Opinion
1285 WDA 2023 J-S29012-24
12-17-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NATHAN T. SNOWBERGER Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0001116-2022
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM
DUBOW, J.
Appellant, Nathan T. Snowberger, appeals from the September 27, 2023 judgment of sentence imposed by the Blair County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search by parole agents. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
We glean the relevant facts from the record before the suppression court, including the testimony of state parole agents, which the court found credible. In May 2022, when Appellant was on parole for a "drug related charge[,]" State Parole Agent Todd Yarnell received an "anonymous" call from a person who identified himself as "Brian," Appellant's supervisor at American Eagle Paper Company. N.T. Suppression, 12/20/22, at 3-5. The caller alleged that Appellant "was acting erratically at work, being confrontational with other employees and possibly selling drugs at the worksite." Id. at 6. Agent Yarnell knew that Appellant was employed at the paper mill at the relevant time and that he was subject to drug and alcohol treatment as a condition of his parole. Id. at 10-11.
The record also references the mill as the Tyrone Paper Mill. Id. at 11, 19.
Based on this information, Agent Yarnell spoke to his supervisor about "mak[ing] contact with [Appellant] and possibly conducting a search of the residence to see if anything that was told to [him] would be true." Id. at 6. The agent specified that he did not act "at the direction of any law enforcement office." Id.
On May 18, 2022, Agent Yarnell and State Parole Agents Max Soellner and Dylan Fishbaine arrived at Appellant's residence for "a planned search." Id. at 13. After finding Appellant and his girlfriend at the residence, they administered a urinalysis test on Appellant, which returned a positive result for opiates according to the agent. Id. at 7. The agent also noticed a rolled-up bill "on the counter with some powdery substance," which the agent recognized as being "commonly used to ingest drugs nasally." Id. The agents then detained Appellant and proceeded to search the residence.
The search revealed suspected marijuana THC wax and a digital scale in the bathroom and a bag in a kitchen cabinet containing 59 grams of suspected methamphetamine. Id. at 23; Affidavit of Probable Cause (Residence), 5/18/22. The agents also discovered a stun gun at the residence. N.T. Suppression at 9.
After discovering the contraband, the parole officers contacted the Altoona Police Department. Upon arrival at the residence, the police officers took Appellant into custody and provided Miranda warnings. After acknowledging his understanding of the warnings, Appellant admitted that the baggie contained crystal methamphetamine. Affidavit of Probable Cause (Vehicle), 5/19/22, at 3. Additionally, the police obtained a search warrant to search the rest of the residence. The search of the residence did not reveal any additional contraband other than $485 in currency. Id. The officers additionally obtained a warrant to search Appellant's vehicle but did not recover additional contraband.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
On August 29, 2022, Appellant filed a pretrial motion seeking, inter alia, to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the parole agents' warrantless search of his residence. Appellant asserted that the search was illegal as it was "based on [an] unreliable, uncorroborated, anonymous tip[.]" Appellant's Suppression Motion Br. at 3. Appellant emphasized that the Commonwealth did not produce either the anonymous tipster at the suppression hearing or any physical evidence such as the positive drug test. Id. at 1-3. Notably, however, Appellant's counsel admitted that he was not challenging the agents' "right to show up at [Appellant's] house" or their "right to ask him to take a [drug] test." N.T. Suppression at 32-33.
Appellant also asserted the "stalking horse doctrine," arguing that the search was illegal because the agents essentially acted as police officers investigating a crime, rather than as parole agents. Appellant's Suppression Motion Br. at 2. Appellant highlighted the agent's testimony admitting that the agents intended to search Appellant's residence even before obtaining the positive drug test.
On February 13, 2023, following argument and supplemental briefing, the trial court denied Appellant's suppression motion. The court concluded that the parole agents, whom it found credible, "had sufficient reasonable suspicion" to search Appellant's residence. Order, 2/13/23, at 1-2. The court noted that the agents "had a legal basis to enter [Appellant's] residence in light of [Appellant's] parolee status" and that they "conducted a permissible drug screen on [Appellant]." Id. at 2. The court concluded that "the anonymous tip, failed drug screen, and contraband []in plain view were sufficient in their totality to constitute reasonable suspicion for a further search." Id. The trial court did not expressly address Appellant's stalking horse doctrine claim.
