Opinion
2853 EDA 2022 J-A21001-23
02-06-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. QUAMEER T. SMITH, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 29, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003222-2017
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM
NICHOLS, J.
Appellant Quameer T. Smith appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence imposed after he pled guilty to murder and related offenses. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea and challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
Briefly, Appellant was arrested and charged with murder and related charges in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Kaleem Jones. On January 16, 2018, the trial court ordered a mental health evaluation of Appellant. Psychologist Jules deCruz, M.S., conducted the evaluation and submitted a report to the trial court on February 22, 2018. Therein, deCruz stated that although Appellant had previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, he was competent to stand trial. deCruz Report, 2/22/18, at 2-5.
On February 26, 2018, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to third-degree murder, possession of a firearm prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime.[ At the time of Appellant's guilty plea hearing, the trial court conducted an oral plea colloquy and supplemented the record with a written colloquy that Appellant signed and reviewed with counsel prior to the hearing. See N.T. Guilty Plea Hr'g, 2/26/18, at 3-7; see also Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 2/26/18, at 1-4. The trial court explained the charges and the maximum sentences. See N.T. Guilty Plea Hr'g at 6; see also Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 2/26/18, at 1. Further, Appellant denied that he was under the influence of medication for psychiatric issues and confirmed that he was pleading guilty of his own free will, and that no one had forced or coerced him into pleading guilty, nor promised him anything to plead guilty See N.T. Guilty Plea Hr'g at 4, 7. The trial court accepted Appellant's guilty plea and sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. The Commonwealth filed a pre-sentence memorandum on May 25, 2018, summarizing Appellant's prior adult and juvenile criminal record and his prison infractions while he was incarcerated for the instant offenses.
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(a), respectively.
The trial court summarized the ensuing procedural history of this case as follows:
Appellant was sentenced to twenty to forty years' incarceration for murder of the third degree, a consecutive five to ten years' incarceration for possession of a firearm prohibited, followed by five years' probation on the remaining charges on May 29, 2018, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-five to fifty years' incarceration [and five years' probation]. A motion for reconsideration of sentence was filed and denied. On June 11, 2018, a[n untimely] motion to withdraw guilty plea was filed and subsequently denied. No direct appeal was taken.
[Appellant's timely, first Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)] petition was filed on April 8, 2019. Counsel was appointed who, after an investigation, filed a [Turner/]Finley no-merit letter on July 12, 2019. The [PCRA] court sent a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 to [Appellant] and all counsel on July 29, 2019. [Appellant] filed a response to the [Rule] 907 notice on August 12th[,] claiming that PCRA counsel failed to develop his claim that his trial counsel abandoned him by failing to file a direct appeal. [Appellant's] PCRA petition was dismissed on November 12th. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on December 10, 2019, with his statement of matters complained of on appeal filed January 7, 2020. Th[e PCRA] court requested the matter be remanded to determine if plea counsel had abandoned [Appellant] by failing to file a requested appeal. Th[e PCRA] court suggested:
this matter be remanded for an evidentiary hearing limited to the issue of an alleged abandonment by counsel by failing to perfect a requested appeal, or in the alternative the appointment of appellate counsel and granting of an appeal nunc pro tunc from the denial of the motion to withdraw [Appellant's] guilty plea.
[PCRA Ct. Op., 1/13/20, at 14-15].
The Superior Court authored [a memorandum] on December 16, 2020, remanding the case for a determination of whether Appellant was denied his right to direct appeal. [See Commonwealth v. Smith, 3584 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 7385798 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 16, 2020) (unpublished mem.)] New
counsel was appointed [for Appellant] on February 4, 2021 and on May 14th[,] this court ordered the release of medical records. A psychiatric examination was requested by counsel and granted on [October 7, 2021]. A new amended [PCRA] petition was filed by [Appellant] on June 8, 2022. It was agreed that trial counsel had abandoned [Appellant] by failing to timely file or pursue a motion to withdraw [Appellant's] guilty plea. The interests of justice required that [Appellant] be permitted to prepare a comprehensive motion to withdraw his guilty plea [nunc pro tunc] . . . .Trial Ct. Op., 1/9/23, at 1-2 (footnote omitted and some formatting altered).
