See Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 625, 500 N.E.2d 774. See also Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 125, 837 N.E.2d 296 (2005) ("defendant's movement -- ‘sit[ting] up erect from a reclined position ... and lean[ing] forward’ -- add[ed] little to the analysis" where "motion judge did not find the gesture to be furtive, nor did he rely on it in denying the motion to suppress"). See also Commonwealth v. Hooker, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 683, 687, 755 N.E.2d 791 (2001) ("That the defendant moved his upper shoulders and appeared to place something on the seat is ... [not] a ground for reasonable apprehension"); Commonwealth v. Holley, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 665, 755 N.E.2d 811 (2001) ("lean[ing] over to the passenger side visor ... cannot be considered as a threatening gesture").

"There is no dispute that the initial stop of the defendant's [vehicle] and request for identification were proper." Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 124 (2005). The question is whether the exit order was proper.

"There is no dispute that the initial stop of the defendant's [vehicle] and request for identification were proper." Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 124 (2005). The question is whether the exit order was proper.

A protective sweep or “patfrisk” of a car must be justified by an officer's reasonable belief that his own safety or that of others is in danger. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 122, 124–125, 837 N.E.2d 296 (2005). Such a belief must be rooted in “specific and articulable facts.”

Indeed, an exit order could not have been issued as an aid to the investigation of criminal activity because there was no evidence at the time the order was issued that a crime had been, was being or was about to be committed. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 125 (2005). Although the Supreme Judicial Court has observed that it does not take much for a police officer to establish a basis for an exit order that will be regarded by the court as reasonable, see Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 664, a hunch is not enough.

Accord, Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72 (2005) (Operating during the daytime with one defective headlight); Commonwealth v. Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320 (2001) (Speeding and a red light violation); Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 673 (2001) (Failure to stop at a stop sign); Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122 (2005) (Failure to stop at a stop sign); Commonwealth v. Stack, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 233 (2000) (Driving with headlights off); Commonwealth v. Robles, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (200) (same); Commonwealth v. Williams, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 181, 182, rev. den. 429 Mass. 1109 (1999) (unsafe lane change); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 649, rev. den. 416 Mass. 1102 (1993) (defective license plate)., Of course, merely following and observing a vehicle does not constitute a seizure under state or federal law.

Indeed, it appears that Pinkes may have violated Massachusetts law when he ordered Wilson out of the vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 662-63711 N.E.2d 108 (1999) (state constitution requires that police officer in routine traffic stop have a reasonable belief that officer's safety, or safety of others, is in danger before ordering driver out of vehicle); Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 126-27 (2005) (failure to produce license and registration, without more, not sufficient to justify requiring driver to leave vehicle and putting him in handcuffs). At the time Pinkes ordered Wilson out of the car, the only remotely suspicious event was Wilson's failure to produce a registration.

g the defendant, thereby reducing the time necessary for his roadside investigation. See Commonwealth v. Locke , 89 Mass.App.Ct. 497, 501–502, 51 N.E.3d 484 (2016) (no reasonable suspicion despite odor of unburnt marijuana, presence of air fresheners, suspect's nervousness, and fact that passenger was staring silently ahead); Commonwealth v. Brown , 75 Mass.App.Ct. 528, 533, 537, 539, 915 N.E.2d 252 (2009) (suspect's "nervous looks" and "tense" appearance were "general descriptions [that] fall short of the ‘specific and articulable facts' which are required to demonstrate reasonableness.... It is not by itself sufficient that the point of encounter with police occurs in a high crime area.... Although in hindsight [the officer's] hunch proved to be correct, we view the reasonableness of the search and seizure from the vantage preceding the discovery of the [evidence], and on that basis the actions of the police here exceeded constitutional grounds" [quotations and citations omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Santos , 65 Mass.App.Ct. 122, 128, 837 N.E.2d 296 (2005) (no reasonable suspicion where suspect did not have his driver's license or vehicle registration in his possession, and where stop occurred in high crime area).Ultimately, by the time the trooper finished discussing with the defendant the broken lights and the window tint, the investigation of the civil traffic violations was complete.

The stop's location, although potentially relevant to an objective assessment of officer safety, cannot justify reasonable suspicion to believe a person is involved in criminal activity. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 125 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Holley, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 663 (2001) (traffic stop taking place in high crime area must be "considered with some caution because many honest, law-abiding citizens live and work in high crime areas"). Further, the officers knew that the defendant lived on Sunnyside Street, the very street on which the encounter occurred.

The officer's "belief must be rooted in ‘specific and articulable facts.’ " Commonwealth v. Johnson, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 340 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 125 (2005). A protective sweep "must be ‘confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover a weapon.’ "