On May 16, 2023, a jury found Appellant guilty of Possession of an Electric or Electronic Incapacitation Device, Possession of a Controlled Substance; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. On September 27, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 16 to 60 months of incarceration, in addition to fines and costs.
18 Pa.C.S. § 908.1(c); 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), and (32), respectively. The jury found Appellant not guilty of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance and Criminal Conspiracy. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1).
On October 26, 2023, Appellant filed pro se a notice of appeal. On December 5, 2023, pursuant to this Court's order, the trial court held a Grazier Hearing and granted Appellant's request to proceed pro se. Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the trial court relied upon its February 13, 2023 order denying suppression for purposes of its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
Appellant raises that following questions on appeal:
1. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law or fact when failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search where parole officers arrived at Appellant's home with intent to search based upon an uncorroborated anonymous tip, without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and where the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of Appellant['s] rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
2. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law or fact when failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search where parole officers switched hats, ceased acting as administrators of the parole system, acted as police officers and aided police officers in effectuating the arrest of Appellant, all of which was in violation of the stalking horse doctrine?Appellant's Br. at 4.
The Commonwealth failed to file a brief, despite requesting and receiving an extension of time to file its brief. On August 13, 2024, Appellant filed a "Motion Requesting Procedural Default" addressing the Commonwealth's failure to file a timely brief. We deny this motion. The consequence for failure to file an appellee brief is not "procedural default." Rather, the consequence is that the appellee "will not be heard at oral argument except by permission of the court." Pa.R.A.P. 2188.
A.
In both issues, Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his suppression motion. We review the denial of a suppression motion "to determine whether the certified record supports the suppression court's factual findings[,] the legitimacy of the inferences[,] and legal conclusions drawn from those findings." Commonwealth v. Gould, 187 A.3d 927, 934 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we defer to the suppression court's factual findings but not its legal conclusions. See Commonwealth v. W. Smith, 302 A.3d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. 2023).
"[O]ur review is limited to the suppression hearing record." Commonwealth v. Rosendary, 313 A.3d 236, 240-41 (Pa. Super. 2024). "We consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted." Gould, 187 A.3d at 934 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden to establish that officers properly seized evidence. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013). Thus, the Commonwealth must comply with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of Pennsylvania's Constitution, which protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. A parolee, however, has a diminished expectation of privacy, and thus more limited rights, due to their supervised status. Rosendary, 313 A.3d at 241-42.
It is well-established that "parolees agree to endure warrantless searches based only on reasonable suspicion in exchange for their early release from prison." Id. at 247 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall be determined in accordance with constitutional search and seizure provisions as applied by judicial decision." 61 Pa.C.S. § 6182(d)(4).
This Court has concluded that a "search of a parolee will be deemed reasonable, and the fruits of the search will be admissible in court, if the totality of the evidence demonstrates: (1) that the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably related to the parole officer's duty." Gould, 187 A.3d 935 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 61 Pa.C.S. § 6182(d)(1-2) (addressing searches of a parolee's person and property based upon reasonable suspicion that the parolee possesses "contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision"). Additionally, parolees, such as Appellant, on parole "from a drug-related crime, shall, without further action of the board, be subject to an ongoing condition that the offender achieve negative results in drug screening tests randomly applied." 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(e)(3).
"In order for an anonymous tip to give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it must be of sufficient quality that it may be found reliable." Commonwealth v. Coleman, 130 A.3d 38, 47 (Pa. Super. 2015). In Coleman, this Court concluded that an anonymous tip that a parolee was dealing drugs failed to provide reasonable suspicion to justify a search of his residence when the parolee was not home, where the tip was not corroborated with additional information, and the parolee did not consent to the agent's entry into the residence. Id. at 46-7.
