Opinion
J-S30004-16 No. 896 EDA 2015
04-15-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. PEDRO JUNIOR RODRIGUEZ Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 3, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0005244-2013 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and JENKINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Pedro Junior Rodriguez, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial conviction for third-degree murder. We affirm.
The trial court opinion fully sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED [APPELLANT'S] PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS MADE BY [APPELLANT] TO THE POLICE WHILE UNDER INTERROGATION AND ALLOWED THEM TO BE ENTERED AS EVIDENCE?
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED
[APPELLANT'S] REQUEST FOR A JURY CHARGE INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT PROOF OF "HEAT OF PASSION" COULD REDUCE THE CHARGE OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE TO THE LESSER OFFENSE OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER?(Appellant's Brief at 7).
We review the denial of a suppression motion as follows:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.Commonwealth v. Williams , 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.
"[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court's decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law." Commonwealth v. Baker , 24 A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Galvin , 603 Pa. 625, 651, 985 A.2d 783, 798-99 (2009)).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable William E. Ford, we conclude Appellant's issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed May 8, 2015, at 4-16) (finding: (1) during police interview, detectives said nothing improper to Appellant about his fiancée in light of information they had; detectives had evidence that Appellant made four phone calls to his fiancée immediately after attack on victim; shortly after those calls, Appellant and his fiancée drove for two hours to Selinsgrove; detectives properly questioned Appellant in attempt to determine respective involvement of Appellant and his fiancée in incident; detectives confronted Appellant with his fiancée's statement to police, which incriminated Appellant and conflicted with Appellant's initial version of events and assertions of innocence; detectives did not say Appellant's fiancée would be prosecuted; rather, detectives said they would call district attorney to discuss what charges, if any, should be brought against her because they could not exclude her as person involved in attack on victim; no evidence supports Appellant's claim that police induced him to confess by threatening to arrest his fiancée or any other family member; Appellant did not testify at suppression hearing as to what prompted him to confess; detectives' challenged statements and questions to Appellant regarding his fiancée could not reasonably be construed as coercive; (2) at trial, Appellant testified that he believed victim had stolen items from Appellant and his fiancée; Appellant went to victim's apartment to confront him day before incident, but victim was not there; Appellant returned to victim's apartment on next day; Appellant said he was still upset but had "calmed down a lot" since previous night; Appellant testified that during argument with victim, victim quickly reached across his body with his right hand; victim was sitting on sofa at that point; Appellant did not know what victim was reaching for; Appellant claimed he panicked, pulled out knife, and began to slash victim; Appellant said he then tried to defuse tension but victim charged him; Appellant admitted he could see victim was not holding weapon; Appellant slashed and stabbed victim with knife several more times; Appellant's testimony provided basis for jury instruction on "imperfect self-defense" voluntary manslaughter; jury instruction on "heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter, however, was not justified; victim's repeated denial that he stole Appellant's property could not constitute adequate provocation necessary for "heat of passion" defense; further, Appellant did not testify that victim's agitated appearance or action of reaching across his body caused Appellant to lose all composure or to enter intense emotional state that obscured his reason; therefore, court properly denied Appellant's request for jury instruction on "heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/15/2016
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