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc on September 14, 2022, in which he requested to withdraw his guilty plea and challenged the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Along with his post-sentence motion, Appellant presented the report from a mental health evaluation performed by Anna D. Lawler, Ph.D. See Post-Sentence Mot., 9/14/22, Ex. D (Lawler Report). The trial court denied Appellant's post-sentence motion on October 24, 2022.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant and the trial court both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
We note that the PCRA court's September 9, 2022 order reinstating Appellant's post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc did not explicitly reinstate Appellant's appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Nevertheless, Rule of Criminal Procedure 720 provides that "[i]f the defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be filed . . . within 30 days of the entry of the order deciding the motion[.]" Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a). Appellant filed his notice of appeal on November 14, 2022; therefore, the instant appeal is timely. See id.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal, which we reorder as follows:
1. Did the trial court err in denying the Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing as not being knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently in violation of Rule 590 of the Pa. Rules of Criminal Procedure without an evidentiary hearing where the Appellant introduced a forensic expert report that the Appellant suffered at the time of the guilty plea colloquy from significant and severe mental health illnesses and is of extremely low intellectual functioning with an IQ of 51 and thus the Appellant's averments during the guilty plea colloquy that he did not suffer from mental health illness nor was taking medication for mental health illness should not be a bar to the involuntariness claim as it would be a "manifest injustice" not to evaluate the Appellant's "lies" against this backdrop especially where here both guilty plea counsel and the [trial] court were in possession of the mental health evaluation which contained these contradictory statements and no effort was made to clarify the contradictory statements with the Appellant during the colloquy?
2. Did the trial court err in denying the Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing without a hearing where Appellant, who has an IQ of 51 and functions in the bottom .01 percentage of his peer group in reasoning and thinking skills and also suffers from mental health illness, relied on the representations of guilty plea counsel who alternatively threatened, coerced, intimidated and made unwarranted promises and guarantees to Appellant as to the sentence he would receive if Appellant pled open to all charges?
3. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion and impose an excessive sentence when it sentenced Appellant on an open guilty plea to the statutory maximum of twenty (20) to forty (forty) years on the third degree murder charge to run consecutively to the statutory maximum sentence of five (5) to ten (10) years on the firearms count [under 18 Pa.C.S. §] 6105 where the [trial] court impermissibly considered the Appellant's juvenile record where his prior record score was 0, improperly factored in the Appellant's prison infractions, failed to consider extensive mitigation evidence of the Appellant's severe and significant mental health issues including schizophrenia,
childhood trauma, and failed to consider the Appellant's character and rehabilitative needs and focused solely on the seriousness of the crime?Appellant's Brief at 11-12 (some formatting altered).
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
In his first two issues, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. First, Appellant contends that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because he was taking medication to treat schizophrenia at the time he entered his plea. Id. at 41. Appellant acknowledges that a defendant may not seek to withdraw a plea based on assertions that contradict the statements that he made during his plea colloquy. Id. at 41-42 (citing Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003)). However, Appellant argues that Pollard is distinguishable because at the time of the plea hearing in the instant case, the trial court had a mental health evaluation which contradicted Appellant's statement that he was not under the influence of medication for psychiatric conditions. Id. at 42-43. Therefore, Appellant concludes that the trial court erred by not inquiring further into Appellant's mental health to establish that his plea was voluntary.
Second, Appellant argues that his counsel coerced him into entering the guilty plea. Id. at 43-45. Specifically, Appellant claims that his counsel induced him into pleading guilty by taking advantage of Appellant's mental health issues and low IQ and promising Appellant that the trial court would impose a minimum sentence of between ten and fifteen years' incarceration. Id. at 43-44. Appellant contends that his counsel gave him inaccurate advice, and that but for that advice, Appellant would not have pled guilty. Id. at 44-45. Therefore, Appellant concludes that he has established a manifest injustice warranting the withdrawal of his guilty plea.