In contrast to Coleman, this Court in Commonwealth v. B. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 537 (Pa. Super. 2014), found a warrantless search of a parolee permissible based on facts similar to the instant case. In B. Smith, agents conducted a home visit to a parolee after receiving an anonymous tip that the parolee was selling drugs. The agents entered the house with the permission of the parolee. While conducting a permissible walk-through of the house, the agents smelled marijuana coming from the basement. Without relying upon the anonymous tip, this Court concluded that "[g]iven that the parole agents were visiting Appellant at his residence in accordance with their supervisory duties, the smell of marijuana gave rise to reasonable suspicion for the agents to conduct a search for the contraband that was ultimately located in the basement." Id. at 537.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the parole agents lacked reasonable suspicion to search when they entered Appellant's residence based solely upon the "uncorroborated, anonymous tip." Appellant's Br. at 9. On appeal, Appellant avers that "the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the parole agents gained entry into Appellant's residence through consent" and argues that "the parole agents were not conducting a routine home visit because they arrived with intent to search the home for drug contraband based upon an uncorroborated anonymous tip." Id. at 25. Appellant discounts the relevance of the positive drug test and the agent's plain view of the rolled-up dollar bill, contending that "the search was already in progress" when officers administered the drug test and saw the paraphernalia. Id. at 9. Moreover, Appellant asserts that the trial court should not have credited the agents' testimony regarding the positive drug test due to the "the lack of documentation for the positive field test[.]" Id. at 23. Appellant therefore asserts that the search was illegal, such that the court should have suppressed the stun gun, THC wax, and methamphetamine. Id. at 9.
We disagree. As the trial court found and Appellant's counsel acknowledged at the suppression hearing, the agents had a legal basis to be inside of Appellant's home and to administer the urinalysis test based upon his parolee status. Moreover, the suppression court had discretion to credit the agent's testimony regarding the positive drug test and the existence of a rolled-up bill and powdery substance in plain view. Similar to the agents' plain smell of marijuana in B. Smith, Appellant's positive urine test and the paraphernalia in plain view provided the agents with reasonable suspicion that additional contraband was in the residence, justifying the agents' search of Appellant's residence. As the agents had reasonable suspicion to search based upon the information received upon entry into Appellant's residence, we need not consider the relevance of the anonymous tip or the agents' statements of their intent to search. Accordingly, this issue warrants no relief.
B.
Appellant next challenges the validity of the search based upon the "stalking horse doctrine." Appellant's Br. at 27-32. Even where reasonable suspicion exists, a court may find a search by parole agents invalid pursuant to the stalking horse doctrine. Gould, 187 A.3d at 938. The doctrine applies where parole agents "essentially 'switched hats,' and, in all relevant respects, became police officers." Id. (citation omitted). "The rationale behind the [doctrine] is to prevent a parole officer from aiding the police by statutorily circumventing the warrant requirement, based on reasonable suspicion, instead of the heightened standard of probable cause." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts look to the "purpose of the search" to determine whether the agent is acting as a parole agent, administering the parole system, or a police officer, engaging in law enforcement. Id. A relevant factor in determining the purpose of a search is whether the parole agent was acting as an agent of law enforcement or had an "express or tacit agreement" with law enforcement relating to the investigation. Id. at 938-39.
Appellant contends that the agents' search in the instant case violated the stalking horse doctrine because the parole agents went beyond their duties as agents when they "specifically arrived at Appellant's residence to conduct an orchestrated search for evidence that Appellant was selling drugs [and] then contacted police to effectuate the arrest of Appellant[.]" Appellant's Br. at 30-31.
We find no merit to this claim, which Appellant raised below but the trial court did not address. Notably, Agent Yarnell, whom the court deemed credible, testified that he did not act at the direction of law enforcement in making contact with Appellant and performing the urinalysis. N.T. Suppression at 6. Rather, the agents' initial actions of contacting Appellant and administering the urinalysis test are consistent with the agents' administration of the parole system, the purpose of which is the supervision of parolees' in "their rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community" and to enforce the "conditions of supervision[.]" 61 Pa.C.S. § 6182(a). The fact that the agents later contacted law enforcement upon discovery of methamphetamine does not negate their actions as parole agents, i.e., verifying that Appellant abided by his probation conditions including drug treatment. Accordingly, we conclude that the agents did not violate the stalking horse doctrine in this case.
Thus, we find that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying suppression.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.