We have interpreted other speedy trial provisions similarly. See Commonwealth v. Whooley, 419 Mass. 421, 423-424 (1995) (no automatic dismissal for exceeding time limit for trial of probation arrestee under G.L. c. 279, § 3); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 370 Mass. 31, 34 n. 1 (1976) (exceeding statutory time limit for adjournment of trial in G.L. c. 276, § 35, does not lead to automatic dismissal); Commonwealth v. Davis, 367 Mass. 422, 423-424 (1975) (compensation for delay of trial under G.L. c. 277, § 73, not allowed when delay benefited defendant). In the peculiar circumstances of this case, as the judge found, where there is uncontradicted evidence that the defendant acquiesced in the delay, the Commonwealth has shown "good cause" for exceeding the sixty-day limit.

Furthermore, he fails to explain how he was in any way prejudiced by the one-day delay, which is fatal to his claim of a due process violation. See Commonwealth v. Whooley , 419 Mass. 421, 424–425 (1995). The rule states in full:

Ibid. Section 72A similarly "provided for the speedy disposition of untried criminal indictments filed against any prisoner then incarcerated in the Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Whooley, 419 Mass. 421, 423 n.4 (1995). A violation of this section could result in the dismissal of charges, ibid.; however, the defendant must "follow the procedures prescribed by § 72A for applying for prompt disposition of the charges pending against him."

We add that the defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Whooley, 419 Mass. 421, 424 (1995). Order revoking probation affirmed.

Rather, the provisions of G. L. c. 277, § 72A, were replaced by rule 36. See Commonwealth v. Whooley, 419 Mass. 421, 423 n. 4 (1995). Moreover, and as the Commonwealth correctly argues, even assuming that the defendant were correct in arguing that G. L. c. 279, § 3, is applicable, which it is not, he is not entitled to an automatic dismissal of the charges against him.

See note 4, supra. See in this regard Commonwealth v. Whooley, 419 Mass. 421, 423 n. 4 (1995). Here, as the Commonwealth knew where to find the defendant for a period of at least four years, if not nine years, it was obligated to bring him to trial on the pending murder charge.

In a similar vein, the court rejected the challenge because the probationer "points to no fact of record to indicate . . . that he was prejudiced thereby," 397 Mass. at 36-37, citing Commonwealth v. Sawicki, 369 Mass. 377, 387 (1975), which held, in similar circumstances, that, even if the right to a prompt probation revocation hearing were of constitutional dimension, "there is no indication on this record of specific prejudice to [the probationer] resulting from the delay" (emphasis added). See Commonwealth v. Whooley, 419 Mass. 421, 425 (1995) (even though probation authorities violated G.L.c. 279, § 3, in not holding revocation hearing within six months after a default warrant issued, "the defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced" thereby). "The [probationer] did not present this issue [as to the notice] to the [tribunal below], and it is therefore not properly before us.