain a copy of Compton's job description. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 162]. After reviewing this description, Dr. Chastain wrote a note on June 12, certifying that Compton could return to work and perform his duties. [ Id., Ex. 10, Dr. Chastain's June 12, 2002 Note; Court File No. 25, Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶¶ 10-11].
Two days later, on June 14, 2002, Charter received and began investigating allegations of impropriety by Compton. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 55; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 79-82; Id., Ex. 14, Ross Dep. at 21-23]. On June 14 Brian Ross ("Ross"), a Charter employee, approached Connie Wilson alleging that in May 2002 Compton stole a Charter toolbox and failed to properly administer the Vehicle Purchase Program. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. 79-82; Id., Ex. 14, Ross Dep. at 21-23]. Wilson encouraged Ross to send an email to Patty Tester concerning these allegations, and Ross did so the same day. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. 79-82; Id., Ex. 14, Ross Dep. at 21-23]. Tester received the email on June 14 and immediately began investigating the allegations against Compton. [ Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 55].
Ultimately, Charter investigated three allegations against Compton: first, that Compton did not properly administer the Vehicle Purchase Program by failing to inform all employees that Charter trucks were available for purchase; second, that Compton violated the purchase program by purchasing a Charter vehicle for significantly less than appropriate under the program's policy; and, third, that Compton stole a truck toolbox from Charter. [ Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 43, 48, 52; Id., Ex. 4, Burns Dep. 28, 49; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 80-82; Id., Ex. 6, Scott Dep. at 58].
Under the Vehicle Purchase Program, Charter employees can purchase old vehicles from Charter that it no longer uses. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 104; Id., Ex. 6, Scott Dep. at 32]. All employees are eligible to bid on these vehicles. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 105]. According to the program, the starting bid for a vehicle is eighty percent (80%) of its "Blue Book" value. [ Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 48]. Compton was responsible for administering this program in Cleveland. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 104].
In approximately April 2002 several Charter trucks were available for employees to purchase under the program. [ Id. at 104-07, 112]. Ross alleged that Compton failed to inform Charter employees that these trucks were available. [ Id., Ex. 14, Ross Dep. at 21-23]. However, Compton claims he announced to employees the availability of these vehicles at weekly safety meetings and one monthly meeting. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 105-07]. In these announcements, Compton indicated that all employees and contractors were eligible to bid on the vehicles and that the bidding would remain open for several weeks. [ Id.; Court File No. 25, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 108-09].
The trucks were sold in May 2002. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 107-10]. Compton purchased one of the trucks for $400. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 10, Bill of Sale]. Approximately six weeks before the purchase, Compton ordered a new transmission, costing $2,073.50, and had another Charter employee install the transmission in the truck Compton ultimately purchased. [ Id., Ex. 11, Transmission Invoice; Id., Ex. 12, Ogle Dep. at 34]. According to two Charter employees, Ross and David Ogle, this truck was not driven between the time the transmission was installed and Compton's purchase. [ Id., Ex. 12, Ogle Dep. at 35-36; Id., Ex. 14, Ross Dep. at 18].
Compton, however, claims that the $400 purchase price was appropriate for the truck. Between the installation of the new transmission and Compton's purchase, the truck was driven approximately 10,633 miles. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶ 5, Compare Ex. A and Ex. C]. Further, to get an estimate of the truck's value, Compton took the truck to a nearby body shop and a local dealer. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 114-15]. Compton submitted a bid of $400 which was accepted and approved by Charter. [ Id., Ex. 10, Bill of Sale]. After purchasing the truck, Compton spent approximately $4,000 in repairs. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 109-11].
The truck Compton purchased from Charter included an expensive, elaborate "tailgater" package which was useful in performing technical cable service operations. [ Id., Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶¶ 6-9]. Compton did not need the "tailgater" package for his personal use, so he wanted to return the package to Charter in exchange for a standard, less expensive truck toolbox. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 118; Id., Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶ 16; Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 116, 120]. To that end, Compton instructed Junior Lowe, a Charter employee, to deliver an unused truck toolbox from Charter to Compton's house during work hours. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 116]. Compton did not inform any Charter employees of his plans to return the "tailgater" package to Charter in exchange for the standard toolbox. [ Id. at 120]. However, when Charter questioned Compton about the exchange, Compton returned the standard toolbox to Charter. [ Id. at 116, 120]. Based on these actions, Ross alleged that Compton stole the standard truck toolbox from Charter. [ Id., Ex. 14, Ross Dep. at 21-23].
