Opinion
16-P-462
02-24-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Christopher SICILIANO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The Commonwealth has appealed from the allowance of the defendant's motion to suppress statements made at the scene of an automobile stop before the delivery of Miranda warnings. We conclude that the defendant failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate that he was in custody at the time the statements were made and reverse the allowance of the motion.
We refer to the judge's findings; the facts are generally undisputed except where noted. West Springfield police Officer Nicholas Maratea first encountered the defendant at the scene of an automobile accident involving the defendant's vehicle and a plow. When he arrived at the scene Officer Maratea initially engaged in eye contact with the defendant who had remained in his vehicle, but then turned his attention to the driver of the plow who appeared to have been injured, whereupon the defendant drove off. Officer Maratea returned to his vehicle, activated his lights but not the siren, and pursued the defendant who stopped approximately one-half mile from the accident scene. As he walked up to the vehicle, Officer Maratea noticed the vehicle was nearly inoperable. In addition to the significant front-end damage to the vehicle that had been apparent to the officer when he first arrived at the scene of the accident, two of its tires were flat.
The judge's finding that Officer Maratea activated his siren is unsupported by the only evidence on the subject, namely the officer's testimony that he had activated only his lights.
While standing at the driver's side door Officer Maratea asked the defendant, "What are you doing?" The defendant responded, "I'm fleeing the scene of an accident because I'm an idiot." Officer Maratea observed that the defendant was experiencing difficulty opening his window and finding his registration. Officer Maratea asked the defendant whether he had anything to drink, and the defendant replied, "I know I've had too much to drink. Just arrest me."
During this encounter the officer observed that the defendant's speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot. He ordered the defendant to get out of the vehicle, assisting him as the defendant had difficulty maintaining balance; once out of his vehicle, the defendant declined field-sobriety tests, stating, "I'm drunk just arrest me. I've been through this before."
Discussion . The judge determined that the defendant was in custody when he made the various inculpatory statements set forth above. We review the judge's ruling by accepting the factual findings absent clear error, and making an independent determination of their constitutional significance. Commonwealth v. Scott , 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). The judge placed emphasis on his finding that Officer Maratea's initial question, "What are you doing?" was not a literal inquiry but that the officer's tone conveyed a request for the defendant to explain "ludicrous criminal conduct."
Even if the record contained any evidence on which the judge could base a finding of the officer's tone of voice at the scene, which it does not, it would not avail the defendant. A tone of incredulity, or a request to explain apparent criminal behavior, is not synonymous with placing a suspect in custody. Here the officer was standing outside the driver's side window while the defendant remained in the vehicle. The conversation between the officer and the defendant as well as their respective positions outside and inside the defendant's car were in all particulars typical of a routine traffic stop. While the knowledge that the defendant had just precipitously left the scene of an accident can fairly be said to provide a heightened and mutual expectation that the defendant would be detained, the conversation while the defendant was allowed to remain in his vehicle was investigatory, not custodial.
The judge found that Officer Maratea had informally attributed fault for the accident to the defendant while he was at the scene.
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Finally, we note that the administration of a sobriety test is not the equivalent of placing a suspect in custody. The fact that the defendant voluntarily made admissions after the officer attempted to administer sobriety tests "does not convert the interview into a custodial interrogation." Commonwealth v. Cameron , 44 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 914 (1998). "[T]here is no requirement that warnings be given prior to general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime." Ibid . (quotation omitted). "The critical question in making the custody determination is ‘whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that he was in custody.’ " Commonwealth v. Sneed , 440 Mass. 216, 220 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Brum , 438 Mass. 103, 111 (2002). See Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984), quoting from California v. Beheler , 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (Miranda warnings apply only when a suspect's freedom "is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest’ ").
Order allowing motion to suppress reversed .