Opinion
13-P-1506
10-08-2014
COMMONWEALTH v. LUCIANO MORALES.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to police before administration of Miranda warnings. We agree with the defendant that it was error to deny his motion and reverse the order of the Superior Court.
The defendant's application for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal was allowed by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court on July 2, 2013, who thereupon transferred the case to this court.
The right of a defendant to be advised of his rights, as prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), applies not only to custodial interrogation but to its "functional equivalent." Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 796-797 (1997). The term "functional equivalent" encompasses "any words or actions on the part of police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 797 (citation omitted). The test is an objective one, based on an evaluation "whether the police statements and conduct would be perceived as interrogation by a reasonable person in the same circumstances." Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 324 (2007) (citation omitted).
In the present case, the defendant was in custody when two experienced agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) introduced themselves to him, and explained that they were investigating the recovery of a firearm stolen from the Camfour Company and wanted to speak to him about it. In response, the defendant stated: "I don't know nothing about it being stolen. I bought that gun from some black guy behind the Getty Mart at Maple and Mill Streets for two hundred bucks and it was in a black bag."
The Commonwealth contends that the statements by the ATF agents that provoked the defendant's response were merely introductory remarks. See Commonwealth v. Mejia, 461 Mass. 384, 391 (2012). However, the statements incorporated reference to specific criminal activity the agents were investigating, in circumstances that clearly conveyed their suspicion of the defendant's involvement in it. Such an implicit accusation naturally invites a defensive response. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rubio, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 506, 513 (1989); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 709-710 (2011). In contrast to the circumstances of the present case, in those cases where our courts have held that interrogatory statements were not the functional equivalent of interrogation, the statements have not included reference to specific criminal activity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Braley, supra at 323-324; Commonwealth v. Mejia, supra.
Because the statements by the ATF agents, though introductory in nature, implicitly accused the defendant of involvement in specific criminal activity the agents were investigating, a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have understood them to warrant a response, and they are fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of interrogation. It was error to deny the defendant's motion to suppress his responsive statement.
The order of the Superior Court denying the defendant's motion to suppress is reversed, and a new order shall enter allowing the motion.
So ordered.
By the Court (Green, Graham & Katzmann, JJ.),
Clerk Entered: October 8, 2014.