During its investigation, various Charter employees met with Compton on June 17 and June 20. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 85, 87-88, 99-100]. In addition, Connie Wilson and Patty Tester phoned Compton to discuss the investigation on June 21. [ Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 62, 97; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 116]. According to Charter, it completed the investigation of Compton on June 24, 2002, and Brenda Scott decided to terminate Compton that day. [ Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 62-63, 93].
Charter did not immediately communicate this decision to Compton. Instead, Charter waited until June 26 when Wilson attempted to arrange a meeting with Compton. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 58-59, 116-19]. Wilson phoned Compton on the morning of June 26 to set up a meeting for 5:00 p.m. that afternoon. [ Id. at 116-119]. Compton was unavailable so Wilson spoke to his wife, arranging the meeting with Compton through his wife. [ Id.]. In this conversation, Compton's wife told Wilson that Compton had an appointment with Dr. Chastain at 4:00. [ Id.]. Compton also claims that he informed Wilson of this appointment when he returned from the hospital on June 11. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 154-55]. Still, Wilson set up the meeting for that afternoon, June 26 at 5:00 p.m. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 116-19].
Compton's appointment with Dr. Chastain was actually at 4:30 p.m. on June 26. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶ 8; Id., Ex. 8, Wade Dep. at 25]. At 5:00 p.m. Compton was still at Dr. Chastain's office and did not attend the Charter meeting. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 59, 118-19]. In fact, Compton was still at Dr. Chastain's office until after 6:00 that night. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 8, Wade Dep. at 25]. At approximately 6:30, Dr. Chastain faxed a disability leave request and an FMLA leave request to Wilson at Charter. [ Id., Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶ 14; Court File No. 22, Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 51-52, 55-56]. Wilson received and read the fax the next morning, June 27, 2002. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 51-52, 55-56]. Having still not informed Compton of his termination, Mike Burns prepared a termination notice on June 27. [ Id., Ex. 15, Termination Notice]. Compton received this termination notice via hand-delivery the evening of June 27. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 179-80].
III. Analysis A. ADA Claim
The AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT ("ADA") prohibits "discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . [the individual's] discharge. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff can present either direct or indirect evidence of such discrimination. Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996)); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 2004); Hopkins v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 196 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 1999).
Direct evidence is that which proves the existence of a fact without requiring any inferences. Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). To establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination using direct evidence, a plaintiff must establish that: 1) he is an individual with a disability; 2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and 3) he was discriminated against solely because of his handicap. Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 452 (citing Monette, 90 F.3d at 1178); see also Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Monette).
HPI cites as applicable in the instant case this three-requirement prima facie claim based on direct evidence of discrimination. [Court File No. 22 at 9]. In that regard, HPI argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Compton cannot satisfy the second or third requirements — that he is qualified to perform the job requirements and that he was discriminated against due to his disability. [ Id. at 9-15]. However, as HPI contends, there is no direct evidence connecting Compton's termination with his disability. [ Id. at 12-15]. Indeed, Compton offers no evidence that, without any inference, proves Charter's decision to terminate him was based on his disability. Consequently, the three-requirement prima facie claim based on direct evidence of discrimination is inapplicable.
Instead, Compton offers indirect evidence, attempting to create an inference of discrimination based on his disability. Indirect evidence is circumstantial evidence creating an inference of discriminatory treatment. DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 414. When a plaintiff presents such evidence, his claim is evaluated using the burden-shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and later refined by Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 452-53; Hopkins v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 196 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 1999). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 453; Hopkins, 196 F.3d at 660. This burden is not onerous. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2001). Establishing a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, requiring the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 453; Hopkins, 196 F.3d at 660. If the defendant offers such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the proffered reason is, in fact, a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.; Hopkins, 196 F.3d at 660. The ultimate burden of persuasion always remains on the plaintiff. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993)); Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 453.
