Opinion
J. A20005/19 No. 94 MDA 2019
11-19-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RICHARD A. VAUGHN SR., Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 13, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No. CP-28-CR-0001395-2016 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:
Richard A. Vaughn, Sr., appeals from the June 13, 2018 judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County following his conviction of corruption of minors, unlawful contact with a minor—sexual offenses, criminal attempt (indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age), and indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age. After careful review, we affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1)(ii), 6318(a)(1), 901(a), and 3126(a)(8), respectively.
The record reflects the following factual and procedural history: On the evening of March 19, 2016, the victim was at the apartment of his stepmother, B.D.P., with his brother and appellant. (Notes of testimony, 2/6/18 at 20-22.) Appellant had been talking to B.D.P., whom he was dating, when he started wrestling with the victim. ( Id. at 21, 23.) As he was wrestling with the victim, appellant grabbed the victim's "private area" and "started [] rubbing it and putting it up against him through [the victim's] clothes, but he didn't go through [the victim's] clothes." ( Id. at 23.) The victim also testified that appellant French kissed him, which the victim testified tasted like coffee and cigarettes. ( Id. at 25-26.) B.D.P. testified that appellant admitted to her that he kissed the victim and that he had sexually explicit dreams about the victim. ( Id. at 49-50.)
A jury convicted appellant of the aforementioned offenses on February 6, 2018. On June 13, 2018, the trial court sentenced appellant to a term of 25-50 years' incarceration. On June 14, 2018, the trial court granted appellant's motion for an extension of time to file post-sentence motions. Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions on July 23, 2018, which the trial court denied in an order entered December 13, 2018. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on January 11, 2019.
Before we can address the issues appellant raises on appeal, we must first determine whether this appeal is properly before us. Where, as here, the defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order deciding the motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). When the motion is deemed denied by operation of law, the clerk of courts shall enter an order deeming the motion denied on behalf of the trial court and serve copies on the parties. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). The notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order denying the motion by operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(b).
Here, the 120-day period for decision on appellant's post-sentence motion expired on November 20, 2018. The clerk of courts, however, failed to enter an order deeming the motion denied by operation of law on that date. Instead, the trial court ruled on the motion on December 13, 2018, outside the 120-day period, and appellant filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of that order. Ordinarily, such an appeal would be untimely. This court, however, has held that an administrative breakdown of the trial court occurs when the clerk of courts for the trial court fails to enter an order deeming post-sentence motions denied by operation of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). See Commonwealth v. Patterson , 940 A.2d 493, 498-499 (Pa.Super. 2007), citing Commonwealth v. Perry , 820 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa.Super. 2003). Accordingly, due to an administrative breakdown in trial court operations, we decline to quash appellant's appeal as untimely and will review appellant's appeal on its merits.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's request for a new trial on the grounds that Noella Rodriguez should have been allowed to authenticate and testify to the previous inconsistent statements of Commonwealth witness [B.D.P.]?
II. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence for a conviction for corruption of minors - defendant age 18 or above?Appellant's brief at 6 (extraneous capitalization and citations omitted).
III. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for unlawful contact with minor - sexual offenses?
IV. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for criminal attempt - ind [sic] asslt [sic] person less [sic] 16 yrs [sic] age?
V. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence for conviction for ind [sic] asslt [sic] person less [sic] 16 yrs [sic] age?
VI. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the conviction for corruption of minors - defendant age 18 or above was not against the weight of the evidence?
VII. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the conviction for unlawful contact with minor - sexual offenses was not against the weight of the evidence?
VIII. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the conviction for criminal attempt - ind [sic] asslt [sic] person less [sic] 16 yrs [sic] age was not against the weight of the evidence?
IX. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the conviction for ind [sic] asslt [sic] person less [sic] 16 yrs [sic] age was not against the weight of the evidence?
In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it did not permit him to call Noella Rodriguez to authenticate Facebook messages allegedly sent to her by B.D.P. and to testify to the previous inconsistent statements allegedly made by B.D.P. ( Id. at 13.) Specifically, appellant avers that the Facebook messages and Rodriguez's testimony would establish that B.D.P. "acknowledged that she coerced the victim into fabricating the story, that she lied to law enforcement and that she knew he would be an easy target due to a past conviction." ( Id .)
Having determined, after careful review, that the Honorable Carol L. Van Horn, in her Rule 1925(a) opinion, ably and comprehensively disposes of appellant's first issue on appeal, with appropriate reference to the record and without legal error, we will adopt the trial court's opinion as our own and affirm on the basis of that opinion as to appellant's first issue. Specifically, the trial court found that appellant, as the proponent of social media evidence, failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence to establish that B.D.P. was the author of the communication in question.
