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Commonwealth v. Washington

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
May 12, 2015
No. J-S47007-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. May. 12, 2015)

Opinion

J-S47007-12 No. 532 EDA 2011

05-12-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. TERRANCE WASHINGTON, Appellant


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on August 6, 2008 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0711021-1996, CP-51-CR-0711091-1996, CP-51-CR-0711141-1996, CP-51-CR-1009712-1996, CP-51-CR-1107481-1997, CP-51—CR-1107621-1997, CP-51-CR-1107651-1997, CP-51-CR-1107671-1997 BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:

Terrance Washington ("Washington") appeals from the August 6, 2008 Order dismissing his Petition for Relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We reverse the Order of the PCRA court and remand with instructions.

As set forth, infra, this Court reinstated Washington's right to appeal the PCRA court's August 6, 2008 Order.

The PCRA court set forth the history underlying the instant appeal as follows:

[Washington] was arrested and charged in connection with several robberies of state liquor stores committed in 1996. While awaiting trial, [Washington] was placed on house arrest with electronic monitoring. [Washington] removed his electronic ankle monitor and committed additional robberies. Following a
two-day jury trial in January 1998, [Washington] was found guilty of four counts of robbery, two counts of criminal conspiracy, two counts of violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) and two counts of possessing an instrument of crime (PIC). On January 21, 1998, [Washington] entered an open guilty plea on 17 additional counts of robbery, conspiracy, PIC, VUFA, and theft of firearms. On February 24, 1998, [the trial court] sentenced [Washington] to an aggregate sentence of 35 to 70 years [of] state incarceration.



[Washington's] [P]etition to [M]odify [S]entence was denied on March 5, 1998. No direct appeal was filed. On December 14, 1998, [Washington] filed a pro se [M]otion to file an appeal nunc pro tunc, alleging that counsel failed to file a timely [requested] direct appeal. On January 5, 2000, [Washington] filed a PCRA [P]etition, which was subsequently denied. On appeal from that denial, [the Pennsylvania Superior Court] remanded the matter for a determination of which cases required the reinstatement of [Washington's] direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, since [Washington's] December 1998 [M]otion should have been treated as a timely PCRA [P]etition. On October 14, 2003, [Washington's] direct appeal rights were reinstated for seven of his eight cases.... [The Pennsylvania Superior Court] affirmed [Washington's] convictions and sentence on October 14, 2005. [ See Commonwealth v. Washington , 890 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. 2005) (unpublished memorandum).] [Washington's] [P]etition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied on June 27, 2006. [ See Commonwealth v. Washington , 902 A.2d 1241 (Pa. 2006).]



On January 24, 2006, [Washington] filed a second pro se PCRA [P]etition, his 1998 pro se [M]otion having been treated as his first PCRA [P]etition.[] On July 24, 2007, [the PCRA court]
conducted a Grazier hearing, and determined that [Washington] could proceed pro se. On October 9, 2007, [Washington] filed a pro se amended [P]etition. On May 12, 2008, [the PCRA court] sent [Washington] a [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907 Notice, notifying him that his [P]etition would be dismissed because it lacked merit. On August 6, 2008, after review of the PCRA [P]etition, the Commonwealth's Motion to dismiss, [and Washington's] reply to the [Rule] 907 Notice, [the PCRA court] dismissed [Washington's] PCRA [P]etition as [being] without merit. [Washington] filed a Notice of Appeal directly with [the Superior Court], [which] returned the appeal to [Washington] since he had filed it in the wrong court. [Washington] then sent his Notice of Appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. On November 5, 2008, the Court of Common Pleas Criminal Post-Trial Unit returned the appeal to [Washington], indicating that it was untimely filed and that he "must file a PCRA to have [his a]ppeal [r]ights reinstated."
PCRA Court Opinion, 6/29/11, at 1-3 (footnote added).

Washington filed his January 24, 2006 PCRA Petition while his Petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was pending. See Commonwealth v. Lark , 746 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. 2000) (holding that when an appeal is pending before a court, a PCRA petition may not be filed until the resolution of review of the pending appeal by the highest state court in which review is sought or upon the expiration of the time for seeking such review). However, Washington filed an Amended PCRA Petition on October 9, 2007, after the conclusion of his appeal. On this basis, we see no jurisdictional bar to the PCRA court's consideration of Washington's Petition.