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination with indirect evidence, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the Act; 2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation; 3) he suffered an adverse employment decision due to his disability; 4) the employer knew or had reason to know of his disability; and, 5) where the plaintiff was terminated, the position remained open or was filled by an individual outside the protected class. Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 453; DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 418; Hopkins, 196 F.3d at 660; accord Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff establishes "a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant can be awarded summary judgment only if no reasonable jury could conclude that the reasons offered for the plaintiff['s] dismissal were only a pretext hiding a discriminatory motive." Rowan, 360 F.3d at 547-48.
Despite couching its arguments in terms of the three-requirement prima facie claim applicable to those cases involving direct evidence of discrimination, HPI ultimately argues that summary judgment is appropriate for two reasons: first, because Compton cannot establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination; and, second, because HPI has legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Compton and no reasonable jury could conclude that these reasons are a pretext for discrimination. [Court File No. 22 at 17-20].
1. Prima Facie Claim
HPI admits, for summary judgment purposes, that Compton is a disabled person under the ADA. [Court File No. 22 at 10 n. 6]. However, regarding the second element of a prima facie claim, HPI argues that Compton was not qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodations. [ Id. at 9-12]. In support, HPI offers the following as evidence that Compton could not perform the essential function of his job: Dr. Chastain placed Compton on shortterm disability leave on June 26, 2002, indicating that Compton was unable to work, [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 72, 176; Court File No. 25, Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶¶ 14-15 and Ex. C]; and, Compton receives Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") based on his physical inability to work. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 71-72].
That Dr. Chastain placed Compton on short-term disability leave does not necessarily prove that Compton was unable to perform the essential functions of his job with or without accommodations. Indeed, Compton contends that he could perform the essential functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation — a short-term leave of absence. The Sixth Circuit has held that "a medical leave of absence can constitute a reasonable accommodation . . ." Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 783 (6th Cir. 1998). There is no "per se rule that an unpaid leave of indefinite duration (or a very lengthy period, such as one year) could never constitute a `reasonable accommodation' under the ADA." Id. at 782.
According to Dr. Chastain, "[a]s of June 26, 2002, Mr. Compton needed short-term disability leave from his employment at Charter Communications; however, more likely than not, that [sic] if Mr. Compton had received such leave as he requested, he would have been able to return to work with or without restrictions." [Court File No. 25, Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶ 15]. Compton agrees with Dr. Chastain's assessment, contending that he could have returned to work if Charter granted him a short-term leave. [ Id., Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶ 15].
HPI argues that the opinions of Dr. Chastain and Compton should not be considered by the Court. As HPI asserts, the Sixth Circuit has consistently held that "[a] party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment has been made, which contradicts her earlier deposition testimony." Reid v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 2003); Graham v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 509 (6th Cir. 2003); Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2000). In his deposition, Compton testified that he was unable to work as of June 26, 2002, did not plan to return to work, and was not seeking any accommodation to work. [Court File No. 26, Ex. A, Compton Dep. at 72-73]. In contrast, the affidavits of Dr. Chastain and Compton contain their respective opinions that Compton may be able to return to work if he is provided a reasonable accommodation of a medical leave. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶ 15; Id., Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶ 15]. Accordingly, HPI argues that both opinions should be disregarded because they contradict Compton's deposition testimony. [Court File No. 26 at 7-12].
The Court agrees with HPI regarding Compton's opinion that he could return to work given a medical leave. Compton's opinion contained in his affidavit no doubt contradicts Compton's previous deposition testimony. Consequently, this opinion will be disregarded by the Court.
