Opinion
J-S75006-19 No. 403 WDA 2019
03-13-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. MATTHEW WAYNE MORRIS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 19, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
Criminal Division at No: CP-03-CR-0000046-2018 BEFORE: STABILE, KUNSELMAN, and PELLEGRINI, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Matthew Wayne Morris, appeals from the February 19, 2019 judgment of sentence imposing 15 to 30 months of incarceration for criminal trespass. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503. The trial court imposed no further penalty for a criminal mischief (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304) conviction.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:
On November 3, 2017, [Appellant] and the victim, Dawn Aldrich, were communicating back and forth via text message and on the social networking application "Snapchat." [Appellant] and Ms. Aldrich prior to this time had been involved in an "on-again, off-again" relationship for several years. That evening, [Appellant] had planned to come to Ms. Aldrich's house to talk. As they continued to communicate by text message, they began to argue about whether either of them had put their Snapchat app
into "ghost mode." Snapchat's "ghost mode" prevents an individual with whom a user is messaging from seeing his or her physical location. When [Appellant] eventually arrived at Ms. Aldrich's home, he texted her to "open the door." Ms. Aldrich, not knowing [Appellant's] location, texted back, "no your lying."Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/19, at 2-3.
Ms. Aldrich at this point had changed clothes and was in the basement doing laundry. On her way back upstairs, she heard a loud "thud" in the area of her backdoor. She initially thought someone outside had thrown something and hit the door. However, as she proceeded up the stairs, she heard a second "thud" and a cracking sound. When Ms. Aldrich entered the upstairs, [Appellant] was inside the house and the back door frame was cracked. [Appellant] then grabbed Ms. Aldrich by the neck and told her that he was going to "shoot her fucking brains out" if she did not talk. [Appellant] then retrieved Ms. Aldrich's keys from a table in the kitchen and left the residence to search her car. After [Appellant] exited the residence, Ms. Aldrich locked the deadbolt on the back door and called 911. The police arrived approximately 10 minutes later. [Appellant] had left by that point.
When the police arrived, Ms. Aldrich told them what happened. [Appellant] did not return to the house and took Ms. Aldrich's keys with him when he left. The police took photographs of the back door frame, which had a large crack. On the advice of police, and because [Appellant] had taken her house key, Ms. Aldrich left the residence and stayed at her parents' home with her two children for approximately the next month.
A jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned offenses—but not guilty of burglary, theft by unlawful taking, and terroristic threats—on September 11, 2018. He filed this timely appeal from the trial court's judgment of sentence on March 11, 2019. He raises two issues for our review:
1. The trial court erred in not granting judgment of acquittal on the charge of criminal trespass as there was no evidence presented that [Appellant] "broke into" the alleged victim's home (as that term is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii)), particularly as there was no
testimony that the alleged victim's door was locked at the time of entry or that [Appellant] intimidated [the] alleged victim into opening the door.Appellant's Brief at 4.
2. The trial court erred in refusing to permit the alleged victim's ex-husband to testify as to her character for untruthfulness pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 404, 607, and 608.
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "our standard of review is de novo [and] our scope of review is limited to considering the evidence of record, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner." Commonwealth v. Rushing , 99 A.3d 416, 420-21 (Pa. 2014).
As noted, Appellant argues his criminal trespass conviction cannot stand because there is no evidence the victim's door was locked when Appellant entered her home. As set forth in the trial court's well-reasoned opinion, the record belies Appellant's argument. First, Appellant texted the victim in attempt to gain entrance to her home. This text would have been unnecessary absent a locked door. Second, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of a cracked doorframe. This circumstantial evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports an inference that Appellant broke into the victim's home as per § 3503(a)(3). We adopt the trial court's April 5, 2019 opinion in support of our rejection of Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence argument.
"A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he: [...] (ii) breaks into any building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii). "Breaks Into" means "To gain entry by force, breaking, intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks, or through an opening not designed for human access." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(3).
Next, Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to present the testimony of the victim's ex-husband regarding the victim's character for truthfulness. We review the trial court's evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Elliot , 80 A.3d 415, 446 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied , 574 U.S. 828 (2014). Appellant's brief simply cites several Rules of Evidence but fails to develop any argument as to why the victim's character for truthfulness was pertinent in this case. We therefore deem Appellant's argument waived for failure to cite pertinent authority and pertinent portions of the record. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b), (c); Commonwealth v. Kane , 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied , 29 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2011). Were we to address this issue on the merits, we would reject it for the reasons explained in the trial court's April 5, 2019 opinion.
In summary, we find no merit to either of Appellant's arguments. We affirm the judgment of sentence based on the trial court's April 5, 2019 opinion, and we direct that a copy of that opinion be filed along with this memorandum.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/13/2020
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