Washington subsequently petitioned for PCRA relief, seeking the reinstatement of his right to appeal the PCRA court's August 6, 2008 Order. The PCRA court dismissed Washington's PCRA Petition as untimely filed. On appeal, this Court reversed, reinstating Washington's right to appeal the PCRA court's August 6, 2008 Order. Commonwealth v. Washington , 47 A.3d 1255 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). Washington thereafter filed the instant appeal of the PCRA court's Order.

Washington presents the following claims for our review:

[1.] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err in dismissing the PCRA [P]etition where trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel ... by failing to object and demand that Judge Genece Brinkley ["Judge Brinkley"] uphold the prior ruling made by Judge Anthony DeFino ["Judge DeFino"] denying the Commonwealth's [M]otion to consolidate and where [Washington's] right to a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel and due process pursuant to the Sixth and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution
and Article I, [S]ection [N]ine of the Pennsylvania Constitution [were violated]?



[2.] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err by dismissing the PCRA [P]etition where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to exercise a peremptory strike or make a motion to strike for cause a biased juror that was improperly allowed to serve on [Washington's] jury panel and where [Washington's] right to a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel and due process pursuant to the Sixth and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, [S]ection [N]ine of the Pennsylvania Constitution were violated?



[3.] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err by failing to have an evidentiary hearing as to [Washington's] claim that trial counsel was ineffective and by failing to communicate a plea offer by the Commonwealth and where [Washington's] Sixth and 14thAmendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article I, [S]ection [N]ine of the Pennsylvania Constitution guaranteeing due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated?



[4.] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err by fail[ing] to hold an evidentiary hearing where trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate and call witness Zenata Harper ["Harper"] and where [Washington's] Sixth and 14th Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article I, [S]ection [N]ine of the Pennsylvania Constitution[,] guaranteeing due process and effective assistance of counsel[,] were violated?



[5.] Did the PCRA court err by dismissing the PCRA [P]etition where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and request a curative instruction where the prosecutor elicited misleading testimony from Commonwealth witness Yvette Forte and Lynette Huggins ["Huggins"] and where [Washington's] Sixth and 14th Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article I, [S]ection [N]ine of the Pennsylvania Constitution[,] guaranteeing due process and effective assistance of counsel[,] were violated?



[6.] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err by dismissing the PCRA [P]etition where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth proceeding under the mandatory sentencing act as a result of its failure to give the requisite notice and for failure to file a motion to withdraw [Washington's] guilty plea as his
guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently entered into and[,] as a result[, Washington's] Sixth and 14thAmendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article I, [S]ection [N]ine of the Pennsylvania Constitution[,] guaranteeing due process and effective assistance of counsel[,] were violated?



[7.] Did the PCRA Court err by dismissing the PCRA [P]etition where trial counsel was ineffective for fail[ing] to object to the overly prejudicial comment made by the prosecutor during closing arguments that the Commonwealth does not have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and where [Washington's] Sixth and 14th Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article I, [S]ection [N]ine of the Pennsylvania Constitution[,] guaranteeing due process and effective assistance of counsel[,] were violated?
Brief for Appellant at 4-6 (numbers added).

Under the applicable standard of review, we determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Spotz , 47 A.3d 63, 75 (Pa. 2012). "The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions." Id .

Washington first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object "and demand that Judge [] Brinkley uphold the prior ruling made by Judge [] DeFino denying the Commonwealth's [M]otion to consolidate." Brief for Appellant at 21. According to Washington, on January 29, 1997, Judge DeFino heard oral argument on the Commonwealth's Motion to consolidate for trial robberies committed on May 31, 1996, June 6, 1996, and two robberies committed on June 17, 1996. Id . at 25. Washington states that Judge DeFino denied the Motion to consolidate, as well as a motion to sever filed by his co-defendant, Howard Cain ("Cain"). Id . (citing N.T., 2/11/97, at 2). Notwithstanding, on the first day of trial, the prosecutor informed the trial judge, Judge Brinkley, that the prior ruling allowed the May 31, 1996 robbery and one of the June 17, 1996 robberies to be tried together. Brief for Appellant at 26 (citing N.T., 1/8/98, at 5-6). Washington now asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not correcting this error and notifying Judge Brinkley of the prior ruling. Brief for Appellant at 26.

