Opinion
No. 12–P–1693.
2013-11-1
COMMONWEALTH v. RANDOLPH R., a juvenile.
By the Court (GREEN, GRAINGER & FECTEAU, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a bench trial in Juvenile Court, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent on the following charges: illegally possessing a firearm, G.L. c. 269, § 10( a ); illegally carrying a firearm at a school, G.L. c. 269, § 10( j ); and illegally carrying a loaded firearm, G.L. c. 269, § 10( n ). Prior to trial, the juvenile filed a motion to suppress physical evidence and statements obtained during a search of his person on school premises. The motion was denied following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the juvenile challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.
Facts. We recite the facts as the judge found them following the evidentiary hearing on the juvenile's motion to suppress. Madison Park High School has a written policy disseminated to all students, which requires all students to enter through a single main entrance where they pass through a metal detector in the presence of school police and administrators. Any student who attempts to enter the school by any other door is subject to a search by school officials. On the morning of April 30, 2012, a door to the gym had been propped open by a teacher while she conducted her class out-of-doors. Sergeant Mark Murphy received a radio call from that teacher reporting that a group of ten males were walking from an area off campus to the rear of the gym where the door was propped open. Sergeant Murphy and his partner, Officer Rosario, both members of the Boston school police, proceeded towards the gym where they eventually discovered a total of ten male students,
including the juvenile. Sergeant Murphy detained the ten individuals and requested assistance from school administrators. Pursuant to school policy, the headmaster informed the students that they were going to be searched. When Sergeant Murphy returned from searching the gym, he found the juvenile talking with Jose Solis, a school administrator, separated from the group of other students. Sergeant Murphy asked the juvenile whether he had anything on him he should not be in possession of. The juvenile, appearing nervous, requested to speak privately with Solis. After a brief exchange, the juvenile opened his bag and produced a firearm, laying it on the floor. Solis put the firearm back in the juvenile's bag and turned it over to Sergeant Murphy. Sergeant Murphy asked the juvenile why he brought the firearm to school. The juvenile responded that he was receiving threatening text messages and was concerned for his safety. The juvenile was then brought to the school police office, where he was placed under arrest.
Three students were found coming down the stairs to the lower level of the gym from the rear door; four more students, including the juvenile, were found during a second sweep of the stairs; three students were found hiding in the gym.
Discussion. “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error. We will, however, independently review the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Commonwealth v. Lawrence L., 439 Mass. 817, 820 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted). The juvenile restricts his appeal to protection under the Fourth Amendment.
“It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school administrators. The Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged that ‘notwithstanding the legitimate goal of school administrators to maintain a safe learning environment, students continue to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons and in the items they bring to school.’ “ Commonwealth v. Smith, 72 Mass.App.Ct. 175, 178 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Damian D., 434 Mass. 725, 727 (2001).
The legality of a search of a student depends on the reasonableness of the search, under all the circumstances. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). There are two prongs to the reasonableness test: the search must be (1) “justified at its inception,” Commonwealth v. Smith, supra at 179, and (2) “limited in scope to those measures ‘reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’ “ Id. at 180, quoting from New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra at 342.
As noted in Commonwealth v. Smith, supra at 180, the inherent purpose of school rules restricting student entrance to one monitored door is to prevent students, either through confiscation or deterrence, from bringing in weapons or other dangerous material. In this case, Sergeant Murphy responded appropriately to a report that a specific number of students appeared to be using an unauthorized entrance in violation of the rules. He detained the students and notified administrators, who responded. We conclude that Sergeant Murphy's adherence to school policy and the ensuing administrative search were therefore justified at inception. See id. at 179, quoting from Commonwealth v. Damian D., supra at 728.
The scope of the search itself can only be characterized as minimally intrusive. The juvenile asserts that he was “impermissibly searched in the constitutional sense.” He contends that Sergeant Murphy's inquiry as to whether he was in possession of contraband was an explicit prelude to a patfrisk during a time in which he was not free to leave, thus constituting a police search.
We do not find any merit in this argument. The students were requested to wait with Officer Rosario until administrators arrived. At the juvenile's request, he was allowed to speak with Solis in a more private setting.
The juvenile was not asked to disclose any weapons he might be carrying, but instead revealed the firearm to Solis of his own volition. It was only after the firearm was in plain view that Solis alerted Sergeant Murphy who seized the weapon legally under the plain view doctrine within the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Juvenile Court judge's reasoning that Sergeant Murphy's inquiry regarding contraband does not rise to the level of custodial interrogation. On these facts, there is nothing to indicate a police search in any sense.
The plain view doctrine “authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification.” Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
The evidence in this case was obtained through an administrative search which was justified at its inception, reasonable in scope, and minimally intrusive. We do not address the Commonwealth's alternate argument that no search occurred because the gun was voluntarily produced. The motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search was therefore properly denied.
Adjudications of delinquency affirmed.