Opinion
SJC-13566
11-22-2024
COMMONWEALTH v. VINCE V., a juvenile.
Brian J. Anderson for the juvenile. Kristen W. Jiang, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Caroline Alpert, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Heard: September 6, 2024.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Essex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on November 19, 2021. The case was tried before Kerry A. Ahern, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Brian J. Anderson for the juvenile.
Kristen W. Jiang, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Caroline Alpert, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ.
KAFKER, J.
As we have previously explained in a trilogy of cases, G. L. c. 119, § 52, expressly excludes from the definition of "[d]elinquent child," and thus from the subject matter jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, children who commit "a first offense of a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months or both such fine and imprisonment." The legislative purpose is also clear: to provide a second chance to juveniles who have committed an isolated act of minor misconduct. Unfortunately, the application of the statute to cases involving multiple charges has proven to be difficult. Here we address another such variation.
See Commonwealth v. Nick N., 486 Mass. 696 (2021); Commonwealth v. Manolo M., 486 Mass. 678 (2021); Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789 (2019).
The juvenile was tried on a delinquency complaint charging him with open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, a felony offense, after he was seen masturbating in a parked car. At trial, the jury were also instructed on the lesser included offense of indecent exposure, a misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months in jail or in a house of correction. The jury then found him delinquent only as to the lesser included offense. Because the juvenile had no prior offenses, and was found to have committed only a minor misdemeanor, he argued that the delinquency adjudication must be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The Juvenile Court judge denied the motion, and the juvenile filed the instant appeal. For the reasons set forth infra, we conclude that once the jury found the juvenile delinquent only as to a minor misdemeanor, and it was undisputed that the misdemeanor was his first offense, the court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the first offense of a minor misdemeanor and therefore the juvenile should not have been sentenced. Rather, the delinquency adjudication should have been dismissed as a first offense, and recorded only as a Wallace W. determination would be. See Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 800-801 (2019).
We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and Citizens for Juvenile Justice.
1. Background.
a. Facts.
On November 10, 2021, a shopper in a department store parking lot called the police to report that a male was masturbating in the passenger seat of a nearby car and had exposed himself to her. An investigating officer located a car that matched the description and license plate number provided by the shopper and found the juvenile in the passenger seat. The juvenile had no prior offenses.
b. Procedural history.
The juvenile was charged with open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 16, a felony punishable by "imprisonment in the state prison for not more than three years or in jail for not more than two years or by a fine of not more than [$300]." A delinquency complaint issued later that month in the Lawrence Division of the Juvenile Court Department, and the juvenile was arraigned the following January. At trial, the juvenile requested, without objection from the Commonwealth, that the jury also be instructed on the lesser included offense of indecent exposure, a minor misdemeanor. The Juvenile Court judge instructed the jury accordingly. The jury found the juvenile not delinquent as to open and gross lewdness, but did find the juvenile delinquent as to the lesser included offense of indecent exposure.
Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor punishable by "imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months, or by a fine of not more than $200, or by both such fine and imprisonment." G. L. c. 272, § 53.
After the jury returned the verdict, the juvenile argued that the Juvenile Court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction. The Juvenile Court judge delayed sentencing and allowed the parties to brief the issue .
The court then heard argument from both parties on the juvenile's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The juvenile argued that because the minor misdemeanor was his first offense, he was exempted from the definition of "[d]elinquent child" under G. L. c. 119, § 52, and the Juvenile Court no longer had jurisdiction to sentence him. The juvenile further argued that "the only thing that that jury verdict can function as is essentially the Wallace W. hearing because there was a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed a first offense misdemeanor." The Commonwealth responded that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over postverdict proceedings when the court had properly exercised jurisdiction up until the moment of the verdict. The Commonwealth also contended that probable cause that the juvenile committed the charged felony was sufficient to support continued jurisdiction over the lesser included minor misdemeanor, as was judicial economy. The Juvenile Court judge concluded that the Legislature did not intend for the minor misdemeanor charge to be dismissed in these circumstances. The judge therefore denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and sentenced the juvenile, issuing a continuance without a finding until the juvenile's nineteenth birthday, approximately ten weeks later. The judge also ordered the juvenile to stay away from and have no contact with the shopper. The charge was dismissed when the juvenile turned nineteen.
The judge also recognized the difficulty of the issue and the Juvenile Court's "need [for] answers around this," and encouraged the juvenile to appeal.
The juvenile thereafter filed his notice of appeal. We transferred the case sua sponte from the Appeals Court to address whether the Juvenile Court retains subject matter jurisdiction over an adjudication of delinquency for a juvenile convicted only of a first offense of a minor misdemeanor after the court conducts a jury trial that included a more serious offense.
2. Discussion.
We conclude that the court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the adjudication of delinquency, but only up until the point at which it was uncontested that this was the juvenile's first offense of a minor misdemeanor. As we have explained in our prior cases, the Commonwealth may proceed directly to arraignment and try to prove a felony or more serious misdemeanor, as the statutory exclusion from jurisdiction does not apply to more serious offenses. See Commonwealth v. Nick N., 486 Mass. 696, 700 (2021); Commonwealth v. Manolo M., 486 Mass. 678, 683 (2021).But once the jury found the juvenile not delinquent on the felony charge, and delinquent only on the minor misdemeanor, and it was uncontested that the minor misdemeanor was his first offense, the court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the first offense of a minor misdemeanor and had no authority to sentence the juvenile on the first offense. Rather the judge should have dismissed the adjudication of delinquency as a first offense. At that point, the jury verdict, and the determination that this was the juvenile's first offense, served the same, limited purpose as a Wallace W. hearing, which is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a first offense of a minor misdemeanor had occurred. See Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 800-801. It would also be subject to the same limited recording requirements.
