Opinion
No. 11–P–2037.
2013-03-20
COMMONWEALTH v. Carl L. TAYLOR.
By the Court (CYPHER, RUBIN & WOLOHOJIAN, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In light of Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 Mass. 741, 748–751 (2010), and Commonwealth v. Carey, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 587, 592–596 (2011), S. C., 463 Mass. 378, 387–389 (2012), we cannot conclude that the introduction in this case of evidence of prior acts of abuse, including the introduction of the photographs and the Boston Emergency Medical Services (EMS) report, was outside the judge's broad discretion. Nor do we think the judge placed too broad a restriction on the defendant's cross-examination. See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 408 Mass. 185, 192 (1990). The defendant has not demonstrated that he was restricted with respect to questioning the victim about her having allowed a restraining order against him to lapse. The judge's ruling that the defendant could not cross-examine the victim with evidence that the victim allegedly stabbed him in 2009 did not unduly interfere with the defendant's ability to show what he describes as “bias.” Nor, in the absence of a self-defense claim under Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 650 (2005), was the judge required to allow this evidence in to show what the defense describes as the victim's “participation in the hostile relationship.” We are not persuaded that there was any error in the exclusion of evidence about the custody arrangement concerning the children of the victim and the defendant where there was no evidence of a custody battle between the two which might have influenced the victim's testimony. We do not think evidence of the defendant obtaining a restraining order against the victim, evidence about whether the defendant feared the victim, and evidence about the victim self-mutilating by pulling out her own hair were things that the defendant was entitled to elicit from the victim on cross-examination such that any of the judge's rulings on these matters were improper. Last, the defendant's claim that he was not allowed to cross-examine the victim regarding the dismissal of earlier charges against her for purposes of showing that she was biased against him because of her gratitude to the Commonwealth for dismissing the charges is insubstantial in light of his contention that those charges were dismissed because of his own refusal to testify against her in the exercise of his marital privilege not to do so.
Judgment affirmed.