Opinion
18-P-731
06-07-2019
COMMONWEALTH v. JAQUIL STONE.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for malicious destruction of property over $250 pursuant to G. L. c. 266, § 127. Specifically, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to permit the jury to find the element of malice beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
Background. In brief, on May 1, 2014, Officer Louis Molinari of the Weymouth Police Department responded to a report that a tenant was locked out of her apartment unit in the Gaslight Village apartment complex, located at 34 Gaslight Drive. Officer Molinari found the tenant, Frany Figueroa, outside and, after feeling intense heat coming from the locked unit, observing smoke, and smelling a burning odor, the officer broke down the door. The extensive damage within the apartment included the chandelier pulled from the ceiling, lightbulbs shattered, every burner on the gas stove turned on high, a large hole in the bedroom wall, the smoke detector and radiator covers removed, the thermostat wires manipulated to keep the heat on, the carpet removed and rolled up over the heaters, and more, totaling an estimated $6,000 worth of damage. The defendant had helped Figueroa empty her apartment of its furniture the day before and had stayed in the apartment overnight with her permission. While Officer Molinari, the fire department, and Figueroa were assessing the damage within the apartment, the defendant was reclining in the passenger seat of Figueroa's car, where he had been since she picked him up from a nearby gas station earlier that morning. He told police that he had consumed "marijuana laced with angel dust" the evening before and that "the demons made [him] do it," and he apologized to Figueroa. He had abrasions on his hands consistent with causing the damage found within the apartment.
Discussion. In reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979). Malice, an essential element of G. L. c. 266, § 127, "requires a showing that the defendant's conduct was motivated by cruelty, hostility or revenge" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Armand, 411 Mass. 167, 170 (1991). Malicious acts include those "that could be construed by a jury as 'cruel' in both of its basic connotations: a disposition to harm and satisfaction in or indifference to suffering" (quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 232 (2012). See Commonwealth v. McGovern, 397 Mass. 863, 868 (1986) (extensive destruction of parking lot booth interior sufficient to prove willful and malicious destruction beyond reasonable doubt). The fact that the defendant may have been under the influence of drugs at the time does not impact the analysis, see McGovern, supra, nor is this a case where the destruction of property was "incidental to some other venture or purpose." Gordon, supra at 233, citing Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2001), and Commonwealth v. Morris M., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 692 (2007). Here, as in Gordon, supra at 230, the magnitude of the destruction, combined with the absence of any explanation as to its cause, permits "an inference of hostility or cruelty."
Additionally, when analyzing malice, "[i]t is immaterial whether the defendant knew the identity of the owner of the property." McGovern, 397 Mass. at 868. Here, the defendant knew Figueroa, who did not testify to any animus between them.
Thus, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth was sufficient to permit the jury to find the element of malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Agnes, Shin, & Wendlandt, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: June 7, 2019.