Opinion
No. 09–P–1866.
12-27-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. Eulogio RODRIGUEZ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant claims error in the denial of his second postconviction motion for a new trial. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion, and affirm.
Though the defendant's appeal consolidates his direct appeal and his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial, he raises only claims concerning the latter.
Admission of expert testimony. As a threshold matter, we observe that there is no merit to the defendant's contention that the motion judge erred in allowing the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Alison Fife, to testify at the evidentiary hearing on his competency . Though the defendant correctly identifies the criteria relevant to qualification of an expert witness, pursuant to Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2016), his application of those criteria to Dr. Fife is flawed. "A judge has broad discretion regarding the admission of expert testimony, and we review that decision only for abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 5 (2007). As the Commonwealth observes, Dr. Fife was a licensed medical doctor with a certification in psychiatry, had performed at least 200 competency evaluations in the past, and based her opinion of competency in the present case on a review of the defendant's medical records and on two interviews of the defendant. The defendant cites no authority for his contention that Dr. Fife's methodology—conducting interviews of the defendant, evaluating his responses, and reviewing his medical records—is not reliable or scientific, and we are aware of none; indeed, such authority as we are aware of is to the contrary. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hardy, 426 Mass. 725, 727–728 (1998). At bottom, the defendant's challenge to Dr. Fife's qualifications amounts to an assertion that the methodology employed by his expert, Dr. Chaskelson—in particular, the standardized tests she administered—was an essential component of any qualified expert opinion on competency. However, without supporting authority for that proposition we discern no abuse of discretion by the motion judge in her decision to accept Dr. Fife's testimony.
The defendant moved first to preclude, and then to strike, Dr. Fife's testimony.
Though we need not repeat it here, we note the detailed explanation appearing in the Commonwealth's brief at pages twenty-three to twenty-six of how Dr. Fife's qualifications satisfied the criteria set forth in Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783 (2010).
Competency. The defendant's claim of error in the motion judge's finding that the defendant was competent at the time of his trial is a variation on the same theme. In this variant, the defendant contends that, even if Dr. Fife's testimony satisfied the threshold of admissible expert opinion, it was so demonstrably inferior in persuasive force that no rational factfinder could credit Dr. Fife's opinion over that of Dr. Chaskelson. The defendant's argument disregards the prerogative held by the judge to resolve questions of weight and credibility of the evidence. Simply put, the defendant's claim "is no more than a disagreement with the judge's decision to believe the Commonwealth's expert witness." Commonwealth v. Shamblin, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 951, 952 (1991). We note as well that the motion judge was also the trial judge, and had the opportunity to observe the behavior, demeanor, and responsiveness of the defendant at trial as well as, to some extent, his interactions with his trial counsel. See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 473 Mass. 840, 847 (2016).
Ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, by reason of trial counsel's failure to seek a hearing concerning the defendant's competency. As the preceding discussion illustrates, had trial counsel pursued such a course it would not have accomplished anything material for the defense. See Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977).
While the motion judge did not explicitly address the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we agree with the Commonwealth that the judge's rejection of the defendant's underlying claim that he was not competent to stand trial operated implicitly to reject the claim of ineffective assistance as well.
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Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.