Opinion
13-P-1378
01-23-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. ROLAND NICHOLS.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a jury trial, the defendant, Roland Nichols, was convicted of one count of rape, three counts of witness intimidation, six counts of assault and battery on a pregnant person, and one count of violating an abuse prevention order. The defendant was acquitted on the remaining charges of what initially had been eighteen indictments. On appeal, the defendant argues that, (1) the trial judge abused her discretion by admitting certain photographic evidence and allowing specific testimony by the victim, and (2) that the judge erred in denying the defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty on his remaining rape charge. We affirm.
1. Evidentiary issues. "In order to be admissible, evidence must meet the threshold test of relevancy, that is, it must have a 'rational tendency to prove an issue in the case.'" Commonwealth v. LaSota, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 24 (1990), quoting from Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 83 (1989). This evidence "need not establish directly the proposition sought; it must only provide a link in the chain of proof." Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 744 (1990) (quotation omitted). See Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2014). However, "[w]hether evidence is relevant in any particular instance, and whether the probative value of relevant evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect, are questions within the sound discretion of the judge," Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 807 (1990), and the trial judge's determination of these issues will not be disturbed except for palpable error. Commonwealth v. Tobin, 392 Mass. 604, 613 (1984). See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2014).
A. Photographs of bloodstained sheets. The defendant takes issue with the admission of photographs of the victim's bloodstained sheets, which were introduced by the Commonwealth in support of the victim's testimony that the defendant had punched her in the face, causing her nose to bleed "[a]ll over the place," including her bed and sheets. The defendant and the Commonwealth dispute whether this challenge was properly preserved and, therefore, which standard of review should apply on appeal. Because we conclude that the judge properly admitted the photographs, we need not resolve this dispute.
The defendant contends that because the photographs were taken two months after the alleged incident, and were not tested by the police to confirm the victim's account of events, the photographs' probative value was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. We discern no abuse of discretion here. The defendant's objections go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. See DeJesus v. Yogel, 404 Mass. 44, 47 (1989). Moreover, the defendant has failed to demonstrate how he was unfairly prejudiced by the photographs, which were not inflammatory. See and compare Commonwealth v. Carrion, 370 Mass. 408, 412 (1976); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 221 (1981); Yesilciman, 406 Mass. at 744-45. Thus, there was no error.
B. Testimony regarding the defendant's statement. The defendant claims that it was error for the trial judge to admit testimony from the victim recounting the defendant's statement that, if the victim tried to end their relationship, she would find that the current levels of his abuse were "nothing compared to what he used to do to his ex-girlfriend." The defendant contends that this was irrelevant and impermissible prior bad act or bad character evidence. The defendant's challenge to the statement was properly preserved at trial, and so it is reviewed under the prejudicial error standard. See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). We conclude that there was no error.
"It is well settled that the prosecution may not introduce evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably or not, for the purposes of showing his bad character or propensity to commit the crime charged, but such evidence may be admissible if relevant for some other purpose." Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986). Given that the defendant was charged with multiple counts of intimidation of a witness, the testimony in question was highly probative and was properly admitted, not for the truth of the statement or to show propensity, but to demonstrate the victim's state of mind. It was also relevant to explain delays in her reporting of the incidents.
2. Required finding of not guilty. In a prosecution for rape, the Commonwealth must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed (1) sexual intercourse (2) by force or threat of force and against the will of the victim." Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 722, 726-27 (2001). The defendant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence -- which rested primarily on the victim's contested testimony -- did not support a finding that the defendant had raped the victim, particularly because the sexual activity started out as consensual, and as such, the trial judge erred in denying the defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty. In our review, we must "determine whether the evidence, in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence presented by the defendant," is sufficient "to permit the jury to infer the existence of the essential elements of the crime charged." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-77 (1979).
Despite the defendant's assertion that the victim's testimony was inconsistent, "[q]uestions of credibility are to be resolved in the Commonwealth's favor, and . . . [t]o the extent that conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is for the jury to decide which version to credit." Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113 (2010). Here there was ample evidence to support a jury determination that the victim withdrew her consent and the defendant nonetheless proceeded to rape her. Consequently, we are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument, and conclude that the motions for a required finding of not guilty were properly denied.
3. Cumulative effects. The defendant makes a final argument that the cumulative effects of the alleged errors requires reversal of his conviction. Because we conclude that there were no errors, and that there was sufficient evidence for his rape conviction, we decline to address this claim.
Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the defendant's convictions.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Kafker, Grainger & Agnes, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
Clerk Entered: January 23, 2015.