Opinion
J-S70029-17 No. 610 MDA 2017
12-08-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RONALD A. SCOTT Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000295-2009, CP-36-CR-0000734-2010, CP-36-CR-0000736-2010, CP-36-CR-0000739-2010, CP-36-CR-0000752-2010, CP-36-CR-0001859-2013, CP-36-CR-0002081-2013, CP-36-CR-0002083-2013, CP-36-CR-0002085-2013, CP-36-CR-0002088-2013, CP-36-CR-0002229-2013, CP-36-CR-0003563-2014, CP-36-CR-0003573-2014, CP-36-CR-0003693-2014, CP-36-CR-0003795-2014, CP-36-CR-0003796-2014, CP-36-CR-0003799-2014, CP-36-CR-0003805-2014, CP-36-CR-0004108-2014, CP-36-CR-0004544-2014, CP-36-CR-0004636-2009, CP-36-CR-0005578-2012 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Ronald A. Scott ("Appellant") appeals from the March 20, 2017 order denying his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. In addition, Appellant's counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc). After careful review, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the order of the PCRA court.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion to this Court, the PCRA court detailed the history of this case, which stems from Appellant's drug use and repeated parole and probation violations. In summary, Appellant entered guilty pleas on May 22, 2013, and January 27, 2015. Thereafter, on April 2, 2015:
[Appellant] was sentenced on the 2012-2013 charges pursuant to his termination from Drug Court. He also stood for sentencing on the 2009-2010 PV convictions that were brought under the supervision of Drug Court, as well as the new charges from 2014. [Appellant] received an aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years' [sic] incarceration, plus costs and restitution. (N.T., Sentencing at 21-22.) [Appellant] was given a Recidivism Risk Reductive Incentive (RRRI) sentence of 12-1/2 years, as he was RRRI eligible as to all offenses. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512.PCRA Court Opinion, 3/20/17, at 4-5 (footnote omitted). Appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence, which the trial court denied by order dated April 24, 2015. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Scott , 144 A.3d 199, 781 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 145 A.3d 164 (Pa. 2016).
Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 14, 2016, challenging trial counsel's assistance. PCRA counsel was appointed, and he filed an amended petition on December 13, 2016, renewing Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") claims. The Commonwealth filed a response, the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing, and the parties filed briefs. On March 20, 2017, the PCRA court denied Appellant's petition. This appeal followed. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On July 26, 2017, PCRA counsel filed with this Court a motion to withdraw and a Turner / Finley letter. In the letter, counsel advised Appellant that he could represent himself or that he could retain private counsel. However, the letter erroneously stated that these rights were conditioned upon this Court granting counsel leave to withdraw. Consequently, in an abundance of caution, on July 27, 2017, this Court issued an order directing that Appellant be permitted to file a response to counsel's Turner / Finley "no merit" letter, either pro se or by privately retained counsel, within thirty days of the date of that order. Appellant filed a pro se response with this Court on September 15, 2017.
Prior to addressing the merits of Appellant's claims on appeal, we must ascertain whether counsel has fulfilled the procedural requirements for withdrawing his representation. Commonwealth v. Daniels , 947 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2008). This Court has listed the following conditions to be met by counsel in seeking to withdraw in a collateral appeal:
Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must proceed ... under [ Turner , supra and Finley , supra and] ... must review the case zealously. Turner / Finley counsel must then submit a "no-merit" letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel's diligent review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner
wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting permission to withdraw.Commonwealth v. Doty , 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the "no merit" letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel's petition to withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new counsel.
* * *
[W]here counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that ... satisfy the technical demands of Turner / Finley , the court—trial court or this Court—must then conduct its own review of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief.
In the present case, counsel complied with the requirements for withdrawal from a collateral appeal. In the motion filed with this Court, counsel alleged that he thoroughly reviewed the case, evaluated the issues, conducted an independent review of the record, and concluded there were no issues of merit. Counsel also listed the issues relevant to this appeal in his no-merit letter and explained why the appeal is without merit. In addition, counsel averred that he sent Appellant a copy of the motion to withdraw and the no-merit letter. Thus, we will allow counsel to withdraw if, after our review, we conclude that the issues presented lack merit.
PCRA counsel presents the following claims on behalf of Appellant:
1. Counsel was ineffective for not seeking a plea agreement;
2. Counsel was ineffective for coercing [Appellant] to plead guilty;Turner / Finley Letter at unnumbered 6. In addition, in his pro se response filed with this Court, Appellant asserts that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to independently review or raise the claims Appellant included in his pro se PCRA petition: (1) counsel's failure to present a viable defense; (2) counsel's failure to investigate the case; (3) counsel's failure to properly consult with [Appellant] concerning the case; and (4) the Commonwealth's lack of jurisdiction "to Arrest, Charge, or Convict [Appellant] of any Crime under its present Constitution." Response to Order, 9/15/17, at 1-2.
3. Counsel was ineffective by failing to show any interest in [Appellant's] case, thus conveying to [Appellant] that his situation was hopeless and that he [had] no choice other than to plead guilty.
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we consider the record "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level." Commonwealth v. Stultz , 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel , 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard , 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court's findings that are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg , 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has long stated that in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel's performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) that the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the appellant prejudice. Commonwealth v. Pierce , 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001).
We have reviewed the parties' filings, the relevant law, the certified record before us on appeal, and the thorough opinion of the PCRA court dated March 20, 2017. We conclude that each IAC claim raised in the amended petition lacks merit and the PCRA court's well-crafted opinion adequately addresses those claims. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's opinion and adopt its reasoning as our own.
The parties are directed to attach a copy of the March 20, 2017 opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter. --------
As for the IAC claims Appellant raised in his pro se petition and reiterated in his response to this Court, we observe that Appellant's argument amounts to mere allegations of PCRA counsel's ineffective assistance and lacks any discussion of the three prongs of ineffective assistance set forth in Pierce. As we have often stated, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not self-proving. Commonwealth v. Wharton , 811 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2002). "[A] post-conviction petitioner must, at a minimum, present argumentation relative to each layer of ineffective assistance, on all three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard...." Commonwealth v. D'Amato , 856 A.2d 806, 812 (Pa. 2004). "[A]n underdeveloped argument, which fails to meaningfully discuss and apply the standard governing the review of ineffectiveness claims, simply does not satisfy Appellant's burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief." Commonwealth v. Bracey , 795 A.2d 935, 940 n. 4 (Pa. 2001). Accordingly, Appellant's undeveloped claim of PCRA counsel's ineffective assistance fails.
Appellant's claim that the Commonwealth lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him also fails. Appellant's arrests, charges, and convictions stem from his multiple violations of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. Thus, the Commonwealth had the authority to prosecute Appellant. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 102(a)(1) ("[A] person may be convicted under the law of this Commonwealth of an offense committed by his own conduct . . . for which he is legally accountable if . . . the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this Commonwealth. . .").
Motion to withdraw as counsel granted. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/10/2017
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