We review the validity of a Federal search warrant under Federal law. See Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 792 (1998) (Pinto). We begin our analysis by noting that Inspector Dailey's removal of the package for further investigation to his Springfield office constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (seizure occurs when "there is meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in th[e] property").

See US v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989). See also Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 790, 793 (1998). Instead, the defendant focuses on the circumstances of the detention of the package in Puerto Rico and submits that the seizure and exposure to the dog sniff was not based on reasonable suspicion. As such, the defendant relies on facts outside of the four corners of the affidavit.

See US v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989). See also Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 793 (1998). Instead, the defendant focuses on the circumstances of the detention of the package in Puerto Rico and submits that the seizure and exposure to the dog sniff was not based on reasonable suspicion. As such, the defendant relies on facts outside of the four corners of the affidavit.

After "the dog indicated the presence of narcotics in the rear of the car, the police had probable cause to search the car." Commonwealth v.Sinforoso, supra at 324, citing Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 793 (1998). Consequently, the discovery and seizure of the contraband was proper and Feyenord's motion to suppress was correctly denied.

After "the dog indicated the presence of narcotics in the rear of the car, the police had probable cause to search the car." Commonwealth v. Sinforoso, supra at 324, citing Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 793 (1998). Consequently, the discovery and seizure of the contraband was proper and Feyenord's motion to suppress was correctly denied.

Once the dog indicated the presence of narcotics in the rear of the car, the police had probable cause to search the car. SeeCommonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 793 (1998). The conduct of this stop and search was a measured response to an evolving set of facts that, at each step, justified the officer's concerns for his safety and ultimately his suspicion that there was contraband hidden in a secret compartment in the car.

January 25, 1999Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790 (1998).

"Under Federal law, it is well settled that a temporary detention of personal property for investigative purposes is permissible when authorities have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 790, 792 (1998). See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-703, 709 (1983).

"Where there is nothing in the record to suggest that at the time of the application for a search warrant by the postal inspector there was any involvement by a State official, the determination of the validity of the Federal warrant must be reviewed under Federal law." Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 792 (1998)."First-class mail, such as letters and sealed packages, is protected by the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable search and seizure.

Discussion. The parties agree that because a Federal law enforcement agent removed the package from the stream of mail during a Federal investigation, we apply Federal law to our assessment of the justification for that removal. See Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 792 (1998). A law enforcement agent may remove a package from the stream of mail only when he possesses reasonable suspicion to believe the package contains contraband.