Opinion
2014-1847 Q C
09-15-2017
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant. Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.), for respondent.
PRESENT: :
The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for appellant.
Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. (Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered July 2, 2014. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the branches of plaintiff's motion seeking summary judgment on the first through fourth, sixth and seventh causes of action, and granted the branches of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action.
ORDERED that the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth, sixth and seventh causes of action are denied; as so modified, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Civil Court as denied the branches of plaintiff's motion seeking summary judgment on the first through fourth, sixth and seventh causes of action, and granted the branches of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing those causes of action on the ground that they were premature because plaintiff had failed to provide requested verification.
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, defendant demonstrated prima facie that it had not received the requested verification and, thus, that the causes of action at issue are premature (see Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 [2005]). However, as plaintiff further argues, the affidavit submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendant's cross motion was sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the requested verification had been mailed to, and received by, defendant (see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). In light of the foregoing, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the causes of action at issue are premature (see Compas Med., P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 49 Misc 3d 152[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).
Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is modified by providing that the branches of defendant's cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first through fourth, sixth and seventh causes of action are denied.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur. ENTER: Paul Kenny Chief Clerk Decision Date: September 15, 2017