To be eligible for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's action or omission; and (3) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error. Commonwealth v. Pander , 100 A.3d 626, 630 (Pa. Super. 2014). "Where the petitioner fails to plead or meet any elements of the above-cited test, his claim must fail." Id . (quoting Commonwealth v. Burkett , 5 A.3d 1260, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief. Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.



The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of
success. Counsel's decisions will be considered reasonable if they effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with other efforts he may have taken.



Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Commonwealth v. Stewart , 84 A.3d 701, 706-07 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Pander , 100 A.3d at 630-31.

While Washington asserts that there is arguable merit to his ineffectiveness claim based upon the failure to challenge the consolidation of the charges for trial, he does not argue or demonstrate prejudice resulting from trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. The failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim. Commonwealth v. Reaves , 923 A.2d 1119, 1128 n.10 (Pa. 2007). Because Washington has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, we are unable to grant him relief on this claim. See id .

The trial court previously rejected Washington's challenge to the consolidation of three separate bills of information for trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/04, at 14-18. Upon reviewing the record, we would conclude that Washington's claim lacks arguable merit for the reasons set forth in the trial court's Opinion. See id .

Washington next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to exercise a peremptory strike, or strike for cause, an allegedly biased juror, who ultimately served on Washington's jury. Brief for Appellant at 30. Washington points out that during voir dire, the juror explained that, in the past two months, her brother and six-year-old nephew had been held up at gunpoint. Id . The juror also indicated that, about thirteen years prior, she and her family had been "shot at." Id . Washington asserts that, when asked whether she could be impartial, the juror responded as follows:

I'll be able to put that aside. I don't know about—just remembering my nephew seeing his father being held with a gun on his head, you know—
Id . at 32 (emphasis and citation to record omitted). Washington contends that his counsel had no reasonable basis for not striking that juror, and that prejudice resulted because "[t]his juror had obviously been traumatized by her family members having a gun held to them and was then asked to complete the impossible task of remaining impartial while hearing facts about individuals having guns held to them." Id .

The party seeking exclusion of the juror has the burden of establishing that the juror was not impartial. Commonwealth v. Duffey , 855 A.2d 764, 770 (Pa. 2004). Our review of the Notes of Testimony of voir dire discloses that the juror indicated that she would not have a problem following the court's instructions and applying the presumption of innocence. N.T., 1/7/98, at 127. Moreover, Washington cites no evidence demonstrating that the juror was biased or evidence that he suffered prejudice resulting from counsel's failure to strike the juror. Accordingly, we cannot grant Washington relief on this claim. See Reaves , 923 A.2d at 1128 n.10.

Next, Washington claims that the PCRA court improperly rejected his assertion of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, where trial counsel had failed to communicate a plea offer by the Commonwealth. Brief for Appellant at 34. According to Washington, the docket sheets for three of his cases, CP 9607-1102, CP 9610-0971 and CP 9711-762, include a notation that a plea offer had been rejected. Brief for Appellant at 34. Washington argues that no offer was communicated to him, and that the PCRA court improperly failed to grant him an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Id . Washington contends that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea in order to consider the earlier offer. Id . Washington cites, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Copeland , 554 A.2d 54 (Pa. Super. 1988), in support of his assertion that relief is due. Brief for Appellant at 35.

In Copeland , this Court recognized that

[t]he decision whether to plead guilty or contest a criminal charge is probably the most important single decision in any criminal case. This decision must finally be left to the client's wishes; counsel cannot plead a man guilty, or not guilty, against his will. But counsel may and must give the client the benefit of his professional advice on this crucial decision, and often he can protect the client adequately only by using a considerable amount of persuasion to convince the client that one course or the other is in the client's best interest. Such persuasion is most often needed to convince the client to plead guilty in a case where a not guilty plea would be totally destructive.
Copeland , 554 A.2d at 60. To establish counsel's ineffectiveness based upon the failure to communicate a plea offer, the defendant must establish that "(1) an offer for a plea was made; (2) trial counsel failed to inform him of such offer; (3) trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to inform him of the plea offer; and (4) he was prejudiced thereby." Copeland , 554 A.2d at 61.

Here, Washington has presented evidence of a docket sheet entry, dated January 7, 1998, which stated "Offer rejected." The docket sheet demonstrates that there is arguable merit to Washington's ineffectiveness claim, based upon the failure to communicate a plea offer. See Copeland , 554 A.2d at 60 (recognizing that "[d]efense counsel has a duty to communicate to his client, not only the terms of a plea bargain offer, but also the relative merits of the offer compared to the defendant's chances at trial").

In Copeland , as in this case, the trial court conducted no evidentiary hearing on the defendant's ineffectiveness claim. Id . at 61. Therefore, this Court deemed it necessary to remand for an evidentiary hearing:

When an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been made, and there has been no evidentiary hearing in the court below to permit the defendant to develop evidence on the record to support the claim, and to provide the Commonwealth an opportunity to rebut the claim, this Court will remand for such a hearing.
Id . (citations omitted).

Because the PCRA court conducted no hearing on Washington's PCRA Petition, we reverse the PCRA court's denial of relief on this issue, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on Washington's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to communicate a plea offer. At the evidentiary hearing on remand, Washington will have the burden of proving that "(1) an offer for a plea was made; (2) trial counsel failed to inform him of such offer; (3) trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to inform him of the plea offer; and (4) he was prejudiced thereby." See Copeland , 554 A.2d at 61 (setting forth the defendant's burden in establishing ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure to communicate a plea offer).

Washington next claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and call Harper as a witness. Brief for Appellant at 37. Washington argues that Harper would have provided alibi testimony that Washington was with her on June 6, 1996 and June 17, 1996. Id .

To prevail on a claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call a witness, the defendant must show that (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available; (3) counsel was informed of the existence of the witness or should have known of the witness's existence; (4) the witness was prepared to cooperate and would have testified on defendant's behalf; and (5) the absence of the witness's testimony prejudiced the defendant. Commonwealth v. Dennis , 17 A.3d 297, 302 (Pa. 2011).

Here, Washington asserts that his trial counsel was aware of Harper, and that she was included on a list of possible witnesses read into the record at the beginning of jury selection. Brief for Appellant at 37; see also N.T., 1/8/98, at 52. Washington attached to his appellate brief and included with his Amended PCRA Petition a document signed by Harper, stating that she would have presented alibi testimony on Washington's behalf, and that she was available to testify at Washington's trial. Brief for Appellant, Attachment D.

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court improperly dismissed this claim without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the PCRA court's denial of relief on this issue, and remand for an evidentiary hearing as to whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call Harper as a trial witness.

In his next claim of error, Washington argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to lodge an objection and request a curative instruction in response to the prosecutor's eliciting misleading identification testimony from Forte and Huggins. Brief for Appellant at 42. Washington challenges the prosecutor's in-court reenactment, which purportedly demonstrated the elapsed time during each witness's identification of Washington's photograph. Id . at 42-45, 46. According to Washington, although each witness stated that it took several minutes to identify Washington's photo, the in-court demonstration reflected an elapsed time of only seconds. Id . at 46. Washington asserts that trial counsel had a duty to object or request a curative instruction that the demonstration was not accurate. Id .

Washington presents no legal authority supporting his claim that the prosecutor's in-court demonstration constituted reversible error. Thus, Washington has not established arguable merit to his claim, or that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for not objecting to the demonstration. Because Washington failed to plead and prove all prongs necessary to an ineffectiveness claim, we cannot grant him relief. See Reaves , 923 A.2d at 1128 n.10.

Washington next argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing him to tender an unknowing and involuntary open guilty plea on January 21, 1998, and by failing to file a motion to withdraw that guilty plea. Brief for Appellant at 48. Washington claims that

[t]he entry of the guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary on account of the Commonwealth proceeding under a mandatory sentencing provision and failing to give requisite notice and because the guilty plea colloquy did not delve into the nature of the charges.
Id . Specifically, Washington asserts that the Commonwealth failed to notify him that it would seek the mandatory minimum sentence of five years, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a), and that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him. Brief for Appellant at 51.

