The first is a “statute [ ] which expressly confer[s] or restrict[s] a court's jurisdiction.” Vittands, supra at 518, 671 N.E.2d 527, quoting from Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 538, 281 N.E.2d 248 (1972). The second is a statute whose “main purpose is directed at [the] powers [of the courts].”
Art. 48, The Referendum, III, § 2. G.L.c. 4, § 1. Such an exception to a general law should be strictly construed. Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 537 (1972). If the SLAPP Act falls within the exception for statutes which relate to the powers of the courts, its effective date would have been January 28, 1995.
By contrast, when an initiative petition only alters the substantive law enforced by the courts, the work of the courts is affected in an incidental way; it cannot be said that the "main feature" of that petition is to alter the power of the courts. Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 537 (1972), quoting Horton v. Attorney Gen., supra at 511 ("A general law covering a subject disconnected with courts in its main feature does not come within the prohibition of . . . art. 48 . . . because, in an incidental and subsidiary way, the work of the courts may be increased or diminished or changed"). See also Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., supra at 522 (petition expanding category of defendants who may request diversion into drug treatment programs not within exclusion); Horton v. Attorney Gen., supra at 511-512 (initiative petition creating automobile insurance fund and repealing judicial review of automobile security rates not within exclusion).
Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 814-815 (1978). Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 537 (1972). Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 354 Mass. 384, 387 (1968).
This public policy promoting the humane treatment of animals, as reflected in the statutes of the Commonwealth, “is a basic source of law when no previous decision or rule of law is applicable.” Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 538, 281 N.E.2d 248 (1972). In light of the public policy in favor of minimizing animal suffering in a wide variety of contexts, permitting warrantless searches to protect nonhuman animal life fits coherently within the existing emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, intended to facilitate official response to an “immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property” (emphasis supplied).
Nassar, supra at 589. See Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 539-540 (1972) (where acts and indictments of defendant occurred before effective date of repeal of G.L. c. 94, §§ 212 and 212A, defendant could be tried and punished under those statutory provisions). We have said that to the extent that amended sections of a statute are inconsistent with the earlier provisions, there has been an implied repeal of the latter.
We have treated these exclusions similarly. See Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 225 (1981); Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 537 (1972). The constitutional convention that debated art. 48 understood the term "powers" of courts to mean something more than the jurisdiction of the courts.
An exception to a constitutional provision must be strictly construed and limited to objects fairly within its terms. Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 281 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1972). Further, the Court is not concerned with the wisdom or expediency or the need of a constitutional provision, but only whether it limits the power of the legislature.
Conversely, if an exception is articulated or perceived with respect to a constitutional provision, it is to be narrowly and strictly construed. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 313 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1975); Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 281 N.E.2d 248 (1972). The language of Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming is not vague or ambiguous.
As a law which "relates to . . . the powers . . . of courts," it cannot be made the subject of a referendum, and therefore takes effect in thirty days. Art. 48, The Referendum, III, § 2. G.L.c. 4, § 1. Commonwealth v. Yee, 361 Mass. 533, 537-538 (1972). The law took effect on November 18, 1983, over a month before the case was argued before this court.