Commonwealth v. McGhee

26 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Villalobos

    89 Mass. App. Ct. 432 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    The Supreme Judicial Court addressed this issue in three recent cases. See Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 25 N.E.3d 251 (2015) ; Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran, 471 Mass. 179, 27 N.E.3d 1261 (2015) ; Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 Mass. 398, 30 N.E.3d 76 (2015). In McGhee, a juror reported to the court on the second day of trial that one of the jurors had been sleeping the day before during the testimony of two of the three victims in the case.

  2. Commonwealth v. Villalobos

    478 Mass. 1007 (Mass. 2017)   Cited 13 times

    "[A] judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires prompt judicial intervention." Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643–644, 25 N.E.3d 251 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78, 933 N.E.2d 951 (2010). "[I]f a judge receives a complaint or other information suggesting that a juror was asleep or otherwise inattentive, the judge must first determine whether that information is ‘reliable.

  3. Commonwealth v. Ralph R.

    490 Mass. 770 (Mass. 2022)   Cited 8 times
    Noting approval of “the procedure set forth in Tavares in response to a preverdict report of jury bias”

    To protect the juvenile's and the public's right to "decisions made by alert and attentive jurors, ... [a] judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires prompt judicial intervention." Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643-644, 25 N.E.3d 251 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78, 933 N.E.2d 951 (2010). However, "not every complaint regarding juror attentiveness requires a voir dire."

  4. Commonwealth v. Ralph R.

    100 Mass. App. Ct. 150 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021)   Cited 6 times

    "[A] judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires prompt judicial intervention." Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 478 Mass. 1007, 1007, 84 N.E.3d 841 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643-644, 25 N.E.3d 251 (2015). If a judge receives a reliable report of a sleeping or inattentive juror, "he or she ‘must take further steps to determine the appropriate intervention.’ "

  5. Commonwealth v. Ralph R.

    No. SJC-13249 (Mass. Nov. 10, 2022)

    To protect the juvenile's and the public's right to "decisions made by alert and attentive jurors, . . . [a] judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires prompt judicial intervention." Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643-644 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78 (2010).

  6. Commonwealth v. Ngoc Tran

    471 Mass. 179 (Mass. 2015)   Cited 23 times
    Analyzing nonrandom selection of alternate juror as irregular

    G.L. c. 234A, § 74. While it may have been better practice for the judge to conduct a hearing to determine definitively whether the juror had been asleep and to what extent the juror was no longer capable of deliberating, see Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 643–646, 25 N.E.3d 251 (2015), the defendant did not object at trial, and there is no indication that the designation of the sleeping juror as an alternate amounted to a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Conversely, “[i]t is obviously not in the interest of justice to have a juror deliberate who has not heard the evidence or parts of the judge's charge.”

  7. Commonwealth v. Alleyne

    474 Mass. 771 (Mass. 2016)   Cited 30 times
    Finding information to be tentative where judge was alerted that juror "appears to be struggling to remain awake through the entire testimony"

    A defendant's right to a constitutionally fair trial may be impaired by a juror sleeping through a significant portion of the trial. Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 645–646, 25 N.E.3d 251 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Dancy, 75 Mass.App.Ct. 175, 182, 912 N.E.2d 525 (2009). “A judicial observation that a juror is asleep, or a judge's receipt of reliable information to that effect, requires prompt judicial intervention to protect the rights of the defendant and the rights of the public, which for intrinsic and instrumental reasons also has a right to decisions made by alert and attentive jurors.”

  8. Commonwealth v. Sharma

    No. 24-P-417 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 30, 2024)

    Where a judge observes a sleeping juror, or where a judge becomes aware of reliable information indicating that a juror is asleep, the judge is required to act promptly "to protect the rights of the defendant and the rights of the public." Commonwealth v. Dancy, 7 5 Mass.App.Ct. 175, 181 (2009). However, "[J]udges have substantial discretion in this area," Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 644 (2015), and "not every instance of juror inattentiveness calls for a voir dire," Ralph R., 490 Mass. at 778. Indeed, "there may be circumstances where a judge receives reliable information that a juror is sleeping and properly exercises his or her discretion to intervene without conducting a voir dire."

  9. Commonwealth v. Louf

    No. 17-P-1359 (Mass. App. Ct. May. 23, 2019)

    While a judge who receives information about a sleeping or inattentive juror must determine whether the report is reliable, and if so, must address it, "not every complaint regarding juror attentiveness requires a voir dire." Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 644 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 78 (2010). "[T]he judge has discretion regarding the nature of the intervention and the remedies," Dancy, supra, and we will not vacate a subsequent conviction unless the defendant shows the judge's response was "arbitrary or unreasonable."

  10. United States v. Chavez

    29 F.4th 1223 (10th Cir. 2022)   Cited 7 times

    We also agree with the Seventh Circuit—as well as the Fourth Circuit and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which have followed the Seventh Circuit's lead—that when "[a] robber forces [a] bank's customer to withdraw ... money, the customer becomes the unwilling agent of the robber, and the bank is robbed." McCarter , 406 F.3d at 463 ; see alsoUnited States v. Johnson , 915 F.3d 223, 232 (4th Cir. 2019) ("Federal law ... covers robbery by conscription."); Commonwealth v. McGhee , 470 Mass. 638, 25 N.E.3d 251, 255 (2015). It is no different than "if the defendant had planned to have a confederate remove the money from the ATM."