Opinion
No. 15–P–1416.
10-25-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. William F. NERONHA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following jury-waived trials, the defendant was convicted of using a motor vehicle without authority, failure to stop for a police officer, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor (OUI) as a second offense, possession of mace without an FID card, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of ammunition without an FID card. On appeal, he principally argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the judge did not adequately instruct himself on the law of criminal responsibility. We affirm.
Criminal responsibility. The defendant was found driving his housemate's car without permission, while intoxicated, and without a license to operate it. He initially accelerated the car when police attempted to stop him, and when he was stopped, he was found in possession of a loaded firearm and mace, all without the requisite license or FID cards. The defendant did not challenge the Commonwealth's proof that he committed the charged offenses; indeed, he stipulated to much of that proof. Instead, his defense was that he lacked criminal responsibility. His theory, presented through an expert witness, was that he suffered from bipolar disorder that caused him to commit his misdeeds by rendering him unable “to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 547 (1967). The defendant specifically argued that a change in his medication induced a manic episode followed by a depressive one and that these mood swings somehow caused him to consume a large quantity of alcohol and then drive off in his housemate's car with a loaded firearm and mace. The defendant additionally posited that his suicidal thoughts impeded his ability to conform his conduct to the law.
As to the other prong of the McHoul test, although the defendant did not stipulate that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, he neither pressed that issue nor presented any evidence that placed it in contest. In any event, there was substantial evidence that he did understand the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time. For example, when he was stopped by police, he stuck his hands out the window while exclaiming “You've got me, you've got me.”
The defendant was being transitioned from one anti-depressant (Prozac) to another (Zoloft). The defendant's expert testified that this transitioning may have caused too many antidepressants to accumulate in the defendant's system (either because the dosing was wrong, or because the defendant did not follow his instructions), and this “might” have caused a manic episode that could have led to the defendant's behaviors.
On rebuttal, the Commonwealth presented an expert who expressed his opinion that the defendant did not suffer from any major mental disorders, only from various personality disorders and alcohol abuse. He further opined that in any event, the defendant's “behavior was primarily the result of [his voluntary] alcohol intoxication.”
After engaging the parties in a lengthy colloquy regarding their respective theories of the case, the judge expressly found that the Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible. On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge inadequately instructed himself regarding the law of criminal responsibility, especially as it relates to involuntary intoxication. As the defendant recognizes, in reviewing a bench trial, we are to presume that the judge properly instructed himself absent an indication to the contrary. Commonwealth v. Batista, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 642, 648 (2002).
The initial question we face is whether the presumption that the judge properly instructed himself has been rebutted. Although this was a bench trial, before issuing his verdict, the judge decided to “go through the law for a moment.” In this manner, he mentioned various applicable principles of law, in the nature of jury instructions. As part of that effort, the judge summarized the overarching principles of the law of criminal responsibility, consistent with Commonwealth v. McHoul, supra. The defendant makes no claim that these statements of the law are inaccurate (nor could he). Instead, he complains that the judge did not mention certain points of law relevant to this case. For example, he highlights that the judge did not specifically reference the principle of “involuntary intoxication,” which according to our case law can include situations “where a defendant suffers intoxicating effects from prescription medication used as instructed .” Commonwealth v. Darch, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 713, 715 (2002).
However, the judge never purported to be making a comprehensive list of all subsidiary points of law relating to criminal responsibility, nor did the defendant ever ask him to do so. And, of course, the judge had no duty to specify how he was instructing himself. Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 468 Mass. 160, 170 (2014) (“In a jury-waived or nonjury case, the judge need not expressly instruct himself”). The defendant had a full and fair opportunity to raise the points of law that he deemed relevant to this case. Nothing in the record indicates that the judge disagreed with the defendant's statement of the law or improperly instructed himself. In these circumstances, the presumption that the judge properly instructed himself still applies. Contrast Commonwealth v. Liebenow, 470 Mass. 151, 156 (2014) (comments made by the judge in explaining his verdict indicated that he applied an incorrect legal principle). The defendant's argument that the judge misinstructed himself therefore necessarily fails.
We note that the judge closed his discussion of the law of criminal responsibility by stating, “[s]o that is the applicable law and I think we all agree that that is the law.” Neither party challenged that statement.
Jury waiver. The defendant additionally argues that he did not sufficiently waive his right to a jury trial as to the subsequent offender portion of the case. At the beginning of the trial on the underlying charges, the defendant signed a jury waiver form, and the judge conducted a waiver colloquy. There was not a separate jury waiver form or colloquy undertaken at the beginning of the subsequent offense portion of the case. Even if we assumed arguendo that the waiver form and colloquy undertaken at the beginning of the trial on the underlying charges did not make clear that the defendant was waiving his right to a jury as to both trials, we are confident that, under the circumstances of this case, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Saulnier, 84 Mass.App.Ct. 603, 610 (2013).