An insanity acquittee has a developmental disability if he or she "has a disability attributable to neurological impairment that originated before [the] respondent's 22nd birthday and [such] disability has continued or will continue for an indefinite period and substantially handicaps [the acquittee's] ability to function normally in society" (Matter of Daniel XX., 20 A.D.3d 759, 760, 798 N.Y.S.2d 262 [3d Dept. 2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415, 843 N.E.2d 1155 [2005] ; see Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03[22] ). "In reviewing a CPL 330.20 commitment determination, this Court's authority is as broad as that of the trial court and we may render any determination warranted by the record, though we defer to the trial court's factual and credibility findings" ( Matter of James Q., 192 A.D.3d 1370, 1372, 143 N.Y.S.3d 164 [3d Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Having reviewed the record, we find that Supreme Court erred in concluding that respondent did not have a "developmental disability" as defined by Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03(22), and, therefore, was not "mentally ill" under CPL 330.20(1)(d).