Opinion
20-P-69
05-10-2021
COMMONWEALTH v. Edison QUITO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0.
The defendant, Edison Quito, was convicted of negligent operation of a motor vehicle, operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), child endangerment while operating under the influence (OUI endangerment), and refusing to identify himself to a police officer. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice resulted from the admission of evidence that his children were "unrestrained" in the backseat of his vehicle, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for refusing to identify himself to a police officer by providing a false name. We affirm.
Background. The jury could have reasonably found that State Police Trooper Paul Gifford was patrolling Interstate Highway 195 eastbound between exits 1 and 2 around 12:20 A.M. on September 23, 2018. The posted speed limit was sixty-five miles per hour. Trooper Gifford observed a vehicle pass him in the right hand lane at a high rate of speed. He clocked the vehicle as travelling at 105 miles per hour. A pursuit ensued, and the vehicle was stopped at a gasoline station off exit 2 in Swansea.
Trooper Gifford approached the vehicle and observed a female in the backseat on the passenger's rear side, a five month old child on her lap, and a six year old child on the driver's rear side. The children were unrestrained. The defendant, who was the driver, stated that he was coming from Providence, Rhode Island and was taking his wife to a hospital in Fall River.
Trooper Gifford observed a half-dozen empty beer containers on the front passenger seat and floor. He noticed a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant's person. When asked by Trooper Gifford for his license, the defendant responded that he did not have the license and he had only a work identification (work ID). The defendant then provided Trooper Gifford with a work ID with the name Kevin Monez. After running the name contained on the work ID through his computer, Trooper Gifford determined that the defendant was not Kevin Monez. When questioned about the improper identification, the defendant stated that he "made a mistake" and presented a photo of a license for Edison Quito on his cellphone. He was placed under arrest.
Swansea Police Officer Jared Ulak explained that upon arriving at the scene to assist Trooper Gifford, the defendant provided him with a New York State identification card. That card identified the defendant accurately.
Discussion. 1. Evidence of "unrestrained" children. The defendant claims that testimony relating to his "unrestrained" children in the backseat was irrelevant to the crimes charged, was improper prior bad act evidence, and was more prejudicial than probative and, therefore, its admission created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. We disagree.
With respect to relevancy, the gravamen of the defendant's claim is that because the crime of OUI endangerment, see G. L. c. 90, § 24V, requires the Commonwealth to prove only the children's presence in the vehicle, evidence that they were without seatbelts in the backseat was irrelevant. "Evidence is relevant if it has a rational tendency to prove a material issue. To be relevant, [e]vidence need not establish directly the proposition sought; it must only provide a link in the chain of proof" (quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Scesny, 472 Mass. 185, 199 (2015). "The relevance threshold for the admission of evidence is low." Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 144 (2004). We agree with the Commonwealth that the challenged evidence was relevant to prove that the defendant "was under the influence of intoxicating liquor," an essential element of OUI and OUI endangerment. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1) ; G. L. c. 90, § 24V. The jury could have reasonably inferred that someone driving over one hundred miles per hour with his children unrestrained in the backseat and empty containers of alcohol on the passenger seat was impaired by alcohol. In addition, although different crimes, "evidence of an operator's intoxication is relevant to a charge of negligent operation" under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a ). Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1022 (2019). Further, we note that any prejudice caused by the admission of this evidence "flowed directly from [its] properly probative effect to illustrate" the defendant's impaired operation of a motor vehicle. Commonwealth v. Gilman, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 758 (2016).
Even assuming that the testimony regarding the lack of restraints on the defendant's children should have been excluded, see Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2019), there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice caused by its admission considering the record as a whole. See Commonwealth v. Dirgo, 474 Mass. 1012, 1016 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005) (substantial risk occurs "if we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been different had the error not been made").
Finally, we reject the claim that evidence of the lack of restraints on the defendant's children constituted improper character evidence. It is well settled that "[e]vidence of prior bad acts may not be admitted to show bad character or a propensity to commit crime." Commonwealth v. Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 56 (2016). See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1) (2019). Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the challenged evidence did not suggest that he "possessed bad character and that he was likely to disobey the law by operating his vehicle while impaired by alcohol." It was not a prior bad act at all; rather, as discussed above, it was relevant and contemporaneous corroboration of the defendant's impairment. Therefore, evidence of the defendant's unrestrained children was properly admitted.
2. Sufficiency. The defendant also claims that the evidence presented to support his conviction for giving a false name to a police officer was insufficient because the Commonwealth did not prove that he intentionally disobeyed Trooper Gifford's request for his driver's license. We disagree.
To review this claim, "[w]e consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 51 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). "The evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth." Ayala, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017). "If, from the evidence, conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province." Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005).
General Laws c. 90, § 25, prohibits, among other things, "providing a false name to a police officer while operating a motor vehicle." Commonwealth v. Escobar, 479 Mass. 225, 231 (2018). Here the judge instructed the jury that this offense required the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, inter alia, the defendant "intentionally disobeyed" a police officer's command. See G. L. c. 90, § 25 ; Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court 5.620 (2019). According to the defendant, because his initial production of a false identification was merely an "innocent mistake" that was promptly remedied by showing Trooper Gifford his license on his cellphone, he did not intentionally disobey Trooper Gifford.
Intent is a question of fact, which may be proved "wholly on circumstantial evidence." Commonwealth v. Berendson, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 395, 397 (2008). Here, the jury were entitled to infer that the defendant intentionally supplied a false name to Trooper Gifford by handing him an identification depicting someone else. Only when Trooper Gifford asked the defendant about the improper identification did the defendant display a photo of his license on his cellphone. The jury were free to reject the defendant's argument that he mistakenly furnished the improper identification. See Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass. 312, 326 (2020). Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction under G. L. c. 90, § 25.
The defendant did not furnish a physical driver's license during the stop.
Judgements affirmed.