In his final eight issues, appellant blends challenges of the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. Our supreme court has explained the difference between the two distinct grounds for appealing a conviction:
We note that the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require the argument section of a brief to be divided into as many parts are there are questions to be argued. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Here, the argument section of the brief contains two headings corresponding to nine questions to be argued. ( See appellant's brief at 8-18.) We have the authority to dismiss or quash an appeal if the defects in an appellant's brief are substantial and hinder our ability to render meaningful appellate review. Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Commonwealth v. Levy , 83 A.3d 457, 461 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2013). Here, we find that our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review has not been hindered, despite appellant's violation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we shall reach a decision on the merits.
The distinction between these two challenges is critical. A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Tibbs v. Florida , 457 U.S. 31 [] (1982); Commonwealth v. Vogel , [] 461 A.2d 604 ([Pa.] 1983), whereas a claim challenging the weight of the evidence if granted would permit a second trial. Id.
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Karkaria , [] 625 A.2d 1167 ([Pa.] 1993). Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. Commonwealth v. Santana , [] 333 A.2d 876 ([Pa.] 1975). When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Chambers , [] 599 A.2d 630 ([Pa.] 1991).
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence[] concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Commonwealth v. Whiteman , [] 485 A.2d 459 ([Pa.Super.] 1984). Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Tibbs , 457 U.S. at 38 n.11 []. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Brown , [] 648 A.2d 1177 ([Pa.] 1994). A new trial
should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. [ Thompson v. City of Philadelphia , 493 A.2d 669, 673 (Pa. 1985).] A trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that "notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice." Id.Commonwealth v. Widmer , 744 A.2d 745, 751-752 (Pa. 2000) (footnote omitted).
We first turn to appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claims. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient evidence to warrant convictions of corruption of minors, unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault, and criminal attempt (indecent assault). (Appellant's brief at 5.) In his brief, appellant acknowledges, "if the fact finder believes the testimony of the victim, then the evidence is unequivocally sufficient." ( Id. at 10.) Appellant, however, also contends that the "right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence must still exist, even if the fact finder believes the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim." ( Id .) We find that appellant waived his sufficiency of the evidence claims on appeal.
[W]hen challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the [a]ppellant's [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925 statement must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Such specificity is of particular
importance in cases where, as here, the [a]ppellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.Commonwealth v. Hoffman , 198 A.3d 1112, 1125 (Pa.Super. 2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Gibbs , 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied , 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010).
Here, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, appellant generally alleges that the trial court erred in finding that the Commonwealth put forth sufficient evidence to convict appellant of corruption of minors, unlawful contact with a minor (sexual offenses), indecent assault, and criminal attempt (indecent assault). ( See appellant's Rule 1925 statement.) Appellant does not identify which element or elements in which the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden for any of the convictions for which he is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, appellant has waived these issues on appeal. Hoffman , 198 A.3d at 1125, quoting Gibbs , 981 A.2d at 281; Commonwealth v. Williams , 959 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258 (Pa.Super. 2008).
Even if appellant were to have preserved the sufficiency of the evidence issue on appeal, his argument that the "right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence must still exist, even if the fact finder believes the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim," runs counter to our established case law. We have repeatedly held that the "uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of sexual offenses." Commonwealth v. Cramer , 195 A.3d 594, 602 (Pa.Super. 2018), citing Commonwealth v. Castelhun , 889 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa.Super. 2005) (collecting cases). This court has further held that even in cases where defense witnesses present contradictory evidence, a victim's uncorroborated testimony, if believed by the fact-finder, is sufficient to warrant a conviction of sexual offenses. Commonwealth v. Davis , 650 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa.Super. 1994), aff'd. on other grounds , 674 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1996) (collecting cases).
In his weight of the evidence challenge, appellant dismisses the testimony against him at trial as "nonsensical and contradictory." (Appellant's brief at 11.) Appellant further argues that "[i]t is preposterous to believe that [appellant], who had never before met the victim or his brother, decided to sexually assault the victim immediately after meeting him, in front of his brother and the person he considers to be his mother." ( Id .) In closing, appellant argues the following:
The evidence that should be believed is that of [appellant]; [t]hat he did not sexually assault a child that he had just met; that he did not sexually assault a child in front of his brother and stepmother without either one noticing; that he did not admit to or make the outlandish and horrific allegations as claimed by [B.D.P.].Id. at 12.
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, which is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Johnson , [] 668 A.2d 97, 101 ([Pa.] 1995). . . . An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of credibility. Commonwealth v. DeJesus , [] 860 A.2d 102, 107 ([Pa.] 2004).Commonwealth v. Palo , 24 A.3d 1050, 1055 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied , 34 A.3d 828 (Pa. 2011).
Here, appellant extends an invitation for us to reassess the jury's credibility determinations in his favor. This is an invitation that we must decline. Because we cannot substitute the jury's judgment on witness credibility with our own, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's weight of the evidence claims.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/19/2019
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