However, the Court does not agree with HPI regarding Dr. Chastain's opinion. To the Court's knowledge, Dr. Chastain was not deposed in this case. Therefore, Dr. Chastain has no prior testimony to contradict in his affidavit. To the extent HPI claims that Dr. Chastain's opinion should be disregarded because it contradicts Compton's deposition testimony, the Court disagrees. In his deposition, Compton was providing his individual characterization of his disability and Dr. Chastain's evaluation. Compton, however, was unable to provide a medical opinion regarding his diagnosis and potential for returning to work in the future. As such, the medical opinion of Dr. Chastain does not contradict Compton's deposition testimony. Accordingly, the Court will consider the opinion provided in Dr. Chastain's affidavit. In light of this opinion, a reasonable juror could conclude that Compton could perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation — a medical leave of absence.
Similarly, that Compton receives SSDI does not mandate that Compton is unable to perform the essential functions of his job with or without accommodations. In Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., the Supreme Court addressed this very issue. 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999). According to the Court,
pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the recipient from pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong presumption against the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was too disabled to work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, she must explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she could "perform the essential functions" of her previous job, at least with "reasonable accommodation."Id. at 797-798. The Court noted several such explanations that would be sufficient to overcome any inconsistency between SSDI and ADA claims. Id. at 803-05. One such situation is an ADA suit where the plaintiff can perform his job only with a reasonable accommodation while simultaneously qualifying for SSDI because he could not perform his own job, or other jobs, without the accommodation. Id. at 803. Indeed, in Cleveland, the Court held summary judgment was inappropriate where the plaintiff provided such an explanation. Id. at 807.
In the instant case, Compton provides a similar explanation. In his ADA claim, Compton contends that he could perform the essential functions of his job only with a reasonable accommodation — a medical leave of absence. Compton simultaneously qualifies for SSDI because the social security provisions do not account for the effect of reasonable workplace accommodations. Consequently, according to Compton, his is a situation in which an ADA claim is not inconsistent with an SSDI claim. Like Cleveland, the Court finds that Compton's explanation creates a factual issue to be decided by a jury. Accordingly, whether Compton satisfies the second requirement of a prima facie claim for disability discrimination involves factual disputes precluding summary judgment.
Regarding the remaining three elements of a prima facie claim, HPI offers no arguments that Compton fails to establish one of these requirements. Nonetheless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Compton, the Court finds these elements sufficiently established. Numerous Charter employees were aware of Compton's disability. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 18; Id., Ex. 4, Burns Dep. at 17-18; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 14-15; Court File No. 25, Ogle Dep. at 48]. Compton suffered an adverse employment decision when Charter terminated him. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 169-70; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 51]. That Charter made this decision approximately two weeks after Compton inquired about disability benefits establishes a sufficient causal link between Compton's termination and his disability to establish a prima facie claim. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 156-57, 162; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 35, 37-9]. Accordingly, given the "relatively low bar for establishing a prima facie case," the Court finds that Compton establishes — or at the least, raises a factual issue regarding — the prima facie claim for disability discrimination. Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2004).
2. Pretext
HPI further argues that, in the event Compton establishes a prima facie claim of disability discrimination, summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate because HPI has legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Compton. [Court File No. 22 at 17-20]. Specifically, HPI argues that Compton was terminated for failing to properly implement Charter's Vehicle Purchase Program, significantly understating the value of a truck he purchased from Charter, and misappropriating a Charter toolbox. [ Id. at 17].
Because HPI has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Compton's termination, Compton bears the burden of proving that the stated reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. A plaintiff can prove pretext "`by showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant's challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct." Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000)). Regardless of which option is used, the plaintiff must still produce "`sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably reject [the defendants'] explanation and infer that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him.'" Id. (quoting Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2001)); accord St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) ("[A] reason cannot be proved to be `a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.") (emphasis in original).
In the instant case Compton offers sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude both that HPI's proffered reasons are false and that disability discrimination motivated Charter's decision to discharge Compton. As the first legitimate reason for Compton's termination, HPI asserts that Compton failed to properly implement the Vehicle Purchase Program in April 2002. [Court File No. 22 at 17]. In this regard, HPI points to one main flaw in Compton's procedure: Compton failed to notify all employees that the trucks were for sale. [ Id.].
In contrast, Compton claims he announced to employees the availability of the Charter trucks at weekly safety meetings and one monthly meeting. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 105-07]. At that time Compton announced that all employees and contractors were eligible to bid on the vehicles and that the bidding would remain open for several weeks. [ Id.; Court File No. 25, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 108-09].
