Opinion
J-S75012-17 No. 445 WDA 2017
02-09-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TIMOTHY C. SAUNDERS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002794-2016 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Appellant, Timothy C. Saunders, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions of one count each of reckless burning or exploding and arson involving danger of death or bodily injury. We affirm the convictions but vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence directing Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $300.00.
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301(d)(2) and 3301(a)(1)(i), respectively.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The convictions arose from Appellant's actions on June 22, 2016 in setting fire to the vehicle of a former girlfriend, Deborah Lynn Marshall, in a parking lot at Eaton Reservoir, a/k/a Bulls Dam, in North East Township, Erie County, Pennsylvania. That day, while Marshall was walking with her dog around the reservoir, Appellant met up with her and made unwanted advances toward her. When Marshall rejected the advances,
Appellant became angry and acted aggressively toward Marshall. Marshall ran from Appellant toward her vehicle, a 2004 green Jaguar. Appellant followed Marshall, entered his own vehicle and drove into the lot where Marshall's vehicle was parked. Appellant parked right beside Marshall's Jaguar, in the space in between the Jaguar and the space where the vehicle of Scott Bigley was parked. Bigley, a friend of Marshall's, was sitting in his vehicle waiting for Marshall to return from the walk. Marshall spotted Bigley, quickly got inside his vehicle and asked him to drive away to escape from Appellant. Confused, Bigley began to drive away. Appellant continued toward Bigley's vehicle and struck Bigley's windshield on the passenger side with his fist, cracking the windshield. Bigley and Marshall drove off. They stopped at a nearby establishment where they called friends to assist them in retrieving Marshall's vehicle. Approximately [twenty] minutes or so after Bigley and Marshall had fled the reservoir parking lot, Bigley and one of the friends returned to the parking lot where they found the back portion of Marshall's vehicle engulfed in flames. Firefighters and emergency personnel were called to the scene and the fire was extinguished. The evidence established the fire to Marshall's vehicle originated on the rear passenger side; the fire was incendiary in nature and Appellant caused the fire.Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/17, at 1-2.
On December 20, 2016, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of the crimes stated above. On February 1, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of incarceration of twelve to twenty-four months for the conviction of reckless burning or exploding, and a concurrent term of incarceration of forty-eight to ninety-six months for the conviction of arson involving danger of death or bodily injury. In addition, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay restitution in the amounts of $250.00, which was for the insurance deductible for Ms. Marshall's vehicle that was destroyed by the fire, and $300.00, which was for the broken windshield of Mr. Bigley's vehicle.
Appellant filed post-sentence motions on February 10, 2017, which the trial court denied on February 22, 2017. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the Commonwealth present insufficient evidence to sustain Appellant's convictions for Arson Endangering Persons and Reckless Burning where the Commonwealth did not demonstrate that Appellant set the fire or that the fire placed any person in danger of death or bodily injury?Appellant's Brief at 8.
2. Were the trial court's verdicts contrary to the weight of the evidence where the trial court relied upon inconsistent or inconclusive evidence to convict Appellant?
3. Did the trial court err and impose an illegal sentence by ordering Appellant to pay restitution to Mr. Scott Bigley for alleged damage to a windshield where Appellant was not convicted of any crime where Mr. Bigley was a victim?
Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Appellant's Brief at 21-27. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who set fire to Ms. Marshall's vehicle. Id. at 21-26. In addition, Appellant claims that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth did not demonstrate that he placed anyone in danger of death or bodily injury to support a conviction of arson endangering another person. Id. at 26-27.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with the following standard of review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Bragg , 133 A.3d 328, 330-331 (Pa. Super. 2016), affirmed, 169 A.3d 1024 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yong , 120 A.3d 299, 311 (Pa. Super. 2015)).
The Crimes Code defines the crime of reckless burning or exploding, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) Reckless burning or exploding. — A person commits a felony of the third degree if he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids, counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, and thereby recklessly:
* * *
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(d)(2).(2) places any personal property of another having a value that exceeds $ 5,000 or if the property is an automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat or other motor- propelled vehicle in danger of damage or destruction.
