Opinion
J-S59023-18 No. 3290 EDA 2017
10-29-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JAMES A. RICHARDSON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 8, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0310462-2003 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:
James A. Richardson appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm based on the Honorable M. Theresa Sarmina's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
On July 28, 2004, a jury convicted Richardson of second-degree murder and related offenses. On March 16, 2007, this Court affirmed Richardson's judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Richardson , 2633 EDA 2005 (Pa. Super. Mar. 16, 2007). Richardson's judgment of sentence became final on or about January 2, 2008, after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Richardson , 934 A.2d 73 (Pa. 2007). Richardson filed the instant petition, his third, pro se on May 18, 2017; he characterized it as a "Petition for a Habeas Corpus Petition."
Richardson did not seek review in the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, Richardson's judgment of sentence became final ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 ("Unless otherwise provided by law, a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by a state court of last resort or a United States court of appeals . . . is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment.").
On appeal, Richardson acknowledges his PCRA petition was patently untimely, but argues that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition because his "Habeas Petition" is not cognizable under the PCRA, and thus, not constrained by its time bar. This claim is meritless. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 ("[The PCRA] shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.").
On September 10, 2018, a rule to show cause order was issued as to why Richardson's appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory. After review of Richardson's show cause memorandum, we conclude that we should not quash Richardson's appeal. See generally , Richardson Show Cause Memorandum, 3/18/18. Accordingly, we proceed with our review.
"If the petition is determined to be untimely, and no exception has been pled and proven, the petition must be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition." Commonwealth v. Jackson , 30 A.3d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Perrin , 947 A.2d 1284, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, Richardson's petition alleges an illegal sentence. See Brief of Appellant, at 3 ("[Richardson's] habeas corpus petition . . . challenge[s] the legality of life without parole for second degree murder[.]"). With respect to legality of sentence claims, our courts have held that "[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto." Commonwealth v. Fahy , 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999), citing Commonwealth v. Chester , 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999).
We agree with Judge Sarmina that (1) Richardson's Habeas Petition is, in fact, cognizable under the PCRA, see PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/18, at 5, and (2) he has failed to allege any exception to the one-year time requirement of the PCRA, see 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). This one-year time bar is mandatory, meaning courts have "no authority to extend filing periods except as the statute permits." Fahy , 737 A.2d at 222. Therefore, the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of his petition, as it became patently untimely on January 2, 2009. Fahy , supra ; PCRA Court Opinion, 2/9/18, at 8.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Sarmina, we conclude that Richardson's PCRA Petition is untimely and that his issue merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. Accordingly, we affirm based on Judge Sarmina's opinion and advise the parties attach it in the event of further proceedings.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/29/18
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