Opinion
No. 11–P–1123.
2012-06-15
COMMONWEALTH v. Sandra ST. JOHN.
By the Court (TRAINOR, SMITH & SULLIVAN, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On September 27, 2010, after a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of one count each of burglary, G.L. c. 266, § 14, mayhem, G.L. c. 265, § 14, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G.L. c. 265, § 15A; and two counts of reckless endangerment of a child, G.L. c. 265, § 13L.
The convictions arose from an incident in October of 2007, when Latoya Pannell, a mother of two, was severely injured by an intruder who entered Pannell's bedroom at night and poured heated cooking oil over her body. Pannell's two minor children were also in the bed at the time, and one of the children was also burned by the oil. At trial, Pannell identified the defendant as her assailant.
On appeal, the defendant argues for reversal on the grounds that (1) the trial judge erroneously denied her motion for a required finding of not guilty on the burglary charge because there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation that she had committed a breaking and entering of a dwelling in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein, (2) the Commonwealth introduced inadmissible hearsay evidence at trial, and (3) the Commonwealth improperly introduced evidence of prior bad acts to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes charged.
Although the defendant states in her brief that “the central issue in this case has always been about identification,” none of her three arguments on appeal appear to challenge the sufficiency of the identification evidence presented at trial. During her testimony, the victim identified the defendant as her attacker on at least three occasions. An officer also testified that the victim identified her assailant as the defendant shortly after the attack occurred.
Discussion. With regard to the defendant's first argument, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the burglary charge under the familiar Latimore standard.
For the intent element of burglary to be satisfied, “[t]he requisite specific intent to commit the underlying felony must exist at the time of the breaking and entering; however, that intent may be inferred from the actual commission of the felonious act, as well as from the circumstances attending the act and from the conduct and declarations of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Lauzier, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 626, 629–630 (2002) (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the fact that the defendant likely did not know of the existence of the heated oil before she entered the house does not negate the intent element. Here, it was reasonable for the judge to infer the presence of felonious intent from (1) the time of night when the defendant entered the house,
To sustain the judge's denial of the motion for a required finding, we “must find that there was enough evidence that could have satisfied a rational trier of fact of each [element of the crime] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677–678 (1979).
(2) her subsequent deliberate use of the oil as a dangerous weapon, and (3) the history of ill will between the victim and the defendant.
The record establishes that the attack occurred between 3 A.M . and 4 A.M. the morning of October 26, 2007.
See id. at 631;Commonwealth v. Bibbo, 50 Mass.App.Ct. 648, 653 (2001). The burglary charge was sufficiently supported by the evidence.
At trial, evidence was presented that Pannell and the defendant were romantically involved with the same man, Edward Gamble, and they had previously engaged in heated verbal altercations.
With regard to the defendant's second argument, we conclude that the objected-to statements by prosecution witness Lori Summers Holt, elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination, were properly admitted for the purpose of determining Holt's state of mind. See Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 454 Mass. 135, 141–142 (2009). The statements were made by Holt in response to a question from defense counsel about why Holt had given Edward Gamble's name to detectives as a possible resource for their investigation of the assault. Holt responded that Pannell had told her that Gamble had told Pannell that St. John had threatened both Pannell and Pannell's daughter (who was also burned in the attack, while another child was left untouched). The judge overruled defense counsel's initial objection to Holt's response and ruled the evidence admissible under the state-of-mind exception. The judge did strike other repetitive portions of Holt's testimony, which we must presume the judge disregarded in reaching her verdicts. See Commonwealth v. Batista, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 648 (2002) (“A trial judge sitting without a jury is presumed, absent contrary indication, to have correctly instructed himself as to the manner in which evidence is to be considered in his role as factfinder”). We conclude that the judge did not err in admitting the statements for the purpose of discerning Holt's state of mind.
Furthermore, we note that because every declarant in question, Holt, Gamble, Pannell, and the defendant, testified at trial, there was no possibility of a violation of the defendant's confrontation clause rights. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 9, 12 (2005) (testimonial statements “are inadmissible unless the declarant testifies at trial or formally is unavailable and was previously subject to cross-examination”).
With regard to the defendant's third argument, we conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting evidence of prior bad acts. “Although ‘evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct may not be admitted to show bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged,’ Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 744 (2008), such evidence may be admitted to show ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or a particular way of doing an act or a particular skill.’ Brodin & Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 4.4.6, at 152 (8th ed.2007).” Commonwealth v. Fidalgo, 74 Mass.App.Ct. 130, 132–133 (2009). The decision of the judge to admit evidence of a prior bad act is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and we will only disturb a judge's decision to admit such evidence in an instance of palpable judicial error. See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 67–68 (1998). Here, the admitted prior bad acts in question all concerned the contentious prior relationship between Pannell and the defendant, and each one was relevant to the contested issues of identity, motive, intent, and state of mind. The judge was within her discretion to find that the probative value of the prior bad acts outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 743–744 (2008).
Judgments affirmed.