Further, Compton claims that, before the sale of the trucks in May 2002, he was never given a specific procedure to follow when notifying employees of the availability of Charter vehicles. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 99, 105, 112]. In fact, Mike Burns, the General Manager of Charter's Cleveland facility, admitted that he was only informed of the proper procedure in June 2002, after the trucks at issue were sold. [ Id., Ex. 4, Burns Dep. at 17, 26-27]. Unaware of the proper procedure, Compton claimed to have administered the purchase program in the same way each time without a problem. [ Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 88]. Based on Compton's allegations, the Court finds there are genuine disputes of material fact from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that HPI's first proffered reason is false.
As its second legitimate reason for terminating Compton, HPI claims that Compton significantly understated the value of the truck he bought from Charter through the purchase program. [Court File No. 22 at 17]. Compton purchased the truck for $400. [ Id., Ex. 10, Bill of Sale]. Approximately six weeks before the purchase, Compton ordered a new transmission, costing $2,073.50, for the truck. [ Id., Ex. 11, Transmission Invoice]. According to HPI, the truck was not driven between the time the transmission was installed and Compton's purchase. [ Id., Ex. 12, Ogle Dep. at 35-36; Id., Ex. 14, Ross Dep. at 18].
On the other hand, Compton claims he did not significantly understate the value of the truck. According to Compton, the truck was driven approximately 10,633 miles after the new transmission was installed and before Compton purchased it. [ Id., Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶ 5, Ex. A and Ex. C]. Further, to get estimates of the truck's value Compton took the truck to a nearby body shop and a local dealer. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 109]. Based on these estimates, Compton submitted a $400 bid which was approved by Charter. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 10 Bill of Sale]. [ Id.]. Finally, after his purchase, Compton spent approximately $4,000 to repair the truck. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 109-11]. The Court finds there are factual disputes from which a reasonable juror could conclude that HPI's second proffered reason is false.
Finally, as its third reason for terminating Compton, HPI claims that Compton misappropriated a Charter toolbox. [Court File No. 22 at 17]. According to HPI, Compton stole a truck-bed toolbox by instructing Junior Lowe, another employee, to deliver an unused toolbox from Charter to Compton's house. [ Id. at 6]. Compton admits having the toolbox delivered to his house but claims he did not intend to steal it. According to Compton, the truck he purchased from Charter included an expensive, elaborate "tailgater" package which was useful in performing technical cable service operations. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 7, Compton Aff. at ¶¶ 6-9]. Compton did not need the "tailgater" package for his personal use, so he sought to exchange the "tailgater" package for a standard, less expensive toolbox. [ Id. at ¶ 16, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 118; Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 116, 120]. Compton did not inform any Charter employees of his plans, but when Charter questioned Compton about the exchange, Compton returned the standard toolbox to Charter. [ Id. at 116, 120]. Based on this record, the Court finds that whether Compton intended to steal the toolbox is a factual issue to be decided by a jury.
To show that HPI's proffered reasons are a pretext for disability discrimination, Compton directs the Court to the temporal proximity between Compton's disability requests and his termination. [Court File No. 25 at 23-25]. From June 5 to June 8, 2002, Compton was hospitalized due to complications from his diabetes. [ Id., Ex. 8, Wade Dep. at 27]. When Compton returned to work on June 11, 2002, he asked Connie Wilson, the office operations manager, about Charter's long-term disability plan. [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 157]. At that time Compton provided Wilson a note from Dr. Chastain, indicating that Compton "needs to be placed on longterm disability. [ Id., Ex. 10, Dr. Chastain's June 11, 2002, Note; Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 157; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 24]. After deciding that he could not afford to be placed on Charter's long-term disability plan, Compton chose to remain at work and informed Wilson of this decision. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 162; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 37-38].
