Opinion
No. 15–P–297.
06-16-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. Tyler REED.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs. On appeal, he claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and that the judge abused his discretion by denying the defendant's motion in limine to exclude an expert's testimony. We affirm.
1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the element that he was under the influence of marijuana. We disagree. “[E]vidence relied on to establish a defendant's guilt may be entirely circumstantial,” and the fact finder may draw “reasonable and possible” inferences from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 544 (2010) (quotation omitted). Here, by the defendant's own admission, he was “high” while driving the car. Also, the arresting officer testified that the defendant abruptly stopped his car by “slamm[ing] on the brakes” at a red light. During the stop by the officer, the defendant squinted with bloodshot and glassy eyes, and a strong odor of burnt marijuana came from inside the car. A reasonable jury could find that the defendant's appearance, odor, and erratic driving demonstrated the impaired judgment and reaction time consistent with marijuana use. Coupled with his own statement to the officer that he was “high,” these facts were sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant was under the influence of marijuana.
The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support the elements of operation or public way.
The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746 (2013), is misplaced. In Daniel, the arresting officer made no observations about the defendant “that would lead a reasonable observer to believe that her capacity to operate a vehicle was impaired.” Id. at 756. Here, to the contrary, the officer observed the defendant's abrupt stop, his bloodshot eyes, and a strong smell of marijuana, from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely was impaired due to marijuana consumption. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 67 Mass.App.Ct. 215, 218 (2006). At best, the defendant's argument offers conflicting interpretations of the evidence, from which the jury may still infer that the defendant's ability was impaired. Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 245 (1981) (“To the extent that conflicting inferences are possible from the evidence, ‘it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies' “ [quotation omitted] ). Accordingly, the judge properly denied the defendant's motion for a required finding.
The defendant also unfittingly relies upon Commonwealth v. Shellenberger, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 70, 76 (2005). There, the defendant was charged with motor vehicle homicide and the prosecution sought to admit a toxicology report to prove he was under the influence of drugs. Id. at 71–74. Because the prosecution sought to admit it mid-trial and the report had no foundation in the record, its admission created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 75–76. The facts here are not analogous.
2. Officer's expert testimony. The defendant also claims the judge abused his discretion by allowing an officer to provide expert testimony to the effects of marijuana consumption and signs of impairment without meeting the foundation requirements of an expert witness. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the officer failed to apply his medical knowledge to the facts of the defendant's case or to have observed the defendant after his arrest, the officer's testimony was improperly admitted. We disagree.
The officer testifying was not the arresting officer, but another officer who was called to testify as to his medical background and knowledge.
--------
As clarified at oral argument, what the defendant claims the Commonwealth failed to do was to have an expert who, as a percipient witness, could opine on the defendant's ingestion of marijuana and how it affected him. This would, however, come dangerously close to having an expert opine on the defendant's guilt, which is prohibited. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 419 Mass. 366, 375 (1995) ; Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 576, 579 (1998). Rather, the Commonwealth used a nonpercipient witness as an expert who testified in general to the effects of marijuana on one who has consumed it. This was proper.
At bottom, the defendant has not shown an abuse of discretion where the officer testified for the limited purpose of describing the symptoms of marijuana use. A judge has “broad discretion to determine how to assess the reliability of expert testimony.” Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 111 (2006). See Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360, 377–378 (2014) (expert testimony admissible for limited purpose of showing effects of drugs and alcohol).
Judgment affirmed.