Opinion
J-S17023-14 No. 1649 MDA 2013
03-21-2014
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. PAMELA DAWN SHANEBROOK, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered August 19, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-01-CR-0001181-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and LAZARUS, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.:
Pamela Dawn Shanebrook ("Appellant") appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after a jury convicted her of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, driving with a suspended license, driving on roadways laned for traffic, and careless driving.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural posture as follows:
Appellant's convictions arose out of a traffic accident which occurred on October 24, 2012. At approximately 7:00 a.m., on that date, Appellant was traveling on Berlin Road in Adams County when her vehicle left the roadway and struck a telephone pole. Upon arrival at the scene of the accident, Trooper Noah Bungard ("Trooper Bungard") of the Pennsylvania State Police interacted with Appellant.Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/13, at 1-2
After noting that Appellant's eyes were bloodshot and glassy and her responses to his questions were slow, Trooper Bungard asked whether Appellant would assent to a chemical test of her blood. Appellant verbally consented to the test. The test revealed that Appellant's blood contained diazepam, nordiazepam, morphine, oxycodone, and oxymorphone. Appellant was subsequently charged with Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance, Driving Under Suspension, Driving Without a License, Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic, and Careless Driving.
Following a jury trial held on August 8, 2013, Appellant was found guilty of Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance. The [trial court] entered guilty verdicts on the remaining four summary counts.
Following a hearing on August 19, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 90 days to 36 months for driving under the influence and a consecutive 90 days for driving with a suspended license. No post-sentence motions were filed. On September 10, 2013, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in allowing lay person testimony from Trooper Bungard that [Appellant's] post-collision attitude and behavior were not consistent with that of a driver recently injured in a motor vehicle collision with a telephone pole?Appellant's Brief at 6. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in permitting Trooper Bungard to testify about her behavior following the accident. Appellant's Brief at 12-14. Specifically, Appellant challenges the trooper's testimony that after the accident, Appellant was not behaving in a manner consistent with that of a person who had just been in a motor vehicle collision. Id. Appellant argues that the trooper's testimony was of a nature that required it to be based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, and was outside the scope of a lay witness. Id. Given that Trooper Bungard was not qualified as an expert witness in such matters, Appellant argues that the trooper's opinion testimony was outside the scope of Pa.R.E. 701 (opinion testimony by lay witnesses) and did not meet the requirements of Pa.R.E. 702 (testimony by expert witnesses).
"A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible and a trial court's ruling on an evidentiary issue will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion. Accordingly, a ruling admitting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous." Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 966 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Pa.R.E. 701 addresses the admission of opinion testimony by lay witnesses and provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is:With regard to the admission of expert witness testimony, Pa.R.E. 702 provides:
(a) rationally based on the witness's perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;
(b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and
(c) the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field.
Here, Appellant argues that Trooper Bungard, who was not qualified as an expert, presented scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average lay person when he testified that after the accident, Appellant did not exhibit behaviors typical of accident victims. Trooper Bungard's testimony reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Assistant District Attorney: [H]ow did you proceed with your investigation once you arrived ...N.T., 8/18/13, at 101-104.
Trooper Bungard: Basically, I was interviewing [Appellant] to get [her] point of view on how the accident occurred.
In speaking with [Appellant] I observed her eyes were bloodshot and glassy, her responses were very slow to me.
I observed that her attitude was not consistent with somebody that was just involved in a crash. What I mean by that is I have investigated over 115 crashes in my career as a State Trooper and the behavior she was displaying was not consistent with someone in that type or that extent of an accident.
Assistant District Attorney: [W]hat ... would you have expected to see?
***
Counsel for Appellant: Judge, I'm going to object on this line of questioning. Require expert testimony. I mean, this isn't going to impairment. This is going to her state of mind at the time. I mean, unless Trooper Bungard is also going to testify he's a doctor with experience in post-traumatic stress.
Trial Court: Overrule the objection. You may answer the question, sir.
***
Trooper Bungard: In my career and investigating crashes [of] this severity, [with] this amount of damage, a person is highly emotional, upset that the crash occurred, concerned not only for their safety, but the property... they struck. These are all
consistent with how a person would act.
[Appellant's] attitude was not concerned with ... the property, which I believe was not even [Appellant's] vehicle. She was not very ... attentive to anything that was going on around her.
***
Her speech was slow. Her responses were slow. Any answer she gave me, again, was not typical. There was something that just stuck out to me that there was more to this than just your typical crash.
***
Assistant District Attorney: What was your opinion based on your training, experience, and observations of [Appellant] regarding ... whether or not she was under the influence of drugs?
Trooper Bungard: I believe she was under the influence.
We agree with the trial court that Trooper Bungard's testimony was not outside the scope of Pa.R.E. 701. In Commonwealth v. Yedinak, 676 A.2d 1217 (Pa. Super. 1996), we held that given that our case law accepts that a police officer may testify to his or her opinion about a suspect's alcohol-induced intoxication and the suspect's ability to drive safely when the officer has observed the suspect's appearance and acts, similarly, such lay opinion testimony is admissible to prove drug-induced intoxication. Id. at 1221 ("we find no basis upon which to distinguish opinion testimony of drug-induced intoxication from opinion testimony of alcohol-induced intoxication where the witness is personally familiar with the effects of narcotics"); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14 (Pa. Super. 2008) ("a police officer may utilize both his experience and personal observations to render an opinion as to whether a person is intoxicated").
At trial, Trooper Bungard testified that he had received training and instruction with regard to the detection of drug impaired drivers. N.T., 8/18/13, at 91-94. The trial court capably explained:
Trooper Bungard's testimony contrasting Appellant's post-collision behavior and attitude with others involved in similarly serious accidents was rationally based on his perception.Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/13, at 5-6.
Trooper Bungard's comparison was also helpful to the jury's understanding of his testimony as a whole and to the jury's determination of whether Appellant's driving ability was impaired by her use of controlled substances. Trooper Bungard testified that, based on his experience, Appellant was behaving in a manner that was out of the ordinary under the circumstances. The portion of the testimony at issue helped explain why Trooper Bungard requested that Appellant consent to a chemical analysis of her blood. It also clarified why he suspected that Appellant was driving under the influence of a controlled substance and why he believed her driving was impaired as a result. Consequently, his comparison was helpful to the jury's understanding of his testimony and helpful to the jury in determining whether Appellant was driving while impaired, the key determination at issue in Appellant's trial.
Additionally, although Trooper Bungard's testimony was based on personal observations which he made in his unique role as a responding officer to traffic accidents, his comparison was not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.
The determination that Trooper Bungard made - that Appellant was behaving differently than other individuals involved in an accident of that nature - was one that could be reached by any individual applying ordinary reasoning to his or her observations. Expert testimony is not needed when a lay witness is testifying to observations that he or she has personally made that are within the realm of knowledge of laypersons.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that Trooper Bungard, who testified as to matters within his personal knowledge and experience, did not need to be qualified as an expert in order to contrast Appellant's behavior after the accident to that of others in similar circumstances, and that he gave permissible lay opinion testimony regarding his observations of Appellant shortly after the accident. Therefore, the trial court did not err in permitting Trooper Bungard's testimony.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. ___________________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary