This Court has specifically held that the purpose KRS 532.110(1)(d) is "to remove judicial discretion when sentencing sex offenses generally by requiring that the sentences be run consecutively." Commonwealth v. Stambaugh, 327 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Ky. 2010). Payne argues that, while KRS 532.110(1)(d) requires the multiple sentences involving multiple victims to be run consecutively, it allows for multiple sentences involving the same victim to be run concurrently.
The majority reasoned that even though section (d) of KRS 532.110 was added after section (c), it was only enacted to prevent light sentencing of sex offenses, and the express, specific cap within (c) controls. 327 S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2010).Id. at 438.
If he is correct that his convictions were proper only for Class C felonies, then he is also correct that his maximum consecutive sentence was 20 years. SeeKRS 532.110(1)(c); KRS 532.080; see also Commonwealth v. Stambaugh, 327 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Ky.2010). If Appellant were correct, he would have been convicted of Class C felonies for each incest count and one Second–Degree Rape count, and Class D felonies for Third–Degree Rape and Third–Degree Sodomy.
McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694, 698-702 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted). See KRS 532.110 and Commonwealth v. Stambaugh, 327 S.W.3d 435, 437-38 (Ky. 2010). --------
Therefore, KRS 29A.160 is inarguably more applicable to plaintiff's claims than KRS 337.415 because the latter more generally applies to any "court-ordered appearance required by law." Commonwealth v. Stanbaugh, 327 S.W.3d 435, 442 (Ky. 2010) ("T]he more specific statute controls over the more general statute"). Applying KRS 29A.160(2) to plaintiff's claims leads the Court to one inescapable conclusion: The action must be dismissed for the plaintiff's failure to file within the ninety-day limitations period.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Stambaugh's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Stambaugh, 327 S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2010).