We also note that it is undisputed that there was probable cause to support the felony charge in the instant case.
a. Statutory language.
The Juvenile Court "is a court of limited jurisdiction, which 'has no . . . authority in the absence of a specific statutory authorization.'" Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 167 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 406 Mass. 31, 34 (1989). Accordingly, the Juvenile Court may only exercise jurisdiction over "[d]elinquent child[ren]" as defined by G. L. c. 119, § 52. See G. L. c. 218, § 60 ("the juvenile court department shall have and exercise jurisdiction . . . over cases of . . . delinquent children"). In 2018, as part of "An Act relative to criminal justice reform," the Legislature amended the definition of "[d]elinquent child" to exclude children between the ages of twelve and eighteen who commit a "first offense of a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months or both such fine and imprisonment." G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended through St. 2018 c. 69, § 72 (effective July 12, 2018) . In the instant case, the juvenile was no longer a "[d]elinquent child" under this definition once the jury rejected the more serious offense and found the juvenile delinquent only as to a minor misdemeanor for which the punishment was not more than six months, and it was undisputed that the minor misdemeanor was the juvenile's first offense. The statute expressly excludes from the court's subject matter jurisdiction a first offense of a minor misdemeanor. Accordingly, under the plain terms of the statute governing the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction, once the jury's verdict was returned, the Juvenile Court no longer had jurisdiction over the first offense of a minor misdemeanor.
As we have previously explained, the court does have jurisdiction to establish that a first offense of a minor misdemeanor has occurred, at least when there is any question whether a juvenile has reoffended. Otherwise, the statute would in effect create a "Catch-22" situation: a first offense could not "occur unless there is a prior adjudication of delinquency, and there [could] never be a final adjudication over the first offense because there is no jurisdiction." Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 798. The jury verdict here, however, fulfilled the purpose of establishing that a first offense of a minor misdemeanor had occurred, in the event the juvenile reoffends.
b. Legislative purpose of the statutory amendment.
To the extent there is any residual ambiguity in the statute regarding its application here, the legislative intent behind this statutory amendment as a whole also supports our conclusion that the Juvenile Court lost jurisdiction over the adjudication of delinquency once it was established that the juvenile had committed only a first offense of a minor misdemeanor. The guiding purpose of the amendment, as we have previously stated, was to provide juveniles who have engaged in an isolated instance of misbehavior a second chance. See Manolo M., 486 Mass. at 685; Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 795. In the instant case, it is undisputed that this was the juvenile's first and only offense. Based on the jury's determination, this misconduct only constituted a minor misdemeanor. The juvenile was therefore entitled to the second chance intended by the Legislature.
c. Case law addressing loss of subject matter jurisdiction.
As we have previously explained, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party or the court at any time and cannot be conferred by waiver." Nick N., 48 6 Mass. at 702. See Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542, 547 (2018), quoting HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 464 Mass. 193, 199 (2013) ("[W]henever a problem of subject matter jurisdiction becomes apparent to a court, the court has 'both the power and the obligation' to resolve it" [emphasis added]). That a court properly exercised jurisdiction earlier in the case is not dispositive as to whether jurisdiction continues. Cf. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-478 (1990) ("To sustain our jurisdiction," there must be actual case or controversy under art. Ill. of United States Constitution; "it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals").
Here, subject matter jurisdiction was expressly raised by the juvenile once the felony charge was rejected by the jury and all that remained in the case was an adjudication of delinquency as to a first offense of a minor misdemeanor. Cf. Nick N., 486 Mass. at 701 n.8 ("If the greater charge proceeded to trial and was not proved, the minor misdemeanor charge would be a first offense, subject to dismissal under G. L. c. 119, § 52"). This first offense had also been conclusively established by the jury verdict, thereby resolving the "Catch-22" problem discussed in note 6, supra, and rendering a future Wallace W. proceeding unnecessary. The court was therefore divested of jurisdiction over the first offense of a minor misdemeanor according to the express exclusion set out in G. L. c. 119, § 52.
Finally, we briefly address the Commonwealth's concerns about efficiency and judicial economy. Although a trial was held on a charge that would eventually prove to be only a first offense of a minor misdemeanor, nothing in that process or result is inconsistent with the statutory language or purpose. Rather, the statutory distinction between felonies and minor misdemeanors was preserved, allowing the Commonwealth to proceed to trial on the felony charge, but requiring dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the jury found the juvenile delinquent only on a minor misdemeanor charge and it was undisputed that this was the juvenile's first offense. Dismissal at that point accomplished the legislative objective of providing the juvenile a second chance to avoid continued involvement with the juvenile justice system for a first offense of a minor misdemeanor, while at the same time establishing that such a first offense had occurred, should the juvenile engage in further misconduct.
3. Conclusion.
We hold that, once the jury determined that the juvenile had engaged only in minor misdemeanor conduct and it was undisputed that this was the juvenile's first minor misdemeanor offense, the court no longer retained jurisdiction over that offense. The judge should at that point have dismissed the adjudication of delinquency. This first offense of a minor misdemeanor shall be recorded only as required by Wallace W. We accordingly vacate the adjudication of delinquency and remand the matter to the Juvenile Court with instructions that such an entry be made.
So ordered.