Opinion
J-S73024-18 No. 617 WDA 2018
01-23-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. AMOS JARARD TAYLOR, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 2, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001489-2017 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OLSON, J. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:
Appellant, Amos Jarard Taylor, appeals from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of four to ten years' incarceration, imposed after a jury convicted him of sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1, indecent assault without consent, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1), and corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii). We affirm.
We need not reiterate the procedural history and factual background of this case, as the trial court set forth a comprehensive summary of both in its April 16, 2018 opinion and order, which it subsequently relied on as its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion and Order, 4/16/2018, at 1-6 ("TCO"); Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 5/10/2018, at 1 (unnumbered, single page). Appellant presently raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in determining the jury's verdicts were based on sufficient evidence?
2. Whether the Court of Common Pleas erred [in concluding] the jury's verdicts were [not] against the weight of the evidence?Appellant's Brief at 2.
We have reviewed the thorough and well-crafted opinion drafted by the Honorable Rita Donovan Hathaway of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. We conclude that Judge Hathaway's opinion accurately and thoroughly disposes of Appellant's first issue, in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. See TCO at 6-9. Accordingly, we adopt Judge Hathaway's opinion as our own on this issue.
On appeal, Appellant argues that "[t]he Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to convict ... Appellant given the alleged victim['s] perceived lack of credibility and the dearth of physical evidence." Appellant's Brief at 9. We observe that this argument challenges the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of it. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins , 692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997) ("[C]redibility determinations are made by the fact finder and ... challenges thereto go to the weight, and not the sufficiency, of the evidence.").
In Appellant's second issue, he contests the weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Appellant argues that "[t]he alleged victim presented multiple accounts of the alleged sexual contact with differing detail and chronology." Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Specifically, he says that "[d]uring each of the alleged events, [the victim] recounted either being in the presence of a sleeping relative, being unable to awake nearby sleeping relatives, or choosing not to wake them in order not to inconvenience them." Id. at 14. He claims that "[n]one of the other eight ... occupants of the home at the time of the alleged events produced any evidence of any inappropriate contact between ... Appellant and [the victim]." Id. Further, he claims that "the Commonwealth failed to produce any physical evidence of any of the crimes, including corroborating text messages, recordings, or audiotapes of ... Appellant's alleged confession." Id. (citation omitted).
We apply the following standard of review:
As a general rule, the weight of the evidence is exclusively for the fact finder who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact. We may only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, our role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion.Commonwealth v. Castlehun , 889 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court rejected Appellant's weight claim. It explained that "the jury determined that [the victim's] testimony was credible in that it established [Appellant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at several counts. It is not the [c]ourt's role to disturb the jury's credibility determinations." TCO at 11. Further, it opined that, "[b]ased on the [c]ourt's own independent review of the record, the guilty verdict did not shock the [c]ourt's sense of justice, nor was it the result of pure conjecture." Id.
Although there were inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, no physical evidence of any of the offenses, and a lack of testimony by other occupants in the home pertaining to inappropriate contact between the victim and Appellant, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that the jury's verdict did not shock its sense of justice. Accordingly, no relief is due.
First, regarding any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, the trial court correctly discerned that the jury determines the credibility of witnesses. In this case, the jury found the victim to be credible despite conflicts and peculiarities in her testimony. See Castlehun , 889 A.2d at 1234 ("[T]he fact finder ... is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.") (citation omitted). Second, concerning physical evidence, this Court has previously rejected similar weight arguments based on a purported lack of it. See Commonwealth v. Diaz , 152 A.3d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2016) (determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's weight claim as "the lack of corroborating physical evidence does not undermine the victim's testimony, found to be credible by the jury"). Finally, with respect to Appellant's argument that the victim did not alert sleeping relatives about any of the incidents involving Appellant, the victim explained that she did not tell anybody about the incidents because she "didn't want anybody to know" and to "look at [her] differently." N.T. Trial, 10/4/2017-10/6/2017, at 53. The trial court also acknowledged that the jury was aware that the victim did not make prompt complaints following the encounters with Appellant and could weigh that evidence accordingly. See TCO at 10; see also N.T. at 139-44 (discussing the victim's failure to notify anyone of the incidents as well as arguing that there were numerous occupants living in the residence at the time of the incidents). Additionally, while Appellant contends that none of the home's occupants testified to any inappropriate contact between Appellant and the victim, the victim's mother and her two stepsisters gave testimony that Appellant — who was approximately 34 years old at the time — indicated to them that he liked the sixteen-year-old victim, thought she was attractive, and wanted to date her. N.T. at 80-81, 89, 96, 98. Further, a detective investigating the case testified that Appellant stated during an interview that the victim "had a crush on him and he had a crush on her. They would sit on the couch and cuddle and kiss and watch movies, but he denied any other sexual activity. [Appellant] also told [the detective] that he did go to [the victim's] parents and ask[ed for their] permission to date her." Id. at 101. Thus, looking at the evidence adduced at trial, we see no abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining that the jury's verdict did not shock its sense of justice. Therefore, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/23/2019
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