Opinion
1299 WDA 2023 J-S34024-24
12-18-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LATAE YOUNG Appellant
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 31, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006678-2021
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
LANE, J.
Latae Young ("Young") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following her guilty pleas to aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and two counts of recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"). We affirm.
In 2021, Deatra Piticca and her family were "walking away from" a restaurant in Pittsburgh when Young "ran and punched . . . Piticca in the face," threw her to the ground, and "continued to assault her." N.T., 3/21/22, at 8. Piticca suffered multiple injuries, including a fractured spine. See id. Police arrested Young and charged her with numerous offenses.
On March 21, 2022, Young entered a negotiated guilty plea to aggravated assault, graded as a first-degree felony, disorderly conduct, graded as a third-degree misdemeanor, and two counts of REAP, both graded as second-degree misdemeanors. The plea agreement did not include any sentencing recommendations. Young signed a written plea colloquy, wherein she acknowledged that she entered the guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The trial court accepted Young's guilty plea, but deferred sentencing for the preparation of a presentence investigation report.
We note that Young had a co-defendant in this case, Wesley Brown, who similarly entered a guilty plea for his assault on Piticca's husband and son.
On June 21, 2022, the trial court conducted Young's sentencing hearing. The Commonwealth argued that Young was not eligible for a reduced sentence under the Recidivism Risk Reduction Initiative ("RRRI") Act, but did not explain why. See N.T., 6/21/22, at 26. In response, the trial court reasoned:
The court notes [Young has] a zero . . . prior record score[;] however, from my review of the presentence report, she had accumulated [twelve] summary level offenses, many of which were charged as higher level offenses, [but later] reduced at the magistrate's office to include a half a dozen disorderly conducts[,] unlawful activities[,] and harassment. [Young] also had nine cases nolle prossed or dismissed in a similar character. It appears she's held harmless in terms of prior record score. It appears that she has not faced any real accountability for this aggressive or assault [sic] or unlawful behavior in the past, and unfortunately, that has, in one way or another, . . . been visited upon the [Piticca] family[. With] the balancing that must occur [sic], in this instance, the court believes the following sentences are appropriate.Id. at 27-28 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of two and one-half to seven years' imprisonment, with a consecutive two-years' probation. Notably, however, the trial court did not definitively indicate whether Young was RRRI eligible. Further, Young did not dispute the trial court's account of her criminal history. Young did not file a notice of appeal from this judgment of sentence.
In January 2023, Young filed a timely pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. Young challenged the legality of her sentence, arguing the trial court failed to determine specifically whether she was RRRI eligible. The PCRA court granted resentencing, and on July 31, 2023, imposed the same aggregate sentence, but specified that she was not RRRI eligible.
Young filed a timely, counseled post-sentence motion, whereby she again argued that she was RRRI eligible pursuant to our Supreme Court's holding in Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d 1239 (Pa. 2017). On September 18, 2023, the trial court denied relief. Young filed a timely, counseled notice of appeal, and both she and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Young raises the following issue for our review: "The [trial] court erred in determining that Young is not RRRI eligible, where the underlying conviction for aggravated assault was Young's first conviction for a crime of violence and therefore cannot be relied upon to disqualify her eligibility pursuant to [Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d 1239]." Young's Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
"The question of whether a defendant is RRRI eligible presents a question of statutory construction and implicates the legality of the sentence imposed. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo and the scope of our review is plenary." Commonwealth v. Quiles, 166 A.3d 387, 392 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotations and citation omitted).
The RRRI Act provides for a reduced minimum sentence for eligible offenders. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4502; see also Commonwealth v. Chester, 101 A.3d 56, 57 (Pa. 2014). "At the time of sentencing, the court shall make a determination whether the defendant is an eligible offender." 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(a). If the trial court determines the defendant is an eligible offender, then the court shall impose an RRRI minimum sentence, which is less than the ordinary minimum sentence. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(c)(1)-(2).
The RRRI Act defines an "eligible person" as a defendant who meets all of the following requirements:
(1) Does not demonstrate a history of present or past violent behavior.
(2) Has not been subject to a sentence the calculation of which includes an enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon . . ..
(3) Has not been . . . previously convicted of . . . criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy to commit murder, a crime of violence as defined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses) or a personal injury crime as defined
under section 103 of the act of November 24, 1998 (P.L.882, No.111), known as the Crime Victims Act, except for an offense under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2701 (relating to simple assault) when the offense is a misdemeanor of the third degree, or an equivalent offense under the laws of the United States . . ..
(4) Has not been found guilty or previously convicted or adjudicated delinquent for violating any of the following enumerated provisions . . ..
(5) Is not awaiting trial or sentencing for additional criminal charges, if a conviction or sentence on the additional charges would cause the defendant to become ineligible under this definition.61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4503 (emphasis added).
Although the RRRI Act does not define what constitutes a "history of present or past violent behavior," our Supreme Court has found that this language precludes individuals with "an established record or pattern of violent behavior." Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 249 A.3d 903, 915 (Pa. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, those persons with only a singular present or prior instance of violent behavior do not have a "history" of violent behavior pursuant to the RRRI Act. See id.; see also Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d at 1239.
In Cullen-Doyle, the appellant pleaded guilty to several counts of criminal conspiracy to commit burglary and one count of burglary. See Cullen-Doyle, 164 A.3d at 1240-41. Because this was his first offense, the appellant requested the trial court impose an RRRI sentence. See id. at 1241. However, the trial court determined that the appellant was not eligible for the RRRI program. See id. On appeal, the appellant argued that although his present conviction for burglary was considered a crime of violence under the RRRI Act, section 4503(1) should not preclude a first-time, single-count offender. See id. Our Supreme Court agreed, concluding that a defendant's present, first conviction of a crime of violence, alone, did not constitute a history of violent behavior such to disqualify them from RRRI eligibility. See id. at 1243.
Presently, Young argues that the trial court erred by finding she was not RRRI eligible as she had a prior record score of zero. Young avers that because her present conviction for assault is her first conviction involving a crime of violence, the court should have considered her to be RRRI eligible in compliance with our Supreme Court's holding in Cullen-Doyle.
The trial court found that because Young had an established history of violent behavior at the time she assaulted Piticca, she was ineligible for RRRI sentencing. In making this determination, the court emphasized:
[While Young] had a zero prior record [score], a review of the presentence report evidenced [she] had accumulated twelve summary level offenses, many of which had originally been charged as misdemeanor or felony offenses. Additionally, [Young] had nine cases nolle prossed or dismissed for similar behavior, which held her harmless in terms of a prior record score but showed she faced no real accountability for her aggressive, assaultive, and unlawful behavior in the past. This lack of legal accountability ultimately led to the violent attack on the Peticca family in the present case. The court, in fashioning its sentence and finding [Young] ineligible for RRRI, relied on the unambiguous violent history [she] has demonstrated in the past, in addition to the violent nature of the present offense.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/2/24, at 9 (citation and unnecessary capitalization omitted). Consequently, the court concluded it properly found Young was not RRRI eligible.
After review, we similarly determine that Young is ineligible for RRRI sentencing given her undisputed history of violent behavior. See Quiles, 166 A.3d at 392. We reiterate that Young cannot qualify for RRRI sentencing if she has a "history of present or past violent behavior[,]" such that she has "established [a] record or pattern of violent behavior." 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4503(1); Finnecy, 249 A.3d at 915. Here, the trial court relied on Young's pre-sentence report to fashion her sentence. The trial court found that although Young had a prior record score of zero, the score did not accurately reflect her behavioral history. Pertinently, it showed that Young had twelve summary level offenses on her record, many of which initially charged as higher-level offenses, each resulting from instances of prior aggressive, assaultive, or unlawful behavior. Young does not dispute or address this account of her criminal history on appeal.
Moreover, we do not agree with Young that Cullen-Doyle dictates that we grant relief. In Cullen-Doyle there was no discussion that the appellant had a history of violent behavior prior to his burglary conviction. Here, the trial court found that Young did have a record of violent behavior prior to her present conviction for assault. Young does not dispute this record on appeal. Consequently, because Young had this record of violent behavior at the time of her present conviction, the trial court properly determined that Young was not RRRI eligible. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4503(1); see also Finnecy, 249 A.3d at 915. As Young is not RRRI eligible, we conclude her illegal sentencing claim merits no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.