Three days later, on June 14, 2002, Charter began investigating allegations that Compton stole a truck toolbox and failed to follow proper procedure for selling the Charter trucks. [ Id., Ex. 3, Tester Dep. at 55; Id., Ex. 5, Wilson Dep. at 79-82]. As a result of this investigation, Charter hand-delivered a termination notice to Compton on June 27, informing him that his termination was effective June 26, 2002. [ Id., Ex. 18, Termination Notice]. Though Charter began investigating these allegations three days after Compton inquired about disability, the incidents — taking the toolbox and selling the trucks — actually occurred approximately a month beforehand in May 2002. [ Id., Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 107-08]. Further, on June 26, 2002, the day before Compton learned of his termination, Dr. Chastain faxed requests to Charter that Compton receive FMLA leave and short-term disability. [Court File No. 25, Ex. 2, Chastain Aff. at ¶¶ 13-15].
Given the temporal proximity between Compton's disability requests and his termination, the Court finds that whether HPI's proffered reasons were a pretext for disability discrimination is a factual issue precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's ADA claim will be DENIED.
B. Age Discrimination Claims
Similar to the ADA, a plaintiff can establish an age discrimination claim under the AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT ("ADEA") or the TENNESSEE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ("THRA"), by presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence of such discrimination. Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2004). When the plaintiff presents no direct evidence of age discrimination, as in this case, his circumstantial claim is evaluated using the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis delineated above. Id.
THRA claims, including age discrimination, are analyzed in the same manner as their federal counterparts. Wilson v. Rubin, 104 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002) (citing Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1996)); accord Barnes v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000); Carr v. United Parcel Serv., 955 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Tenn. 1997) (overruled on other grounds). Accordingly, the Court will analyze both of Compton's claims under applicable ADEA law.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove that: 1) he was 40 years old or older; 2) he was qualified for the particular position; 3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and, 4) he was replaced by a younger individual. Id. at 547 (citation omitted); DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 417; Skalka v. Fernald Envtl. Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 1999). As with an ADA claim, if the plaintiff establishes a prima claim of age discrimination, the defendant can be awarded summary judgment only if no reasonable jury could conclude that the reasons offered by the defendant are a pretext. Id. at 547-548.
HPI does not contest whether Compton establishes a prima facie claim of age discrimination. Instead, HPI argues that summary judgment is appropriate because HPI has legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Compton and no reasonable jury could conclude that these reasons are a pretext for discrimination. [Court File No. 22 at 17-20]. HPI contends here, as it does in response to Compton's ADA claim, that Compton was terminated for misappropriating a Charter toolbox, significantly understating the value of a truck he purchased from Charter, and failing to notify all employees that three trucks were available for bidding under Charter's Vehicle Purchase Program. [ Id. at 17].
Because HPI has stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Compton's termination, Compton bears the same burden of proving pretext as in the ADA claim. Specifically, to sustain his ADEA claim, Compton must produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that HPI's proffered reasons are not only false but also are a pretext for age discrimination.
In the ADA analysis, the Court found that Compton offers sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that HPI's proffered reasons have no basis in fact. Here, HPI proffers the same three reasons for terminating Compton and Compton makes the same counterarguments. The analysis regarding these proffered reasons is the same here as in the ADA claim above. Accordingly, the Court finds that Compton produces sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that HPI's proffered reasons are false.
However, unlike the ADA claim, Compton does not produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that HPI's proffered reasons are a pretext for age discrimination. Indeed, the only evidence of age discrimination Compton offers is a Fall 2001 meeting with Dave Conkle, Grant Evans, and Mark Evans. According to Compton, the three "was [sic] trying to look out for [his] health" and said that Compton "wasn't getting any younger." [Court File No. 22, Ex. 1, Compton Dep. at 57]. The three also told Compton that "they wanted [him] to be around to be able to work and they didn't want nothing [sic] to happen to [him]," and that they "wanted to see [him] be around for a long time." [ Id. at 58, 60]. Compton did not think these comments were negative but, rather, "took it as they were trying to look out for [him]." [ Id. at 62-62]. Compton believed that the three were sincerely concerned for his health and did not think anything about the meeting at the time it occurred. [ Id. at 60].
