The facts surrounding the crime that led to Ruell's conviction are set out in the decision of the SJC; only the facts that are relevant to this opinion bear repetition. See Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126 (2011). A. The Martowski Murder

Concluding whether a prospective juror stands indifferent is also within the judge's discretion. Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 136, 943 N.E.2d 447, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 841, 132 S.Ct. 153, 181 L.Ed.2d 69 (2011). However, this discretion is not unfettered; the judge's conclusion must be supported by a voir dire that sufficiently uncovers whether the prospective juror can fairly evaluate the evidence and follow the law.

We reject both of these claims. As we declared in Commonwealth v. Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800–801, 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009), and repeated in Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 130–131, 943 N.E.2d 447 (2011) ( Ruell ): “Third-party culprit evidence is a ‘time-honored method of defending against a criminal charge.’

Commonwealthv.Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 136, cert, denied, 565 U.S. 841 (2011). However, this discretion is not unfettered; the judge's conclusion must be supported by a voir dire that sufficiently uncovers whether the prospective juror can fairly evaluate the evidence and follow the law."

Jurors nos. 27 and 37 affirmatively stated, and demonstrated, to the judge's satisfaction, an ability to set aside personal dislike of some aspect of the defendant's actions, such as marital infidelity, and impartially decide the case. See Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 136, 943 N.E.2d 447, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 841, 132 S.Ct. 153, 181 L.Ed.2d 69 (2011) (judge vested with broad discretion in deciding whether prospective juror is impartial). Contrast Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 804, 647 N.E.2d 1162 (1995) (error where juror never answered unequivocally that he could put aside ethnic bias against defendant); Commonwealth v. Auguste, 414 Mass. 51, 57–58, 605 N.E.2d 819 (1992) (judge's inquiry failed to ascertain whether juror would be impartial).

Our jurisprudence concerning the circumstances in which third-party culprit evidence may be excluded is consistent with these strictures. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 461 Mass. 438, 446–447, 961 N.E.2d 566 (2012) ; Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 131–133, 943 N.E.2d 447 (2011). We have permitted the exclusion of such evidence in view of concerns with limited probative value, unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury.

” Commonwealth v. Silva–Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800–801, 906 N.E.2d 299 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 130–135, 943 N.E.2d 447 (2011); Commonwealth v. Conkey, supra at 66–67, 819 N.E.2d 176. The defendant has not met this standard.

"A judge has broad discretion in deciding whether a prospective juror is impartial, and his decision will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 136 (2011).

However, "[a] judge has broad discretion in deciding whether a prospective juror is impartial, and [a judge's] decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 136, 943 N.E.2d 447, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 841, 132 S.Ct. 153, 181 L.Ed.2d 69 (2011). We discern no abuse of the trial judge's discretion.

See Williams, 481 Mass. at 448. See also Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 137 (2011). The defendant, citing Commonwealth v. Somers, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 920 (1998), argues that the seating of jurors no. two and thirty-seven over his objections caused his peremptory challenges to be prejudicially diminished.