In reviewing Washington's challenge to the application of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a), we are cognizant that in Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), the United States Supreme Court held that

[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury.
Alleyne , 133 S. Ct. at 2155. Applying Alleyne , this Court has concluded that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 is unconstitutional in its entirety. Commonwealth v. Valentine , 101 A.3d 801, 811-12 (Pa. Super. 2013).

To be entitled to the retroactive application of a new constitutional rule, a defendant must have raised and preserved the issue in the court below:

[W]here an appellate decision overrules prior law and announces a new principle, unless the decision specifically declares the ruling to be prospective only, the new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal.
Commonwealth v. Newman , 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cabeza , 469 A.2d 146, 148 (Pa. 1983)); see also Commonwealth v. Miller , 102 A.3d 988, 996 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that Alleyne does not apply retroactively). Here, Washington did not raise this issue before the trial court or on direct appeal. Accordingly, Alleyne is not applicable.

Washington's claim that counsel's ineffectiveness caused him to tender an unknowing or involuntary plea is without arguable merit. For a plea to be valid, a defendant must be informed of the maximum penalty that could be imposed. Commonwealth v. Persinger , 615 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. 1992); see also Commonwealth v. Fowler , 893 A.2d 758, 765 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that for a plea to be valid, the defendant must be informed of the statutory maximum; there is no legal requirement that the defendant be informed of the guideline ranges). At the plea colloquy, Washington was informed of the maximum penalty that he could receive (570 years in prison). N.T., 1/12/98, 30. Because Washington's underlying claim lacks arguable merit, his claim of ineffectiveness fails. See Reaves , 923 A.2d at 1128 n.10.

Finally, Washington claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an "overly prejudicial comment" made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Brief for Appellant at 54. According to Washington, the prosecutor stated that the Commonwealth does not have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id . Washington claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to this statement and that counsel's inaction caused him prejudice. Id . at 56.

"A prosecutor's declaration during an opening or closing statement constitutes reversible error only if the prosecutor deliberately attempts to destroy the objectivity of the jury and the unavoidable effect of the remark is to create such a bias and hostility toward the defendant that the jury would be unable to render a true verdict." Commonwealth v. Mollett , 5 A.3d 291, 311 (Pa. Super. 2010). Under this standard, we cannot conclude that Washington's claim has arguable merit.

In his closing statement, the prosecutor stated the following, in relevant part:

We talked about guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel touched on it, Her Honor will define it. Let me just briefly say this, I don't have to prove—it's not my burden to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but to a mathematical certainty. Reasonable doubt has been defined as something which makes you pause or hesitate or refrain from acting in a major decision in your life....
N.T., 1/12/98, at 133 (emphasis added). The prosecutor's statement appears to imply that the Commonwealth must prove guilt to a mathematical certainty, an even higher standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt." Nevertheless, the record shows that the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" was made clear to the jury. Early in his closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following:
[Defense] counsel said the burden never shifts. It's a burden that I've got. It's [a] burden I accept. It's a burden, I submit, I met in the case for both robberies that occurred on May 31st and June 17th, 1996, and Your Honor will remind you of that in her closing argument....
Id . at 116-17. Further, the trial court specifically instructed the jury regarding the Commonwealth's burden of proof, and defined "reasonable doubt." Id . at 138-40. As the jury is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions, see Commonwealth v. Travaglia , 611 Pa. 481, 28 A.3d 868, 882 (Pa. 2011), Washington cannot demonstrate that the prosecutor's misstatement caused prejudice. Accordingly, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the PCRA court in not conducting an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

Accordingly, we reverse the PCRA court's Order denying relief. We remand the matter for further proceedings, as set forth in this Memorandum.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum. Superior Court jurisdiction relinquished.

Panella, J., joins the memorandum.

Bowes, J., files a concurring and dissenting memorandum. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/12/2015


Summaries of

Commonwealth v. Washington

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
May 12, 2015
No. J-S47007-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. May. 12, 2015)
Case details for

Commonwealth v. Washington

Case Details

Full title:COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. TERRANCE WASHINGTON, Appellant

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: May 12, 2015

Citations

No. J-S47007-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. May. 12, 2015)