Opinion
J-S68025-17 No. 447 MDA 2017
01-17-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ORLANDO MEJIAS-JIMINEZ, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0008404-2015 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Orlando Mejias-Jiminez, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered on December 2, 2016, in the York County Court of Common Pleas following his conviction of Indecent Assault and Corruption of Minors. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S § 3126(a)(7) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i), respectively.
The court convicted Appellant of the above charges on August 23, 2016, following a bench trial. On December 2, 2016, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of 6 to 23 months' incarceration and a concurrent term of 5 years' probation. On December 12, 2016, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion challenging the weight of the evidence and the Commonwealth's amendment of Appellant's Criminal Information during trial. The court denied Appellant's Motion on February 10, 2017. This timely appeal followed.
The trial court has fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case in its Opinion in Support of Order. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them and we adopt the facts and procedural history as set forth therein. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/4/17, at 1-6.
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it found its verdict of guilty as to the charges of Indecent Assault and Corruption of minors was not against the weight of the evidence presented at trial?Appellant's Brief at 4.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the [I]nformation during trial.
In his first issue, Appellant claims the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence.
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who "is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Commonwealth v. Diggs , 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008). The trial judge may award a new trial only if the fact finder's "verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice." Commonwealth v. Rivera , 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). "Appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Ratushny , 17 A.3d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). Thus, "a trial court's denial of a post-sentence motion 'based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.'" Commonwealth v. Sanders , 42 A.3d 325, 331 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Diggs , 949 A.2d at 880.
Appellant argues that the court erred in finding the testimony of the victim and her mother more credible than that of Appellant and his family members. Appellant's Brief at 12-15. Appellant notes that the record is rife with inconsistent testimony about how often the victim spent the night at Appellant's home; when the incident giving rise to the instant charges occurred; and whether Appellant would have had an opportunity to be alone with the victim. Id. at 12-13, 15. Appellant disputes the court's characterization of the inconsistencies as "insignificant." Id. at 13. Appellant also complains that the court placed too much weight on Appellant's admission that he kissed the victim's ear and neck and that he had "made a mistake." Id at 14. Last, Appellant argues that the trial court should have given more weight to his family members' testimony. Id. at 15.
Here, with respect to the inconsistent testimony about how often the victim stayed overnight at Appellant's home, the trial court explained that this inconsistency was "insignificant as it [was] not central to the criminal episode itself and is explainable by the passage of time and the youthful ages of several of the witnesses." Trial Ct. Op. at 7.
The trial court explained its decision to give little weight to Appellant's family members' testimony that Appellant was never alone with the victim. The court found Appellant's family members not credible noting their motive to testify favorably to Appellant and the improbability that each of those witnesses was in the presence of the victim each time, and for the entire time, the victim was in Appellant's residence. Id. at 7-8. The court also noted that Appellant admitted that he told a police detective that he had had the opportunity to be alone with the victim. Id. at 8.
Last, the court opined that it credited the victim's testimony because "her account of the sexual assault was clear and detailed and consistent with prior accounts." Id. at 8. The victim's testimony was also "corroborated by her report to her mother[.]" Id. The court also found compelling Appellant's apology for his conduct and his admission to "much of the conduct surrounding the assault described by the victim" and concluded that Appellant's acknowledgment that he "made a mistake" supported the victim's testimony. Id.
Our review of the record confirms that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion for Post-Sentence Relief as to Appellant's weight of the evidence claim. Having found no "palpable abuse of discretion," we will not disturb the court's verdicts. Ratushny , supra at 1272.
In his second issue, which Appellant characterizes as challenging the court's decision to permit the Commonwealth to amend the Criminal Information, Appellant is actually raising a Devlin claim. See Appellant's Brief at 15-20. He alleges that the Commonwealth violated his due process rights by failing to present sufficient evidence of the date on which he committed the crimes with which the Commonwealth had charged him.
Commonwealth v. Devlin , 333 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1975). --------
With respect to claims of this sort, this Court explained:
We consider Devlin to be the polestar in our assessment of whether the appellant's due process argument is to give way in favor of the child-victim's right to have her assault brought to justice. In Devlin , our Supreme Court opted for a balancing approach to resolve conflicting interests of the accused vis-a-vis the victim when it came to the specificity required to be proven as to the time-frame of the alleged crime. It wrote:
Commonwealth v. Fanelli , 547 A.2d 1201, 1204 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v . Hutchinson , 556 A.2d 370 (Pa. 1989), quoting Devlin , 333 A.2d at 892 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).Here, as elsewhere, [t]he pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and circumstances of each case. Due process is not reducible to a mathematical formula. Therefore, we cannot enunciate the exact degree of specificity in the proof of the date of a crime which will be required or the amount of latitude which will be acceptable. Certainly the Commonwealth need not always prove a single specific date of the crime. Any leeway permissible would vary with the nature of the crime and the age and condition of the victim balanced against the rights of the accused.
In support of this issue, Appellant asserts that the Information charged him with offenses allegedly committed on January 1, 2013, but that the Commonwealth's evidence indicated that the incident occurred either in the summer of 2012, or the fall of 2013. Appellant argues that the court's decision "hamstrung" him because he had witnesses available to testify that he did not commit the alleged criminal acts on the date alleged in the Criminal Information. Appellant's Brief at 19-20. Thus, Appellant claims that the court erred in denying his Motion for a Directed Verdict.
Contrary to Appellant's averments, the Commonwealth alleged that Appellant committed the crimes charged "on or about January 1, 2013." Criminal Information, 10/27/15, at 1. In addressing Appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict, the trial court noted that it denied the Motion because, "the fall 2012 time period testified to by the minor victim was 'sufficiently close to January 1st of 2013.'" Trial Ct. Op. at 9.
The Honorable Christy H. Fawcett has authored a comprehensive, thorough, and well-reasoned Opinion, supporting this conclusion and ably distinguishing the instant facts from those in Devlin. See id. at 9-12 (concluding that the victim's testimony placed the date of the offense as before June 2013 and that the exact date of the offense was irrelevant for purposes of Appellant's defense). We adopt that portion of the trial court's Opinion as our own and affirm on the basis of that Opinion. The parties are instructed to annex the trial court's May 4, 2017 Opinion to all future filings.
Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/17/2018
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