In addition, our Crimes Code defines the crime of arson endangering other persons, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Arson endangering persons.
(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids, counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, and if:
18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i).(i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily injury, including but not limited to a firefighter, police officer or other person actively engaged in fighting the fire[.]
We have reviewed the brief filed by Appellant, the relevant law, the thorough opinion of the trial court, and the complete certified record before us on appeal. It is our conclusion that the trial court's opinion adequately and accurately addresses Appellant's allegation that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/17, at 5-21. Accordingly, because the trial court's analysis is supported by the record, we adopt its opinion as our own, and conclude that Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit.
We note with disapproval that the Commonwealth has failed to file a brief in this matter.
The parties are directed to attach a copy of the June 27, 2017 opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter. --------
In his next issue, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Appellant's Brief at 27-29. Essentially, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth presented inconclusive and inconsistent evidence to convict Appellant. Id. at 28-29. As such, Appellant avers that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a new trial. Id. at 29.
In Commonwealth v. Clay , 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court set forth the following standards to be employed in addressing challenges to the weight of the evidence:
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer , 560 Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d 745, 751-[7]52 (2000); Commonwealth v. Brown , 538 Pa. 410, 435, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (1994). A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Widmer , 560 A.2d at 319-[3]20, 744 A.2d at 752. Rather, "the role of the trial judge is to determine that 'notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.'" Id. at 320, 744 A.2d at 752 (citation omitted). It has often been stated that "a new trial should be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so
that right may be given another opportunity to prevail." Brown , 538 Pa. at 435, 648 A.2d at 1189.
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Brown , 648 A.2d at 1189. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Farquharson , 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1976). One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Widmer , 560 Pa. at 321-[3]22, 744 A.2d at 753 (emphasis added).
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have explained:
The term "discretion" imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Clay , 64 A.3d at 1054-1055. "Thus, the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings." Commonwealth v. Diggs , 949 A.2d 873, 879-880 (Pa. 2008).
Widmer , 560 A.2d at 322, 744 A.2d at 753 (quoting Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., 533 Pa. 441, 447, 625 A.2d 1181, 1184-[11]85 (1993)).
The trial court addressed this issue as follows:
Viewing the evidence against this standard, Appellant's weight of the evidence claim is without merit. The verdicts are not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. The verdicts are amply supported by the evidence, as summarized herein. In reaching the verdicts, the [trial c]ourt specifically considered the weight of the evidence and the nature of the evidence in this case. The [trial c]ourt stated:
The Court: ... And what I have to do in this situation is apply my own common sense and human experience and further recognize that sometimes it's necessary to rely on circumstantial evidence in criminal cases, especially when the crimes are committed in secret.
I'm satisfied that the testimony of the witnesses was truthful and accurate. And I believe that the existence of the facts that they told us about, including the confrontation of the defendant with the victim ... Deborah Marshall ... her testimony, as well as the other evidence that was presented including the evidence of the note, the evidence of the phone calls, which takes me one step further here about the motive.
Now, the Commonwealth's not required to prove a motive, of course, but the evidence of motive it tells us that individuals have more propensity or are more likely to commit a crime if they have a motive rather
than if they have no motive. So I have to weigh and consider that evidence, along with all the other evidence in the case, in deciding whether or not, sir, you are guilty or not guilty.
And I'm giving great weight to what I think was a motive. I think for whatever reason you felt rebuffed by Ms. Marshall and in your drunken state you took your anger out on her and her friend who was simply coming to her rescue and giving her a ride home. It's not necessary for me to reiterate all the evidence, it was not a long trial, you were all sitting here listening to the testimony.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/17, at 23-24.
Tr. pp. 166-168.
The [trial c]ourt appropriately exercised its discretion in reviewing the evidence and assigning weight to the circumstantial evidence in the case. Appellant's weight of the evidence claim must be dismissed.
Based upon our complete review of the record, we are compelled to agree with the trial court. Here, the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence against Appellant. The trial court weighed the evidence and concluded Appellant perpetrated the crimes in question. We agree that this determination is not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. We decline Appellant's invitation to assume the role of fact-finder and to reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant relief on Appellant's challenge to the weight of the evidence.
In his final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing an illegal sentence when it ordered that he pay restitution for damage sustained to the windshield of Mr. Bigley's vehicle. Appellant's Brief at 29-32. Specifically, Appellant asserts that, because Mr. Bigley was not a victim of either crime of which Appellant was convicted, the portion of the sentence awarding restitution to Mr. Bigley must be vacated. We are constrained to agree.
The award of restitution is governed by Section 1106 of the Crimes Code, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 1106. Restitution for injuries to person or property.18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a).
(a) General rule. — Upon conviction for any crime wherein property has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered personal injury directly resulting from the crime, the offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor.
In reviewing Appellant's issue, we are mindful of the following:
With regard to appeals stemming from the imposition of restitution as a condition of the judgment of sentence,
[r]estitution may be imposed only for those crimes to property or person where the victim suffered a loss that flows from the conduct that forms the basis of the crime for which the defendant is held criminally accountable. In computing the amount of restitution, the court shall consider the extent of injury suffered by the victim and such other matters as it deems appropriate. Because restitution is a sentence, the amount ordered must be supported by
Commonwealth v. Poplawski , 158 A.3d 671, 674 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dohner , 725 A.2d 822, 824 (Pa. Super. 1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). The sentencing court applies a "but for" test in imposing restitution; damages which occur as a direct result of the crimes are those which would not have occurred but for the defendant's criminal conduct. Poplawski , 158 A.3d at 674 (citing Commonwealth v. Wright , 722 A.2d 157 (Pa. Super. 1998)) (emphasis added).the record; it may not be speculative or excessive. The amount of a restitution order is limited by the loss or damages sustained as a direct result of defendant's criminal conduct and by the amount supported by the record.
The trial court has acknowledged that Appellant is correct and that it erred in sentencing Appellant to pay restitution to Mr. Bigley. Specifically, the trial court offered the following discussion:
Appellant asserts the Court erred in ordering restitution in the amount of $300.00 to compensate Scott Bigley for the broken windshield to [Mr.] Bigley's vehicle. Appellant claims the Court erred in ordering this restitution because the Court acquitted Appellant at Count Two, Criminal Mischief.
The factual basis of Count Two, the criminal mischief charge, was Appellant set fire to [Ms.] Marshall's vehicle causing damage in the amount of $499.00 or less.3 See Information, Count Two. On technical grounds the Court found Appellant not guilty at Count Two. Tr. p. 168.
3 The record established the value of [Ms.] Marshall's Jaguar was far in excess of $499.00. Tr. pp. 13-15; 50.
At sentencing, the Commonwealth requested restitution of $300.00 to compensate [Mr.] Bigley for the damage to his windshield. See Transcript of Proceedings, Revocation/Sentencing Hearing (Tr. Sentencing), pp. 23-24. The Commonwealth stated: "I've been asked to request restitution for [Mr. Bigley] in the amount of $300.00." Based upon the offenses as charged, Appellant objected to restitution for [Mr.] Bigley. Tr. Sentencing, pp. 26-27. At Count One, Arson and Related Offenses (reckless burning or exploding), the Court ordered restitution to be paid to [Mr.] Bigley in the amount of $300.00. Tr. Sentencing, p. 31.Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/17, at 26-27.
As the Court acquitted Appellant at Count Two, and [Mr.] Bigley is not the subject of the arson charge at Count One, it would appear Appellant has raised a viable claim of error in ordering restitution to [Mr.] Bigley at Count One. The Order of restitution in the amount of $300.00 must be set aside.
Because the damage to Mr. Bigley's windshield was not a direct result of the crimes of arson nor was it a loss flowing from those crimes, we are constrained to agree with the trial court. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in imposing an order of restitution for the damage to the windshield of Mr. Bigley's vehicle. Hence, we vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence directing Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $300.00 to Mr. Bigley.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part as to the convictions and vacated in part as to the award of restitution of $300.00. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 2/9/2018
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