Opinion
J-S57023-17 No. 1405 EDA 2017
11-14-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. HOWARD MITCHELL Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Dated April 6, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005241-2004 BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.:
Pro se Appellant Howard Mitchell, appeals from the order dismissing his fourth Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, which he styled as a petition for habeas corpus. We affirm.
Appellant is also known as Mitchell Howard, and the record reflects dispositions under that alias.
We need not state the facts in length. According to the PCRA court:
On April 31, 2004[, Appellant] committed armed robbery at a Radio Shack store in Upper Darby, PA. He entered the store, robbed two employees at gunpoint and fled with, inter alia, the store manager's wallet, over $1,000.00 in cash, and a Cannon Video Camcorder. A radio call went out and plain clothes police officers in the immediate area approached [Appellant], who matched the description of the robber. [Appellant] attempted to flee but he was apprehended. He had a fully loaded handgun, a large sum of cash, the store manager's wallet, a bag containing controlled substances and his own photo identification card and the stolen Cannon Camcorder in his possession. The gun he possessed was reported stolen . . . . This incident gave rise to a
plethora of robbery and theft charges and alleged violations of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic and Uniform Firearms Acts.PCRA Ct. Op., 10/28/14, at 1.
In 2005, Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced as a "third strike" offender pursuant to the Three Strikes Law following his armed robbery of two victims . . . . Thereafter, in 2006, Appellant filed a PCRA petition wherein he successfully contended his sentence had been illegal. The sentencing court vacated Appellant's original mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five (25) years to fifty (50) years' imprisonment and imposed a new sentence of fifteen (15) years to thirty (30) years in prison pursuant to a negotiated plea on February 20, 2007. On February 22, 2007, the sentencing court realized the second strike penalty was applicable to only one of the two robbery counts and vacated its February 20, 2007, sentence. Once again, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea . . . .Commonwealth v. Howard , No. 3522 EDA 2008, at 1-2 (Pa. Super. Nov. 16, 2009). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of fifteen to thirty years' imprisonment. PCRA Ct. Op., 9/30/09, at 3.
Specifically, the court imposed a 10-20 year sentence on one robbery count, a consecutive 5-10 year sentence for the second robbery count, and concurrent sentences of 18-36 months and 12-24 months for two firearms counts. N.T., 2/22/07, at 5-6. --------
Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition in 2008, and the court appointed counsel. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which the PCRA court granted. Appellant appealed pro se, claiming that his first PCRA counsel was ineffective, the 15-30 year sentence was illegal, and the firearm charges merged with the robbery charges for purposes of sentencing. PCRA Ct. Op., 9/30/09, at 24. This Court affirmed, rejecting each contention. Howard , No. 3522 EDA 2008, at 6.
In June of 2014, Appellant, pro se, filed his second PCRA petition, claiming that his sentence was illegal under Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). The PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition as untimely, and this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Howard , No. 2790 EDA 2014, at 3.
On September 28, 2016, the court docketed Appellant's third PCRA petition, which alleged that the PCRA court's denial of his first PCRA petition was not a final order because counsel was ineffective. After issuing a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, the PCRA court dismissed the petition on October 3, 2016. Appellant appealed, but subsequently discontinued his appeal.
On January 27, 2017, the court docketed the petition that currently is before us, which Appellant styled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition claimed that the PCRA court erred by denying Appellant's first PCRA petition, and that his appointed PCRA counsel was ineffective. Appellant also reiterated his claim that his 15-30 year sentence was illegal. The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice which, among other things, construed Appellant's petition as a fourth PCRA petition, and Appellant filed a response in opposition. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition as untimely, and Appellant then filed this appeal. Appellant raises one issue: "Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellant's Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief since his confinement is based on a PCRA proceeding that denied due process?" Appellant's Brief at 3.
The PCRA court construed Appellant's habeas corpus petition as a PCRA petition and then dismissed it because it failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements in the PCRA for the timely filing of a petition. We conclude that the PCRA court's disposition was correct. First, Appellant's petition was properly treated as a petition for relief under the PCRA:
It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 . . . . Unless the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus. Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition. . . . Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.Commonwealth v. Taylor , 65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some citations and footnote omitted). Second, because this was a PCRA petition, the PCRA's time limits apply:
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment is final unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves one of the three exceptions to the time limitations for filing the petition set forth in Section 9545(b)(1) of the statute.4 A PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the claims could have been presented. Asserted exceptions to the time restrictions for the PCRA must be included in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. This Court's standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA is to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.
4 The three exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference of government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
Commonwealth v. Furgess , 149 A.3d 90, 93 & n.4 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and most citations omitted).
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant contends the court erred by relying on first PCRA counsel's "no merit" letter and granting counsel's petition to withdraw. Appellant's Brief at 9. Appellant posits that this treatment violated due process, and thus brings his petition outside the scope of the PCRA. Id. at 10. He makes an unsupported claim that his PCRA counsel provided ineffective representation because counsel engaged in some unspecified fraud. Id. at 11-12.
After careful review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the decision of the Honorable James P. Bradley, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's decision. See PCRA Ct. Op., 5/11/17, at 3-6 (holding that Appellant's claims in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus fall within the scope of the PCRA, and thus his petition should be construed as a PCRA petition; the instant PCRA petition was untimely; and "a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits"). Because the PCRA court did not err, we affirm the order below. The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the PCRA court's decision to any pleadings that reference it.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/14/2017
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