Opinion
J-S06004-14 No. 1880 MDA 2012
03-28-2014
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. RAHEIM ALPHONSO WILLIAMS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 1, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0005490-2011
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.
Raheim Alphonso Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of York County following his convictions for offenses arising out of a robbery in York City. After careful review, we affirm.
The underlying facts of the case are as follows. On the night of July 17, 2011, Tyler Knaub and Todd Lippy accompanied their friend Mikey to his house at 729 Jessop Place, York City. They opened the back door, walked through the kitchen and went into the living room, where they joined two other residents of the house, Jay and Cash. While the five men were in the living room, Williams and an accomplice, both of whom were armed, entered the house through the back door. They walked into the living room, and Williams asked if anyone knew where he could find a girl whom he thought lived in the house. When no one could provide the information, Williams and his accomplice, who were both pointing guns at the victims, ordered them to take off their shoes and put the contents of their pockets on the coffee table. They then ordered the men to remove their pants and stand by the front door with their backs to them.
The morning after the robbery, Knaub and Lippy reported the incident to police.
On June 5, 2012, at the conclusion of a two-day trial, a jury convicted Williams of two counts of robbery and two counts of simple assault. On August 1, 2012, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 15½ to 40 years for the robbery convictions, with no additional sentence for simple assault. The court also ordered Williams to pay restitution.
Williams filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on September 24, 2012. He filed a notice of appeal on October 23, 2012, and following the grant of an extension of time, Williams filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on December 14, 2012. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 28, 2013.
On appeal, Williams raises two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied [Williams'] request to admit evidence of a recanted robberyAppellant's Brief, at 4.
and drug related activity at the same residence several days earlier.
2. Whether the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose exculpatory reports and photographs of possible other perpetrators during pretrial discovery that may have led to additional investigation by defense counsel and change in trial strategy.
At trial, Williams called Kristopher Lorenzen, an employee of the York County 911 Center, to testify regarding a "Detail Call for Service Report" ("DCSR") generated on July 13, 2011, beginning at 4:43 a.m. Lorenzen testified that a person identifying himself as Christopher Chang called to report that upon returning home to 729 Jessop Place, he found his roommate Michael Smith upset and yelling. Chang told the 911 operator that men with guns came into the house and robbed Smith and some of his friends. Police were dispatched to the scene, but at 5:15 a.m. there was a notation on the DCSR that the complainant no longer wished to make a report.
Prior to Lorenzen's testimony, the trial court ruled that Williams could not ask him about the italicized portion of the last line of the report, which states: "This is all over drugs and [complainant] no longer wants to make a report." N.T. Trial, 6/6/13, at 274-78.
On appeal, Williams asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding Lorenzen from testifying that the July 13, 2011 robbery, which occurred just days before the robbery that is the subject of the instant appeal, was drug related.
"A trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous." Commonwealth v. Bozyk, 987 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
Williams argues that the entire 911 report was admissible under Pa.R.E. 803(6), which provides a hearsay exception for a:
(6) Record of Regularly Conducted Activity. A record (which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in any form) of an act, event or condition if,Pa.R.E. 803(6).
(A) the record was made at or near the time by - or from information transmitted by - someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a "business", which term includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all the conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) [certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity] or (12) [certified foreign records of a regularly conducted activity] or with a statute permitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
The statement in the 911 report that "this is all over drugs" is untrustworthy because it is unclear who made the statement. There is no indication whether it was made by a police officer or some other third party. Moreover, Williams did not present the testimony of Cheryl A. Cobb, the 911 operator who created the entry in the report. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statement at issue was an inadmissible exception to the hearsay rule.
Williams asserts that the trial court's decision to redact the portion of the 911 report referring to drug activity precluded him from challenging the credibility of witnesses Knaub and Lippy. He argues:
The account revealed that the victims were not entirely truthful about the events on the night in question. The redacted portion showed that the alleged robbery that took place was a dispute over drug money. The recanted robbery was reported at the same residence four days prior, and then withdrawn. The withdrawn report was identical to the reported robbery, where victims identified two black males who threatened danger and unlawfully took money and other possessions. The redacted portion of the transcript added a necessary layer to Mr. Williams' defense.Appellant's Brief, at 13.
Williams relies on Commonwealth v. Baez, 431 A.2d 909 (Pa. 1981) for the proposition that the credibility of a witness may be impeached by: (1) showing that on a prior occasion he made a statement that is inconsistent with his trial testimony; (2) competent evidence tending to show bias, bad character for truth and honesty, or defects in memory; and (3) competent contradictory testimony of other witnesses whose versions of the facts differ from that of the witness being impeached. Id. at 912. Even if the trial court had admitted the statement regarding drug activity, Williams has not shown how he could have used it to impeach Knaub and Lippy, who were not present during, nor testified about, the July 13, 2011 robbery. Accordingly, Williams is not entitled to relief on this issue.
At trial, Knaub testified that his stolen bank card was used at Rutter's and Arby's. On direct examination, the following exchange took place between the assistant district attorney and Detective Alan Clarkson:
Q: So did you do anything else in this investigation?N.T. Trial, 6/5/12, at 238-39.
A: I did. The credit card that was used that was taken and used I ran a check on that. It was used at a Rutter's at Pennsylvania and Route 30 in the city and at Arby's on Jonestown Road.
Normally, what we will do, most every business now has video surveillance, and the first thing we will do in these cases is we will call there. And as far as the Rutter's go, we have one person that we call that deals with Rutter's security. I called him and asked him, and I gave him the dates and the times descriptions that I may be looking for and the card number that we are dealing with. He pulled the surveillance and it showed a car.
At this point, counsel for Williams requested a sidebar and objected to the fact that the Commonwealth had not provided the defense with any photographs from the Rutter's surveillance video. The Commonwealth represented that it had only just seen the photographs, which is why it did not intend to use them. Id. at 242. The Commonwealth showed Williams' counsel a photograph of a car at the Rutter's gas pumps, and two photographs of the car leaving the parking lot. The Commonwealth also showed counsel a bank statement referencing a hold on Knaub's checking account for the Rutter's and Arby's transactions, and a transaction journal from Rutter's indicating the purchase of $45.59 of gasoline on July 18, 2011. The Commonwealth conceded that the failure to provide these materials was a discovery violation. Id. at 245. It was agreed that these items would be marked as exhibits but would not be shown to the jury.
Williams argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the Commonwealth's failure to provide the evidence to him prior to trial constitutes a Brady violation.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Our Supreme Court has explained Brady as follows:
Under Brady, a prosecutor has an obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to the guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an impeachment nature. To establish a Brady violation, appellant must demonstrate: the evidence at issue was favorable to him, because it was either exculpatory or could have been used for impeachment; the prosecution either willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and prejudice ensued. The evidence at issue must have been material evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Favorable evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Furthermore, the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.Commonwealth v. Champney, 65 A.3d 386, 397 (Pa. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted).
Williams has failed to establish the exculpatory nature of the blured photograph of a person standing by a gasoline pump and the photographs of a car leaving a parking lot, with no view of a driver or passengers. The other items, which simply show that someone used Knaub's card for two transactions the day after the robbery, clearly are not exculpatory.
Moreover, Williams has failed to establish that the photographs and documents were material evidence that, if disclosed, would have led to a different result. In fact, the only element of a Brady violation that Williams established is that the Commonwealth suppressed the evidence, a fact that the Commonwealth candidly admitted at trial.
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the 911 employee from referring to the portion of the report connecting the July 13, 2011 robbery to drug activity, and no Brady violation occurred, Williams is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered. ___________________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary