Opinion
2879 EDA 2022 J-S37018-23
01-12-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MAURICE WILLIAMS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 14, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000444-2020
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM
SULLIVAN, J.
Maurice Williams ("Williams") appeals from the judgment of sentence following his conviction of unauthorized use of automobile.[ We affirm.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928.
As stated by the trial court, the relevant facts underlying Williams's convictions were as follows:
On December 7, 2019, between 5:45 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., [Reid Brown, Jr. ("Mr. Brown")] parked his 2018 Hyundai Sonata in front of his home on the 800 block of E. Rittenhouse Street in Philadelphia. Mr. Brown inadvertently dropped his car keys outside of his home prior to entering the front door. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Mr. Brown looked outside and noticed that his car was gone. After confirming that neither his wife nor sons took the car Mr. Brown called the police to report it stolen.
On his cell phone, Mr. Brown tracked the stolen car's approximate location by using Hyundai's GPS-enabled "Blue Link" application. Accompanied by his wife, Mr. Brown drove his wife's car to several locations in the city attempting to locate his stolen Hyundai. Additionally, Mr. Brown and his wife drove to the 35thpolice district and requested assistance in recovering the vehicle. Mr. Brown and his wife eventually located the stolen Hyundai in
the parking lot of Martin Luther King High School. Mr. Brown pulled his wife's car directly behind the Hyundai. Mr. Brown and his wife approached his stolen vehicle and called 911.
[Williams]-the sole occupant of Mr. Brown's Hyundai-was sitting in the driver's seat listening to music when Mr. Brown and his wife approached. Mr. Brown testified that [Williams] was wearing Mr. Brown's Eagles hat and was in possession of a bottle of liquor-both of which Mr. Brown secured in his vehicle before it was stolen. According to Mr. Brown, [Williams] initially said the car was his. However, [Williams] subsequently told Mr. Brown that he rented the vehicle from an individual identified as "Anwar" for $100. Mr. Brown kept [Williams] at the scene until the police arrived.
Officer [Christine] Little testified that [Williams] was sitting in the driver's seat of the Hyundai when she responded to the scene.
[Williams] testified and provided an entirely different version of events, claiming that his car was in the shop and as a result he paid his friend Anwar to drive [him] around town. [Williams] further testified that he never drove the Hyundai. Moreover, [Williams] claimed that he was standing outside of the vehicle waiting for his phone to charge when Mr. Brown and his wife approached him in the parking lot of Martin Luther King High School. [Williams] also testified that he was unsure whether Anwar was the owner of the vehicle, but continued, that he could not have committed a crime because he was outside of the vehicle.
This court found the testimony of both Mr. Brown and Officer Little credible. Conversely, the court found that [Williams's] testimony was self-serving and lacked credibility.See Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 1-3 (some grammar and spacing corrected; record citations omitted).
We note with disapproval that Williams failed to secure the presence of the trial transcript in the certified record.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, convicted Williams of unauthorized use of automobile and imposed a sentence of one year of reporting probation. Williams timely appealed, and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Williams raises the following issue:
Was the evidence insufficient to convict on the charge of unauthorized use of an automobile where the Commonwealth failed to prove that [Williams] was at least reckless as to his lack of permission to use the car?Williams's Brief at 3.
This Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence under the following standard:
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.Commonwealth v. Stahl, 175 A.3d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 2017) (added emphasis removed). In reviewing a sufficiency claim, this Court has also acknowledged that:
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. . . . The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
A person commits unauthorized use of an automobile if he operates it without the consent of the owner; it is a defense to prosecution that the actor reasonably believed the owner would have consented to the operation had he known of it. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928. To prove guilt, the evidence must show that the accused acted knowingly or recklessly regarding the owner's consent. See Commonwealth v. Hogan, 468 A.2d 493, 496-97 (Pa. Super. 1983). A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(a)(3). The necessary knowledge or recklessness may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Hogan, 468 A.2d at 496. Whether possession of goods is unexplained is a question of fact. A court may consider the circumstances the Commonwealth presents as suggesting an explanation for the accused's possession. See id. at 496-97.
Williams asserts the circumstances surrounding his possession of the car show that he acted innocently because, inter alia, the car had no physical damage, he explained his possession of the car, and he did not flee when approached. He also asserts the circumstances failed to prove he acted in conscious disregard of a substantial risk the car was stolen. Finally, he asserts that this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 505 A.2d 255 (Pa. Super. 1985), compels relief.
The trial court found Williams possessed the requisite recklessness with the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, his conduct, and his appropriation of Mr. Brown's possessions. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 4-5.
Viewed under the applicable standard of review, the facts show that Williams was found sitting alone in the driver's seat of a car belonging to Mr. Brown that was recently stolen. The stolen car belonged to Mr. Brown. When Mr. Brown confronted Williams at the scene, Williams was wearing Mr. Brown's hat and drinking liquor Mr. Brown kept in the car. See N.T., 5/19/22, 33-35. Williams possessed Mr. Brown's car keys, which Mr. Brown had not given him See id. at 27-30, 36. Williams originally claimed the car was his but changed his account quickly when Mr. Brown confronted him. See id. Moreover, Williams's assertion that he had been in the parking lot for two or three hours was contradicted by Mr. Brown's credited testimony that he had tracked the car around Philadelphia for hours before finding it. See id. at 30-33. Under these facts, it was reasonable to infer that Williams acted recklessly and lacked consent to possess Mr. Brown's car and would not have reasonably believed Mr. Brown consented to his use of the car to drive around Philadelphia and wear his hat and drink his liquor. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928; Hogan, 468 A.2d at 496-97 (stating that the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is strong enough to demonstrate an inference of guilty knowledge, which is a higher proof showing than recklessness). See also Commonwealth v. Lovette, 450 A.2d 975, 977 (Pa. 1982) (stating that circumstantial evidence does not preclude a conviction where the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence overcomes the presumption of innocence).
Our standard of review requires us to review the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the verdict winner. See Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 878-79 (Pa. 2008) (rejecting Diggs's sufficiency challenge as improperly based on a view of the facts in the light most favorable to him). Here, Williams cannot demonstrate evidentiary insufficiency merely because he offered an alternative explanation for his possession of the car attributable to "Anwar's" renting the car to him; "even if the accused offers an explanation, the trier of fact may consider the possession as unexplained if [the court] determines the explanation is unsatisfactory." Hogan, 468 A.2d at 497; Cf. In Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 651-52 (Pa. Super. 2017) (finding evidence of receiving stolen property sufficient in part because accused falsely claimed he was a passenger in a stolen car rather than its driver). The trial court plainly found Williams's explanation unsatisfactory. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 5.
Dunlap, which Williams cites, does not compel a different result. In that case, Dunlap parked a car that had been stolen nine days earlier, then returned to it minutes later with the keys and freely admitted to driving it. See Dunlap, 505 A.2d at 258. Here, although Williams had the keys to the car, he did not admit to driving it and claimed, contrary to other evidence, that the car had been parked for several hours. Additionally, he initially lied and told the owner of the car that he was the car's owner. These facts make Dunlap inapposite. Williams's sufficiency claim fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.