In reviewing the denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we are guided by the following principles:
[T]he decision whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Although no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea exists in Pennsylvania, the standard applied differs depending on whether the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or after sentencing. When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing, he must demonstrate prejudice on the order of manifest injustice. [A] defendant may withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only where necessary to correct manifest injustice. Thus, post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny since the courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices.
Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly. In determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding the plea. Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise.Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664-65 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and footnote omitted and formatting altered).
Further, we have explained that "the law does not require that the defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made." Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted and formatting altered).
"A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court's power to deviate from any recommended sentence." Id. at 782 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Although not constitutionally mandated, a proper plea colloquy ensures that a defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary. Commonwealth v. Maddox, 300 A.2d 503, 504 (Pa. 1973) (citation omitted). "Furthermore, nothing in [Pa.R.Crim.P. 590] precludes the supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read, completed, and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea proceedings." Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212-13 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. "A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy." Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523 (citation omitted).
[T]he decision whether to hold a hearing is left to the discretion of the trial court. It is true that in borderline cases a hearing should be granted. However, this should not lead to the grant of a hearing every time a claim is made that a guilty plea was improperly induced.
. . . . [A] hearing is not necessary where [the defendant's] motion is supported solely by facts that are in direct variance with his unequivocal record responses at the time of the plea. In short, we will not allow evidence to be heard to contradict the terms of the record, where the trial court's strict adherence to the detailed procedures of the plea colloquy ensured that [the defendant] was fully informed of the nature and results of his plea.Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 791 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(2)(b) (stating that "[t]he judge shall also determine whether a hearing or argument on the motion is required, and if so, shall schedule a date or dates certain for one or both.").
Here, the trial court explained:
[Appellant] alleges that "he pled guilty because he relied on the misrepresentation of guilty plea counsel who alternatively threatened, coerced, and intimidated Appellant as well as making unwarranted promises and guarantees to Appellant as to the sentence he would receive if Appellant pled 'open' to all charges."
As noted above, [Appellant] stated, under oath, in the presence of this court, that he was not threatened or coerced and that no promises were made to him that were not included in the plea agreement. [Appellant's] contention that he was somehow forced or coerced into pleading guilty clearly is without merit. . . .
For [Appellant] to succeed in his claim, he would need assert that he was lying under oath when he attested to the written guilty plea forms. He is barred from doing so. [Appellant's] testimony and written colloquy that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and that he was not forced or coerced in any manner is binding upon [Appellant] and he cannot now attempt to withdraw his plea by arguing that he lied during the colloquy. As such this claim is meritless.
* * *
Appellant claims his plea was unknowing, involuntary and unintelligently made averring that he suffers from severe mental health illness and extremely low intellectual functioning.
After this matter was remanded, counsel was appointed, and a forensic expert report submitted on [Appellant's] behalf. [Appellant] now contends that this forensic report shows that [Appellant] suffers from severe mental health illness and is of extremely low intellectual functioning. As such [Appellant] now claims that his responses during the guilty plea colloquy are of no consequence and it was error for the court to refuse to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.
It should be first noted that a mental health evaluation was performed prior to the date set for trial. That report found [Appellant] to be competent with a psychological assessment noting a history of schizophrenia with some depressive features in fair remission with medications; a history of PTSD related to this incident and a history of head trauma. Although the evaluator noted that regardless of the outcome of the criminal matter, he would need psychiatric treatment, he was able to cooperate and function adequately in the courtroom and participate in his defense. [deCruz Report, 2/22/18, at 4-5]. . . .
* * *
[Appellant] was evaluated on November 12, 2021, and February 4, 2022 by Anna D. Lawler, Ph.D. for the defense. Dr. Lawler made the following summary and conclusions:
* * *
Was competent to submit a guilty plea on 2-26-18 as he appeared psychologically stable and appeared to understand the consequences of entering an open plea.
[Lawler Report, 4/1/22, at 34.]
