Opinion
14-P-40
02-20-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. ANTONIO R. WILLIAMS.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Antonio R. Williams, was charged with one count of possessing a class B substance with the intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A(a), and with doing so in a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. He appeals the denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to these charges based on the fact that the class B substance was submitted to the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton drug lab or lab) during the time that Annie Dookhan worked there. See generally Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 338-342 (2014). We affirm.
Background. The defendant was arrested on July 29, 2007, and arraigned on the class B drug charges on July 30, 2007. Thereafter, the alleged class B substance was sent for analysis to the Hinton drug lab, where it was received on August 23, 2007. On September 25, 2007, prior to the lab's performance of an analysis and the issuance of a drug certificate, a District Court judge accepted the defendant's guilty pleas.
The substance sent to the lab was subsequently analyzed on December 3, 2007, and a drug certificate issued on December 4, 2007, more than two months after the defendant's guilty pleas. Annie Dookhan did not sign the certificate as either the primary or secondary chemist.
Standard of review. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial, Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 390 Mass. 714, 715 (1984), which can be allowed when it appears that justice may not have been done. Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial, we "determine whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Williams, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 353 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Milley, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 687 (2006).
Discussion. The defendant cites the fact that he was unaware of Dookhan's misconduct at the time of his guilty pleas and argues that it was error to deny the motion to withdraw his pleas, relying on Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. at 345-346. The defendant thus does not support his claim on appeal by asserting a facial defect in the plea procedure itself. Rather, he argues that his pleas were in some way tainted by government misconduct. To succeed in such a claim, the defendant must show "both that 'egregiously impermissible conduct . . . by government agents . . . antedated the entry of his plea' and that 'the misconduct influenced his decision to plead guilty or, put another way, that it was material to that choice.'" Id. at 346, quoting from Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006). We conclude that he has failed to satisfy either of these requirements.
This case differs significantly from Scott on its facts. Even were we to conclude, which we do not, that the defendant has demonstrated "impermissible conduct" by government agents in his case, he has failed to establish that such conduct "antedated the entry of his plea" and thereafter influenced his decision to plead guilty. In Scott, the lab tested the substance in question and issued a drug certificate before the defendant's plea. Scott, supra at 342-343. Here, the defendant pleaded guilty prior to any testing of the class B substance with which he was charged and two months prior to the eventual issuance of a drug certificate by the lab. Consequently, it cannot be said that any alleged misconduct at the lab influenced the defendant's decision to change his pleas.
In any case, the defendant has not demonstrated that there was in fact misconduct at the lab with respect to the drug certificate that eventually issued. Indeed, there is no evidence that Dookhan was involved in any way with the analysis performed on the substance submitted in his case. Consequently here, unlike in Scott, because Dookhan did not sign the drug analysis certificate either as the primary or secondary chemist, the defendant is not entitled to a conclusive presumption that misconduct occurred. See id. at 338, 352. At the same time, the record does not establish misconduct on the part of any other government agent relative to the drug certificate that eventually issued.
The defendant asks that we take into account the contents of a written report about conditions at the Hinton drug lab that was released on March 4, 2014, by the Office of the Inspector General. The report is not part the record below and was issued after proceedings were concluded in the trial court and this appeal was filed. Accordingly, we do not consider it in deciding this appeal.
Conclusion. It has not been shown that the defendant's decision to change his pleas to guilty was influenced in any way by misconduct at the Hinton drug lab. We thus discern neither error of law nor abuse of discretion in the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Order denying motion to withdraw guilty pleas affirmed.
By the Court (Rapoza, C.J., Cohen & Green, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: February 20, 2015.