Opinion
No. 15–P–914.
10-28-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. James L. PARKS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, James L. Parks, was convicted of numerous charges related to the sexual abuse of his foster daughter. On appeal, he contends that the judge abused her discretion in allowing in evidence testimony that exceeded the scope of the first complaint doctrine. We affirm.
The defendant was convicted on three indictments for indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, three indictments for indecent assault and battery on a child over the age of fourteen, and three indictments for aggravated rape of a child. He also was convicted of attempting to commit a crime, posing or exhibiting a child in a state of nudity, and dissemination of matter harmful to minors. The Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi on six additional indictments charging indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen.
The victim testified that the defendant began abusing her when she was eleven years old. The victim's coworker testified as the first complaint witness. She stated that in June, 2013, when the victim was fifteen years old, the victim disclosed to her that she had been sexually molested by the defendant. When asked whether the defendant had said anything to the victim, the coworker testified that he said that he “didn't want [the victim] to say anything because ... it would ruin his marriage and his wife would divorce him.” Counsel for the defendant lodged an objection in the middle of the witness's response, without stating any ground for the objection, which the judge overruled. The defendant now argues that the statement exceeded the scope of permissible evidence under the first complaint doctrine. Under the first complaint doctrine,
The Commonwealth contends that because the objection lacked specificity the alleged error was not preserved. We need not reach that issue as the result is the same whether reviewed for prejudicial error or a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
“[T]he recipient of a complainant's first complaint of an alleged sexual assault may testify about the fact of the first complaint and the circumstances surrounding the making of that first complaint. The witness may also testify about the details of the complaint. The complainant may likewise testify to the details of the first complaint (i.e., what she told the first complaint witness), as well as why the complaint was made at that particular time.”
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 218–219 (2005). Evidence of complaints in addition to those allowed under King are ordinarily inadmissible. See Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 456–457 (2008). We review the admission of first complaint evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 73 (2011).
The defendant argues that the statement had to either occur during the event or be posed as a threat. Whether framed as a threat, a warning, or a consequence, the statement was admissible first complaint testimony because it helped to explain why the disclosure was made almost five years after the abuse began. See King, supra. See also Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845 (2010). It also “[gave] the jury as complete a picture as possible of how the accusation of sexual assault first arose.” Commonwealth v. Revells, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 492, 496 (2010), quoting from King, supra at 247. Finally, the statement was fully consistent with the victim's testimony, consistent with the defendant's testimony that he was concerned about his marriage, and was not a point of emphasis during the five-day trial. Accordingly, the judge neither abused her discretion, nor caused undue prejudice to the defendant, by admitting it.