* * *
Appellant's own evaluation invalidates his claim and as such, there was no manifest injustice, and the court properly denied [Appellant's] motion to withdraw his guilty plea.Trial Ct. Op. at 6-9, 11 (some citations omitted and some formatting altered).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Hart, 174 A.3d at 664-65. As stated above, Appellant completed both an oral and written plea colloquy at the time he entered the guilty plea. See N.T. Guilty Plea Hr'g at 4-7; see also Written Guilty Plea Colloquy at 1-4. Appellant stated that he was not under the influence of any psychiatric medication and that no one had coerced him into entering a guilty plea. Appellant is bound by his statements at the plea hearing and in the written colloquy, which demonstrate that his plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523. see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt.
Further, both mental health evaluations in the certified record indicate that Appellant was competent when he entered his guilty plea in February of 2018. See Lawler Report, 4/1/22, at 27-29, 34; deCruz Report, 2/22/18, at 2-5. Dr. Lawler also observed that although Appellant claimed that his plea counsel promised Appellant would receive a sentence of twelve years' incarceration, Appellant's prison health records from 2018 indicated that Appellant was aware that he had entered an open guilty plea and was not guaranteed to receive a specific sentence. Further, during the guilty plea colloquy the trial judge explained that the subject charges carried an aggregate maximum sentencing range of sixty-nine years. See N.T. Guilty Plea Hr'g at 6; see also Lawler Report, 4/1/22, at 29. Therefore, we agree with the that trial court that Appellant has not demonstrated a manifest injustice necessitating the withdrawal of his guilty plea. See Hart, 174 A.3d at 664-65. For these same reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision not to hold a hearing on Appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Stork, 737 A.2d at 791. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on these claims.
Discretionary Aspects of the Sentence
Appellant also challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Appellant's Brief at 21-40. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider Appellant's rehabilitative needs, failed to obtain additional information about Appellant's background including "extensive mitigation evidence of the Appellant's severe and significant mental health issues, past trauma, and extremely low intellectual functioning[.]" Id. at 21-28. Appellant further contends that the trial court failed to gather sufficient facts about Appellant to impose an individualized sentence. Id. at 23, 28-36 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149 (Pa. Super. 2017)). Appellant also claims that the trial court impermissibly considered Appellant's juvenile adjudications and prison infractions which "involved offenses such as talking back to a prison guard." Id. at 22, 37-38. Lastly, Appellant contends that the sentence was based solely on the nature of the offense. Id. at 22, 38-40.
"[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right." Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such claims, we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issues; (3) whether Appellant's brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code.Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
"To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
"The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis." Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d 1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). "A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellant preserved his sentencing issue in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely appeal, and included a Pa.R.Crim.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. See Corley, 31 A.3d at 296. Additionally, we conclude that Appellant has raised a substantial question for review. See Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020) (concluding that the defendant's claim that the sentencing court relied on an impermissible factor by considering the defendant's drug-related prison infraction raised a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating "an excessive sentence claim-in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors raises a substantial question" (citation omitted)).
Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and (d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:
The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).
In reviewing the record, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54 (some citations omitted and some formatting altered).
The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal granted on other grounds, ___ A.3d ___, 289 MAL 2023, 2023 WL 7123941 (Pa. filed Oct. 30, 2023). In conducting appellate review, this Court "cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose judgment in place of [the] sentencing court where [the sentencing] court was fully aware of all mitigating factors[.]" Id. (citation omitted).
"When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public, [the] gravity of [the] offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim[s] and [the] community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, the trial court "must consider the sentencing guidelines." Id. at 848 (citation omitted).
Where a PSI report exists, this Court will "presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors." Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Fullin, 892 A.2d at 849-50; cf. Luketic, 162 A.3d at 1165 (reiterating that in the absence of a PSI report, the trial court must "conduct sufficient presentence inquiry such that, at a minimum, the court is apprised of the defendant's personal history and background" (citation omitted and formatting altered)). This Court may only disturb a standard-range sentence if we find that the circumstances of the case rendered the application of the guidelines "clearly unreasonable." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).
"Further, a sentencing court is required to examine a defendant's juvenile record when crafting an appropriate sentence." Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2009). Additionally, during sentencing the court may consider "a defendant's prior arrests which did not result in conviction, as long as the court recognizes the defendant has not been convicted of the charges." Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 131 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
"Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. [An a]ppellant is not entitled to a 'volume discount' on his multiple convictions by the imposition of concurrent sentences." Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted and formatting altered).
Here, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:
The court reviewed the presentence investigation report, considered all of the testimony and arguments of counsel and imposed a sentence within the applicable guideline range. The undersigned considered [Appellant's] mental health and rehabilitative needs as well as his history, the need for the protection of the public and the gravity of the offense.
This was a brutal and completely senseless murder. [Appellant] admitted to the facts presented at his guilty plea that demonstrated that he was having a domestic dispute with Amber Coulter, which became loud enough for the neighbors to come by to check in and make sure Amber was okay. In response, [Appellant] then proceeded to retrieve a gun and then callously walked back to the front door and shot Kaleem Jones in the face and then fled.
Appellant was twenty-one years old when he committed this murder. As a juvenile [Appellant] had been arrested five times in Philadelphia as well as Camden[,] New Jersey for various offenses including robbery, assault, conspiracy, drugs, and terroristic threats.
As an adult [Appellant] has twelve arrests and eight convictions including drug dealing, resisting arrest, and now murder. While incarcerated for this offense, [Appellant] has had six prison infractions, both minor and major. The sentence imposed considered the [PSI], the [deCruz report], along with the facts that [Appellant] clearly and unequivocally agreed to during his guilty plea. As such, this claim is meritless.Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14.
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the trial court reviewed both the PSI and the deCruz reports before imposing Appellant's sentence. See N.T. Sentencing, 5/29/18, at 4. Therefore, we may presume that "was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors." See Watson, 228 A.3d at 936; cf. Luketic, 162 A.3d at 1165 (concluding that the trial court failed to impose an individualized sentence because there was no PSI report nor had the trial court performed "any other significant gathering of relevant information that the court then employed in its decision" (citations omitted)).
Further, Appellant did not challenge the adequacy of the reports, nor did he claim that further information was needed before the trial court could impose its sentence. Therefore, to the extent that Appellant argues that the trial court should have considered additional information about Appellant's background, character, and/or mental health, that claim is waived. See Malovich, 903 A.2d at 1251; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Although Appellant argues that the trial court erred by considering his juvenile record, it is well settled that trial courts are required to consider a defendant's juvenile record and may consider arrests, so long as the court acknowledges that those arrests did not result in convictions. See Lilley, 978 A.2d at 1000; P.L.S., 894 A.2d at 131. Further, to the extent Appellant claims that his prison infractions were minor and involved conduct "such as talking back to a prison guard," his claim is belied by the record. See Commonwealth's Sentencing Mem., 5/25/18, Ex. B at 4-5 (reflecting that on October 23, 2017, prison officials concluded that Appellant had conspired with others to extort fellow inmates) (unpaginated).
In sum, the record reflects that the trial court reviewed the PSI and the deCruz reports prior to sentencing; therefore, the trial court was aware of Appellant's rehabilitative needs and his mental health issues, and this Court will not reweigh the sentencing factors. See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536; Watson, 228 A.3d at 936; Fullin, 892 A.2d at 849-50. In addition to considering other relevant information, including mitigating factors, the trial court considered Appellant's criminal history, and explained that Appellant's prior record score was five, and noted that the offense gravity scores in the instant case were fourteen for third-degree murder and ten for persons not to possess firearms. See N.T. Sentencing at 4. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences in the standard ranges of the Sentencing Guidelines for third-degree murder and persons not to possess firearms. See id. at 33. On this record, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court's application of the guidelines was "clearly unreasonable" or that the trial court abused its discretion in structuring Appellant's sentences consecutively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2); Brown, 249 A.3d at 1216. For these reasons, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.