Opinion
14-P-159
11-24-2014
COMMONWEALTH v. KRISTIN R. WOOLF.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant was found guilty, after a jury-waived trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On direct appeal, the defendant claims it was error to deny her motion for a required finding of not guilty. We affirm.
The defendant was also charged with negligent operation of a motor vehicle so as to endanger, but she was acquitted of that charge.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we consider whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find each essential element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 912 n.6 (2009). The crime of operating under the influence, G. L. c. 90, § 24, requires (1) operation of a vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) while under the influence of alcohol. Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 631 (1995).
The defendant does not dispute that she was intoxicated at the time of her arrest, and in any event there was strong evidence of this adduced at trial. She also admitted to police officers who came across the defendant's car parked off the road in Orleans that she had been driving the car from Provincetown to Hyannis with her boyfriend, and this admission was supported by corroborating evidence. See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 401 Mass. 470, 473 (1988). For example, the only other person on the scene who might have been the driver (the boyfriend) was found passed out in the passenger's seat. The trial judge was also permitted to consider, as evidence of operation, the fact that the defendant cooperated with the field sobriety tests. O'Connor, 420 Mass. at 632.
The defendant's eyes were bloodshot, her complexion was flushed, her speech was slurred, she smelled of alcohol, she was unsteady on her feet (and in fact stumbled to the ground), she admitted to having consumed four drinks earlier that evening, and she failed all of the field sobriety tests administered at the scene (in dramatic fashion).
Because there was ample evidence of the defendant's intoxication and of her having driven the vehicle on a street that was unquestionably a public way, the defendant is left to argue there was insufficient evidence that she was intoxicated during the time when she was operating the vehicle. In other words, she suggests that she instead might have become intoxicated at some point after she drove off the road into the woods. There is no merit to this claim. Putting aside the absence of any evidence to support the defendant's theory, the trial judge had ample evidence on which to draw the reasonable inference that she was intoxicated while operating her vehicle. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 398 Mass. 63, 68 (1986). Indeed, the position of the car itself supports such a conclusion. Ibid.
Moreover, although Officer Haley could not recall whether the engine was running, he testified that the vehicle's exterior lights were on.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rapoza, C.J., Milkey & Hanlon, JJ.),
Panel members appear in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: November 24, 2014.