The Court finds that this evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to prove that HPI's proffered reasons for Compton's discharge are a pretext for age discrimination. Compton's only evidence of age discrimination — this meeting — occurred approximately nine months before Compton was terminated. The individuals in the conversation were not involved in the decision to terminate Compton. The conversation does not indicate any animus based on Compton's age. In fact, Compton sincerely believed the three were concerned for his health and did not think the meeting foreshadowed any future discrimination. Given this limited evidence, no reasonable jury could find that HPI's proffered reasons for terminating Compton are a pretext for age discrimination.
Although Compton creates factual issues regarding whether HPI's proffered reasons are false, he fails to produce sufficient evidence that the reasons are a pretext for age discrimination. In essence, even if a reasonable jury concluded that HPI's proffered reasons are false, the jury could not conclude that these reasons are a pretext for age discrimination. Therefore, no reasonable jury could conclude that HPI terminated Compton due to his age. Accordingly, HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's age discrimination claims under the ADEA and the THRA will be GRANTED. C. FMLA Claim
The FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT ("FMLA") entitles an eligible employee to twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-month period if the employee meets any one of four enumerated circumstances in 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). There are two distinct theories for recovery under the FMLA: (1) the "entitlement" or "interference" theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); and (2) the "retaliation" or "discrimination" theory arising from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Compton claims that Charter both interfered with his FMLA rights, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and terminated his employment in retaliation for exercising his FMLA rights, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).
1. Retaliatory Discharge
Compton argues that his termination violates the retaliatory provision of the FMLA, § 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). An FMLA retaliation-case relying upon indirect evidence, as in this case, is governed by the same three-step process delineated in McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 314-16 (6th Cir. 2001). Following the McDonnell Douglas rubric, the plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge. Id. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for the retaliatory discharge. Id.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge for asserting his rights under the FMLA, an employee must show that: (1) he availed himself of a protected right by notifying the employer of his intent to take leave; (2) he was adversely affected by an employment decision, e.g., discharge; and (3) the proximity in time between the employee's request for leave and the adverse action constitutes indirect evidence of a causal connection. Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at 314.
In the instant action, Compton claims that he availed himself of a protected right when, on the evening of June 26, 2002, Dr. Chastain faxed to Charter FMLA paperwork requesting Compton be placed on FMLA leave. Compton certainly was adversely affected by an employment decision when he received the termination notice on June 27, 2002. Finally, Compton argues that the proximity in time between his leave request and his termination — one day — establishes a causal connection.
HPI does not contest Compton's claims regarding the first and second element of the prima facie claim. However, HPI argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Compton cannot establish a causal connection between the leave request and the termination. HPI offers two reasons for this contention: first, Charter decided to terminate Compton on June 24, 2002, two days before Dr. Chastain sent the FMLA request; and, second, Charter attempted to communicate Compton's termination to him at the meeting planned for June 26, 2002, at 5:00 p.m., which was one and one-half hours before Charter received the FMLA request. [Court File No. 26 at 2-6].
Essentially, HPI argues that Compton was effectively terminated on either June 24 — the date the termination decision was allegedly made — or June 26 — the intended date to inform Compton of his termination — both of which were before Compton requested FMLA leave. Compton contests this assertion, claiming he was not terminated until the evening of June 27, 2002, when he received the hand delivered termination notice. [Court File No. 25 at 14]. The Court finds that whether Compton's termination date was June 24, 26, or 27 is an issue of fact to be decided by a fact finder. The existence of this factual issue precludes summary judgment on Compton's FMLA retaliation claim. Accordingly, HPI's motion for summary judgment on this claim will be DENIED.
2. Denial of FMLA Rights
HPI does not address the pretext issue with respect to Compton's FMLA retaliation claim. Presumably, HPI asserts the same legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons enunciated in the ADA discussion above. To that extent, the Court finds a reasonable fact finder could conclude that HPI's articulated reasons are a pretext for retaliation. The analysis here is the same as in the ADA discussion above.
Compton also claims that Charter interfered with his FMLA rights by refusing to authorize FMLA leave beginning on June 26, 2002. [Court File No. 25 at 16-17]. The interference provision, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided in this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b).
