Opinion
13-P-1395
05-07-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. ROBERT A. SAFFORD.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant Robert A. Safford appeals from a decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court, which affirmed a finding of responsible for a civil motor vehicle infraction, i.e., driving in excess of the posted speed limit. We affirm.
The defendant claims he was denied mandatory discovery, and thus was entitled to dismissal of the citation. We agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the Appellate Division that this claim lacks merit. Civil motor vehicle infraction proceedings are intended to be expeditious and informal, and the normal discovery rules of civil litigation do not apply. See G. L. c. 90C, § 3(A)(4). As the Appellate Division correctly noted, the defendant never properly sought to obtain an order from the trial judge under c. 90C, based upon a showing of need, to inspect necessary documents in the possession of the State police. Nevertheless, the judge indulged several of the defendant's requests for documents, even though she would have been well within her discretion to have denied them all. Accordingly, the judge did not err by giving the defendant more than that to which he was entitled.
As noted by the Appellate Division, any alleged failure to comply with the defendant's public records request under G. L. c. 66, § 10, has no bearing on the civil motor vehicle infraction before the court.
The judge allowed the defendant's request to be provided with information regarding the maintenance and repair of the cruiser's speedometer, the trooper's time card for the day of the stop and citation, and a copy of both sides of the citation In addition, the defendant was given two continuances and extra time to review all of the information he was provided.
The defendant raises several other claims, none of which require extended discussion. He states he was prevented from introducing evidence or cross-examining witnesses, purportedly violating his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. He also asserts that certain facts recited by the Appellate Division are unsupported by the record. Each of these claims consists only of a single sentence without reference to any authority. This "falls short of anything that can properly be called an argument within the meaning of Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975)," A. Leo Nash Steel Corp. v. Southern New England Steel Erection Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 385 (1980), and we need not consider them.
The defendant's claims regarding the credibility of the trooper and whether the infraction was proved by a preponderance of the evidence are not properly before us, as our review is confined to issues of law. See Gladstone Bros., Inc. v. Board of Health of Salisbury, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 780, 780 (1976) (argument that judge's findings were against weight of evidence presents no question of law). See also Trial Court Rules VII(b)(1), Uniform Rule on Civil Motor Vehicle Infractions (LexisNexis 2014-2015) ("The evidence shall be given such weight as the judge or clerk-magistrate deems appropriate").
Decision and order of Appellate Division affirmed.
By the Court (Grainger, Meade & Fecteau, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: May 7, 2015.