Opinion
J-A10003-18 No. 2686 EDA 2017
06-20-2018
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000261-2017 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Aaron Pagan, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, following his stipulated bench trial convictions for possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute ("PWID"), possession of drug paraphernalia, and no rear lights. We affirm.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), (32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b), respectively.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS WHERE APPELLANT, FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF A VALID TRAFFIC STOP, WAS SUBJECTED
TO A SECOND SEIZURE THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO JUSTIFY A CONTINUED INVESTIGATORY DETENTION RENDERING HIS CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE INVALID, AND THE SUBSEQUENT WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE?(Appellant's Brief at 5).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Wallace H. Bateman Jr., we conclude Appellant's issue merits no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed November 20, 2017, at 3-10) (finding: Appellant concedes initial traffic stop was lawful but argues officer's continued engagement initiated investigatory detention that lacked reasonable suspicion and invalidated Appellant's consent to search; whether interaction transformed from mere encounter to investigatory detention is fact specific; here, officer pulled over Appellant during daytime in parking lot, Appellant remained inside his vehicle for duration of contact and there was no physical police contact, law enforcement did not direct Appellant's movements, officer's demeanor was pleasant, path to leave was unobstructed, Appellant possessed his license and registration, officer stepped away and told Appellant he could leave, indicating break in chain from initial traffic stop, and nature of initial investigatory detention was professional and innocuous such that no coercive undertones translated to re-engagement; fact that officer told Appellant he was free to leave is "potent and objective factor" in analysis; based on totality of circumstances, reasonable person in same situation would have felt free to leave and to decline officer's request to search; second interaction with Appellant constituted mere encounter, not investigatory detention; moreover, even if second interaction was investigatory detention, Officer Bielecki had reasonable suspicion to re-engage Appellant because of Appellant's presence in high drug-trafficking area, his tinted windows, Appellant's extreme nervousness, presence of air fresheners and laundry detergent (common masking agents for drug mules), and Appellant's inaccurate paperwork; Appellant's consent to search was valid). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
In Commonwealth v. Kemp , 961 A.2d 1247 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc), this Court held that facts gathered during a valid traffic stop can be used to justify an investigatory detention after an officer has indicated a defendant is free to leave. Notwithstanding differing viewpoints on the logic of Kemp 's holding, we are bound by this precedent.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge McLaughlin joins this memorandum.
Judge Ransom notes her dissent. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/20/18
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