To prevail on an interference claim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was an eligible employee; (2) the defendant is a covered employer; (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) he gave the defendant notice of his intent to take leave; and, (5) the defendant denied his FMLA benefits or interfered with FMLA rights to which he was entitled. Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2003).
Although HPI does not contest whether Compton establishes these requirements, the Court finds that Compton, at the least, raises factual issues on each element which precludes summary judgment. Specifically, whether Compton was an eligible employee when he sent his FMLA request on the evening of June 26, 2002, requires a fact finder to determine when Compton was terminated, June 24, 26, or 27. Further, the Court finds that Compton establishes the remaining elements: Charter was a covered employer; Compton was entitled to leave under the FMLA; Compton gave notice to Charter of his intent to take FMLA leave by faxing the leave request to Charter on the evening of June 26; and, Charter denied Compton's FMLA leave.
Instead of addressing the requisite elements, HPI argues that Compton must prove that his termination was related to his FMLA leave request. [Court File No. 26 at 6-7]. This contention appears to confuse the difference between an interference claim and a retaliatory discharge claim. Yet, HPI asserts support from two decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Bones v. Honewell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 877-78 (10th Cir. 2004) and Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). However, to date the Sixth Circuit has not adopted the position taken by HPI.
Nonetheless, even if HPI were correct in its contention that Compton must prove a relation between his termination and his FMLA leave request to sustain an interference claim, the Court finds that Compton presents factual issues regarding such a relation. HPI contends there is no such relation because it decided to terminate Compton before receiving the FMLA leave request and, in any event, Compton was terminated for legitimate reasons. Both of these contentions have been discussed at length above, and the Court has found there exist factual issues in dispute on both issues. Those same factual issues still exist and preclude summary judgment of Compton's FMLA interference claim even if he must prove a relation between his termination and the FMLA leave request. Accordingly, HPI's motion for summary judgment on this claim will be DENIED. D. Retaliation for Seeking Disability Benefits Claim
Compton also claims that Charter "violated the provisions of the THRA by terminating Compton in retaliation for Compton asserting his legal right to seek disability benefits." [Court File No. 1 at ¶ 44]. HPI contends that summary judgment is appropriate on this claim because the THRA does not protect those employees who have sought disability benefits. The Court agrees.
Retaliation for seeking disability benefits is not protected under the THRA. The purpose of the THRA is to "[s]afeguard all individuals within the state from discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin." TENN. CODEANN. § 4-21-101(a)(3). The THRA defines "discriminatory practices" as those actions that occur "because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin." TENN.CODEANN. § 4-21-102(3). Finally, the THRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee based on "race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin." TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401. Nowhere does the THRA protect those employees who have sought disability benefits.
In contrast, ERISA's anti-retaliation provision forbids employers to retaliate against an employee for seeking disability benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1140; Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 803 (6th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, "ERISA preempts `any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.'" Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). Consequently, there is no doubt that the THRA fails to protect those individuals who have sought disability benefits.
Apparently Compton recognizes that the THRA does not create a right of action based on an employer's retaliation for an employee seeking disability benefits. For, Compton does not even address this claim in his response to HPI's summary judgment motion. [Court File No. 25]. Accordingly, the Court finds that the THRA does not protect those employees seeking disability benefits. Consequently, HPI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and HPI's summary judgment motion on this claim will be GRANTED.
In sum, HPI's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's disability discrimination claim based on the ADA will be DENIED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's age discrimination claim based on the ADEA will be GRANTED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's FMLA interference claim will be DENIED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's FMLA retaliatory discharge claim will be DENIED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's retaliation for seeking disability benefits claim based on the THRA will be GRANTED.
A separate order will enter.
ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, HPI's motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 [Court File No. 21] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's disability discrimination claim based on the ADA is DENIED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's age discrimination claim based on the ADEA is GRANTED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's FMLA interference claim is DENIED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's FMLA retaliatory discharge claim is DENIED; HPI's motion for summary judgment on Compton's retaliation for seeking disability benefits claim based on the THRA is GRANTED.SO ORDERED.