Opinion
J-S23036-19 No. 1539 WDA 2018
06-21-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID ALLEN YINGLING Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 19, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-32-CR-0001059-2016 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, David Allen Yingling, appeals from the order entered September 19, 2018, that denied his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm on the basis of the PCRA court opinion.
In its opinion, the PCRA court correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. See PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 19, 2018, at 1-4. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them at length here.
For the convenience of the reader, we briefly note that a competency evaluation of Appellant was completed by Abhishek Jain, M.D., who submitted a written report to the trial court dated July 7, 2016. According to Dr. Jain, Appellant understood the nature and object of the proceedings against him, could participate and assist his defense, and was therefore competent to stand trial. On January 13, 2017, Appellant pleaded guilty to murder of the third degree. On April 3, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 17½ to 35 years of confinement. At both his plea and sentencing hearings, Appellant was represented by two attorneys, Donald McKee, Esquire, and Annmarie Everett, Esquire (hereinafter, collectively, "trial counsel"). Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
On March 26, 2018, Appellant filed his first, pro se, timely PCRA petition. On April 3, 2018, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant and ordered PCRA counsel to file an amended petition within 90 days of the date of the order, and PCRA counsel complied on June 22, 2018. The amended PCRA petition alleged:
Despite [Appellant]'s mental health concerns, prior counsel did not further investigate [Appellant]'s mental state . . . at the time [Appellant] entered his plea. . . .Amended PCRA Petition, 6/22/2018, at ¶¶ 18-19, 23.
[Appellant] believes and therefore avers that prior counsel should have attempted to bargain a plea for him based on a Guilty but Mentally Ill plea.
. . .
[Appellant]'s prior counsel was ineffective in that [Appellant] would not have entered a plea had he been aware of the proper sentencing range that he was going to be subjected to due to his prior record score.
On August 27, 2018, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, both Attorney McKee and Attorney Everett testified that they considered the possibility of a guilty-but-mentally-ill defense, but, given the Dr. Jain's findings and the Commonwealth's plea offer of third-degree murder, they did not believe that presenting such a defense was the best possible strategy for Appellant. Attorney Everett additionally testified that she discussed the possible range of sentences with Appellant at the time of his plea.
The notes of testimony for the PCRA hearing are incorrectly labelled as "Omnibus Pretrial Motion".
On September 19, 2018, the PCRA court entered an order denying Appellant's petition and an accompanying opinion. On October 19, 2018, Appellant filed this timely appeal.
On November 19, 2018, Appellant filed his statement of errors complained of on appeal. Later that same day, the PCRA court ordered that the opinion accompanying its order denying PCRA relief would serve as its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it made a finding that defense counsel was effective counsel when defense counsel failed to inquire about [Appellant]'s mental state at the time of the plea hearing, making the plea involuntary and unknowing[].
2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it made a finding that defense counsel was effective counsel, even though counsel failed to pursue a guilty but mentally ill defense, causing the plea to be involuntary and unknowing.
3. Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it made a finding that defense counsel was effective counsel, even though defense counsel failed to advise [Appellant] about the possible sentencing ranges that he could face at sentencing.Appellant's Brief at 6 (suggested answers and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
"We review the denial of PCRA relief to decide whether the PCRA court's factual determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Medina , 2019 PA Super 119, *8 (filed April 17, 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown , 196 A.3d 130, 150 (Pa. 2018)).
All of Appellant's claims allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Appellant's Brief at 16-22. Appellant specifically contends that his trial counsel was ineffective, because counsel "did not inquire into [Appellant]'s mental state at the time of his guilty plea" and "failed to advance a guilty but mentally ill verdict or plea" or "to inform [him] of this possible legal avenue." Id. at 16, 18, 22. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "advise [him] of his prior record score and sentencing ranges prior to sentencing." Id. at 14.
In his brief to this Court, Appellant also contends that Dr. Jain's evaluation does not include his prior mental health treatment history and that his "hearing issues coupled with his mental illness ultimately caused his guilty plea to be involuntarily and unknowingly entered." Appellant's Brief at 17-18. However, Appellant makes no mention of Dr. Jain's failure to explore his mental health history or his hearing issues in his amended PCRA petition, and, thus, these challenges are waived. Commonwealth v. Santiago , 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) ("Regardless of the reasons for [an a]ppellant's belated raising of [an] issue, it is indisputably waived. We have stressed that a claim not raised in a PCRA petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."). Assuming Appellant's claim that Dr. Jain should have explored his mental health treatment history were not waived, when asked during his guilty plea hearing if he had "ever received treatment for a mental disease or disability[,]" Appellant answered, "No." N.T., 1/13/2017, at 4. "A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath[.]" Commonwealth v. Yeomans , 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011); accord Commonwealth v. Wilcox , 174 A.3d 670, 674 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 184 A.3d 545 (Pa. 2018). Likewise, assuming arguendo that the issue of Appellant's hearing were not waived, immediately prior to his plea hearing, Appellant completed a nine-page written guilty plea colloquy giving his full name, age, education, and comprehension of written and spoken English and acknowledging that he understood the charge to which he was pleading guilty, the facts summarized by the Commonwealth that supported his plea, his right to trial by jury including the jury selection process, and the presumption of innocence; he initialed pages 2 to 9 and signed page 9. Appellant's hearing problems could not have affected his ability to complete a written colloquy, and this written colloquy satisfied all of the inquiries necessary to find that a plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. See Commonwealth v. McGarry , 172 A.3d 60, 66-67 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 185 A.3d 966 (Pa. 2018). Additionally, during his oral guilty plea colloquy in open court, Appellant never requested that a question be repeated, asked any participant to increase his or her volume, or otherwise demanded assistance with his hearing. See generally N.T., 1/13/2017. Hence, assuming this issue were not waived, we would still find no arguable merit to Appellant's assertion that his hearing somehow rendered his plea unknowing or involuntary.
[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective.
To overcome this presumption, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove that: (1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel's error.
Commonwealth v. Root , 179 A.3d 511, 518 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted) (some formatting). "A failure to satisfy any of
the three prongs of [this] test requires rejection of a claim of ineffective assistance[.]" Commonwealth v. Chmiel , 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (Pa. 2011).Medina , 2019 PA Super 119, *15. "Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea." Commonwealth v. Barndt , 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Thomas M. Bianco, we conclude Appellant's issues merit no relief. The PCRA court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of those questions. See PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 19, 2018, at 7-12 (finding: (1) with regard to Appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Appellant's mental health at the time of the plea, Appellant failed to establish that the underlying claim has arguable merit, because the competency evaluation sufficiently addressed Appellant's state of mind at the time of the crime and at the time of the plea, so a request for a further evaluation was not warranted; (2) with regard to Appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict or plea, Appellant failed to establish that trial counsel lacked an objectively reasonable basis, because both Attorneys McKee and Everett testified during the PCRA hearing that they considered the possibility of such a defense but, given Dr. Jain's findings and the Commonwealth's plea offer of third-degree murder, did not believe that seeking a guilty-but-mentally-ill finding was the best strategy; and (3) with regard to Appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his prior record score and the applicable sentencing ranges prior to the entry of his plea, Appellant failed to establish that trial counsel lacked an objectively reasonable basis, because (a) Attorney Everett testified that she discussed the possible range of sentences with Appellant at the time of his plea, and (b) Appellant never told trial counsel that he wished to withdraw his plea after learning his prior record score and the applicable standard range of the sentencing guidelines).
Accordingly, having discerned no error of law, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's opinion. See Medina , 2019 PA Super 119, *8. The parties are instructed to attach the opinion of the PCRA court in any filings referencing this Court's decision.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/21/2019
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