It is well-settled that a defendant who made a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver of testimony may not later claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to testify. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, [] 750 A.2d 261, 274-75 ([Pa.] 2000); Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa. Super. 1997) ("While, in retrospect, appellant may believe her failure to testify prejudiced her, the fact remains that appellant's decision was fully informed and voluntary. As such, neither trial nor appellate counsel may be deemed ineffective in this regard.")
See U.S. Const. Amdt. 5; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 9. Generally, a defendant cannot successfully claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call him to testify after a defendant has voluntarily waived his right to testify in a colloquy, unless certain exceptions are established. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Peay, 806 A.2d 22, 29 (Pa.Super. 2002)); Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa.Super. 1997). In order to sustain a [PCRA] claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the appellant of his rights in this regard, the appellant must demonstrate either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.
Generally, a defendant cannot successfully claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call him to testify after a defendant has voluntarily waived his right to testify in a colloquy, unless certain exceptions are established. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa.Super. 2014), citing Commonwealth v. Peay, 806 A.2d 22, 29 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 813 A.2d 840 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa.Super. 1997). In order to sustain a [PCRA] claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the appellant of his rights in this regard, the appellant must demonstrate either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not presented any evidence to support a claim that trial counsel's advice was so unreasonable that Appellant's decision was not knowing and intelligent. See Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa. Super. 1997) ("While, in retrospect, [Schultz] may believe that her failure to testify prejudiced her, the fact remains that [her] decision was fully informed and voluntary."). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Nevertheless, it is well settled that a defendant who knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives his right to testify will not be afforded relief based upon a claim that he committed perjury during the trial court's colloquy. See Lawson, 762 A.2d at 756 ("A defendant will not be afforded relief where he voluntarily waives the right to take the stand during a colloquy with the court, but later claims that he was prompted by counsel to lie or give certain answers."); Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa. Super. 1997) ("While, in retrospect, appellant may believe her failure to testify prejudiced her, the fact remains that appellant's decision was fully informed and voluntary.
Based on the foregoing, the record supports the PCRA court's determination that Williams made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to testify. See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 762 A.2d 753, 753 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that a defendant who made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of testimony may not later claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to allow defendant to testify); see also Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that while appellant may believe that the failure to testify on her own behalf prejudiced her, counsel was not ineffective where appellant knowingly waived her right to testify). The record reflects that Williams has failed to prove that his trial counsel interfered with his freedom to testify or gave him specific unreasonable advice so as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.
It is well settled that a defendant who made a knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver of testimony may not later claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to testify. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 750 A.2d 261, 274-75 (2000); Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa.Super.1997) ("While, in retrospect, appellant may believe her failure to testify prejudiced her, the fact remains that appellant's decision was fully informed and voluntary. As such, neither trial nor appellate counsel may be deemed ineffective in this regard."). See also Commonwealth v. Wallace, 347 Pa.Super. 248, 500 A.2d 816, 819-820 (1985); Commonwealth v. Spells, 490 Pa. 282, 416 A.2d 470, 474 (1980) ("[W]here the appellant knowingly and intelligently decided not to testify, based on conversations with his lawyer, and the colloquy with the trial judge, we find no ineffectiveness.").
In addition, where a defendant voluntarily waives his right to testify after a colloquy, he generally cannot argue that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call him to the stand. Commonwealth v. Peay, 806 A.2d 22, 29 (Pa.Super.2002); Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa.Super.1997). While Nieves recognizes that there can be limited instances where a colloquy does not preclude trial counsel from being held ineffective based on erroneous advice provided to his client about testifying, Appellant's failure to plead the matter excuses PCRA counsel from not broaching this non-record-based claim in his Turner/Finley no-merit letter.
See Commonwealthv. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa.Super. 1997).WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Once counsel has complied with these requirements, withdrawal will be permitted if, after independent review, we conclude that the issues raised by appellant do not support a grant of relief (i.e., the issues lack merit). Commonwealth v. Schultz, 707 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa.Super. 1997) (citations omitted). Counsel has detailed the nature and extent of his review thus: