Commonwealth v. Zane Z.

13 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Pelosi

    55 Mass. App. Ct. 390 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 6 times

    See Bishop, supra at 174 n. 2 (parties proceeded on the assumption that the records were privileged);Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 431 Mass. 609, 616 (2000) (same). See alsoCommonwealth v. Ramos, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 795-796 (1999) (court reviewed a Bishop determination despite a lack of written findings);Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 143-145 (2001) (judge did not reduce stage one findings to writing, but no reason to remand for written findings without some showing of what might be accomplished). The motion judge's written decision combined the privilege determination stage with the relevancy determination stage.

  2. Commonwealth v. Howze

    58 Mass. App. Ct. 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 32 times
    In Howze, the court held that removing the victim's clothing was "bound up with and necessary to the act of penetration" and that these events were both "part of a continuous stream of conduct occurring within a short time frame and governed by a single criminal design."

    It is entirely possible that the criminal act relied upon by the jury with respect to both verdicts was the rape. See Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 141 (2001). Contrast Commonwealth v. Black, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479 (2000) (reversal not required where manner of presentation of evidence and instructions overall adequately i dentified separate conduct on which cognate counts were based).

  3. Commonwealth v. Fan

    490 Mass. 433 (Mass. 2022)   Cited 13 times

    In her opening statement and closing argument, the prosecutor did not rely upon any particular instances of trafficking, but, rather, discussed evidence of the codefendantsโ€™ general pattern of behavior. See Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 139-140, 743 N.E.2d 867 (2001) (analyzing Commonwealth's opening and closing statements to determine whether specific unanimity instruction was warranted). Indeed, the prosecutor noted on multiple occasions that this case was about an unlawful "business" that was "selling sex," thus underscoring that its theory turned on a general scheme to traffic women, rather than on distinct acts of trafficking.

  4. Commonwealth v. Palermo

    482 Mass. 620 (Mass. 2019)   Cited 15 times
    Holding a special juror unanimity instruction "is required when, on a single charged offense, the prosecutor presents evidence of separate, discrete incidents, any one of which would suffice by itself to make out the crime charged"

    Id. See Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 138, 743 N.E.2d 867 (2001). Several Federal Courts of Appeals have required specific unanimity instructions where there exists a "genuine risk," United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1992), or "genuine danger," United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 114โ€“115 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945, 107 S.Ct. 1603, 94 L.Ed.2d 789 (1987), of jury confusion.

  5. Commonwealth v. Pagan

    10-P-1230 (Mass. Jan. 10, 2012)

    The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child, G. L. c. 265, ยง 13B. On appeal, he contends that the convictions may be duplicative because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that the convictions must be based on separate and distinct acts, see Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 141 (2001); that the conviction on count one (indecent assault and battery on a child, as a lesser included offense of statutory rape), may not have been based on the same act for which he was indicted, see Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 421 Mass. 547, 554 (1995); and that G. L. c. 265, ยง 13B, is unconstitutionally vague, as applied, because it permitted conviction for touching the chest of a five or six year old girl, without providing fair notice that such conduct was criminal. Substantially for the reasons set forth in the Commonwealth's brief at pages 15 through 33, we affirm.

  6. Commonwealth v. Zanetti

    454 Mass. 449 (Mass. 2009)   Cited 284 times
    Finding no need for specific unanimity in joint venture cases as to liability as a principal or a joint venturer, and noting that โ€œ[t]he inevitable risk posed by special verdict slips is a greater number of mistrials arising from hung juries, because jurors may all agree that the defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the crime but differ as to whether he did so as a principal or a joint venturerโ€

    Jurors, of course, are free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of each witness in whole or in part. See Commonwealth v. Hawkesworth, 405 Mass. 664, 674-675 (1989); Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 140 (2001). At the same time, however, "a jury cannot properly be permitted to wrest part from a clear and consistent context so as to attribute to a witness a statement which he did not make."

  7. Commonwealth v. Laguer

    448 Mass. 585 (Mass. 2007)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming denial of motion for new trial due to failure to disclose fingerprint report; absence of defendant's fingerprints at crime scene not exculpatory as defendant was aware Commonwealth could not place him in victim's apartment by means of any physical evidence

    His size was obvious during the trial. Commonwealth v. Zone Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 147-148 (2001). The victim repeatedly informed the emergency room doctor who treated her the morning following the rape that "the assailant would kill me if I told what he looked like."

  8. Commonwealth v. Feliciano

    442 Mass. 728 (Mass. 2004)   Cited 6 times
    Discussing single justice's authority to act pursuant to G.L. c. 211, ยง 3, despite no explicit reference in statute to single justice

    It has become clear, as our common law has developed, that the heightened Fuller standard of relevance applies to all cases in which the defendant seeks privileged treatment records. See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 431 Mass. 609, 616-617 (2000), S.C., 438 Mass. 325 (2002); Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 142-143 (2001). While we will not endorse "unrestrained foray[s] into confidential records," Commonwealth v. Bishop, supra at 182, in some situations a review, though certainly an additional intrusion into the privacy of a complaining witness, is necessary to preserve the standards of justice and fairness.

  9. Commonwealth v. Donovan

    No. 19-P-877 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 2, 2021)

    Commonwealthv. Zane Z., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 135, 140 (2001). The defendant also contends that the denial of his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case was clear error because of a statement made by the judge.

  10. Commonwealth v. Donovan

    100 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021)

    He was "free to believe all or any part of the testimony [he] heard at trial." Commonwealth v. Zane Z., 51 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 140 (2001). The defendant also contends that the denial of his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case was clear error because of a statement made by the judge.